Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

1. INTRODUCTION

This article analyses the concept of military doctrine, the sources and formulation of military doctrine, levels of military doctrine, and the relationship between doctrine, strategy and the principles of war. Some reference to the effect of post-Cold War developments on military doctrine is also made, and the current status of doctrine in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) is discussed in broad terms.

Doctrine, in the general sense of the word, is described as "any explicit set of beliefs that purports to explain reality and usually prescribes goals for political action. A coherent set of doctrines constitutes an ideology". (1) Doctrine can therefore guide (and follow from) both political decision-making and strategic decision-making at all levels, from the national strategy level to the operational and tactical level. In this article the emphasis will fall on military doctrine -- sometimes also called strategic doctrine -- although the latter actually applies to higher levels than the military.

2. THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY DOCTRINE

The term strategy is, in certain usages, still seen as the equivalent of doctrine. Similarly, the concept strategic doctrine is sometimes used interchangeably with military doctrine or defence doctrine. As stated, strategic doctrine is usually associated with a higher level of decision-making than is the case with military doctrine, and is described as consisting of "the major set of consciously adopted political-military assumptions on which specific strategies and manageable elements of defence policy are based" (2) (it would of course at this level also include non-military doctrine).

The current usage of military doctrine refers to "a system of views adopted by a given state as a programme for preparing and waging war, and the rationale of this". (3) In this context, military doctrine should include the concept of future wars (including doctrine, strategy and preparation); the use of military force to prevent war and to wage war; the use of military force in peace-time in support of foreign policy; and the domestic role of the armed forces. Doctrine does not only consist of certain principles or views, but includes drills and procedures, especially at lower levels.

Military doctrines of specific countries are shaped by factors such as national goals and policies; the size of a military force; threat perception; and anticipated ranges of the use of military force. The concept of deterrence substantially changed the concept of military doctrine as related to guidelines for the fighting of wars. Deterrence is, however, in certain views, not part of military doctrine but a political concept. (4)

Military doctrines should also indicate the methods of co-ordination of military and non-military instruments, both in times of war and peace. As far as focus is concerned, military doctrines tend to be externally oriented. Domestic uses of military force tend to be toned down or omitted, especially in Western countries. However, military doctrine serves the purpose of mobilising domestic public opinion in support of foreign and defence policies, and boosting morale, also of the armed forces. There may be discrepancies between the official version of military doctrine and its actual content, mainly for reasons of the requirements of secrecy. Doctrine could also be official or unofficial. At a lower level of military organisation, doctrine could imply a set of beliefs regarding the functions to be performed and rules for performing them, as accepted by a specific service (or lower level) within the armed forces. This can be a self-perceived role, as opposed to roles following from the implementation of governm ent policy. (5)

Doctrine is also defined as "(f)undamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives". (6) Combined doctrine refers to two or more nations in co-ordinated action, while joint doctrine refers to forces of two or more armed services of the same nation in co-ordinated action. The term multi-service doctrine is used in the latter case.

For the United States (US) Army, doctrine is described as capturing the lessons of past wars, reflecting the current nature of war and conflict and anticipating technological and other developments that will ensure victory, also in future. Doctrine should be able to guide specific operations, but should also be adaptable enough to address diverse situations and threats. (7)

3. LEVELS OF DOCTRINE

A distinction is increasingly made between various levels of military (or strategic) doctrine, namely national (grand) doctrine and strategy -- the level at which all military and non-military strategies are co-ordinated according to political objectives -- and lower levels of doctrine and (military) strategy including the level of each armed service. In this context, doctrine ultimately reflects a certain ideology or philosophy. (8)

Military doctrine is sometimes regarded as being situated at a level between the national strategy (doctrine) level and the doctrines of the particular military services. The latter is referred to as tactical doctrine (although not necessarily correctly, because it is in fact operational as well as tactical doctrine). In this sense general military doctrine is described as "a basic guideline for a state's defence policy in a certain period" (9) (for example, massive retaliation). Doctrine may also relate to certain types of weapon systems, for example nuclear doctrine.

Within a specific arm of service, for example the army, doctrine is described as "the general set of rules intended at least to guide, and possibly to control, combat decisions at all unit levels from platoon leader to the generals commanding army corps". (10) It has, however, been observed that although doctrine plays an important role at the highest strategic levels where a country, for example, defines its general war aims or equips itself for possible war, it tends to be less important at the operational level. This is of course a debatable point, as the operational and tactical levels obviously function according to certain guidelines, whether these are called principles or strategies or doctrines. Especially where the terms are used as synonyms, this point becomes even more clear. Justification for the diminishing role of doctrine at lower levels is perhaps to be found in the observation that "(n)o plan survives the first contact with the enemy". (11) It is, however, argued that without doctrine, battle s would disintegrate into anarchy. In this context, doctrine at higher levels is seen as either politically imposed or "developed by the military to please the civilians who control budgets". (12)

Another class of distinction between levels and types of doctrine is made by Drew. He distinguishes between fundamental doctrine, environmental doctrine and organisational doctrine. Fundamental doctrine is the foundation for all other types, being broad and abstract. It defines the nature of war and the purpose of military forces. It tends to be timeless in nature and is to some extent isolated from political philosophy or technological change. (13)

Environmental doctrine is a set of beliefs regarding the employment of military forces within a particular geographical theatre of operations, such as the sea, on land and in the air. It has a more specific focus than fundamental doctrine and is influenced by factors such as technology. (14)

Organisational doctrine relates to basic beliefs regarding the operation of a particular military organisation or "group of closely linked military organisations". It addresses roles and missions, current objectives, force employment, and at times, tactics. It is rather narrow in scope and current in focus. It also forms the bulk of doctrinal publications in the US and is subdivided into doctrine for specific types of forces, conflicts, etc and approximates regulations or standard operating procedures. Tactics and doctrine are thus virtually assimilated at this level. (15)

The US Army Field Manual of 1993 (FM 100-5) links doctrine to the different levels of war as well as operations other than war. The levels of war are described as the strategic level and the tactical level, and the manual is described as providing an "authoritative foundation" for subordinate doctrine, force design, etc. The doctrine set out in the manual is therefore positioned at the level of military doctrine applicable to a specific arm of service, in this case the US Army. This is one level below what is termed "national military strategy" and which is in turn derived from national security strategy. National military strategy is said to provide a number of "strategic principles" to guide the employment of military forces, for example strategic agility, decisive force, and maritime and aerospace superiority. (61) As far as the relationship between army doctrine and joint doctrine is concerned, it is stated that "(a)rmy doctrine stresses unified air, land, sea, and special operations all supported by spac e operations throughout the theatre of war. Army doctrine is compatible with and supports joint doctrine...". (17)

The levels of doctrine and strategy are depicted in Figure 1.

4. THE FORMULATION OF DOCTRINE

The process of formulating doctrine differs in various countries, but certain typical features can be identified. A basis for military doctrine is found in long-range national interests, perceived challenges to national security, and missions of armed forces. These factors, however, have to be reviewed periodically or even radically if circumstances suddenly change. White Papers on Defence may contain radical doctrinal changes. (18)

More concrete and detailed decisions on force posture, normally made on an annual basis, elaborate on general statements regarding military doctrine. These are found in various documents such as the inputs to the budgeting process and the state of military technology and armament production. Rivalry between the armed services, pressure group interests, ideology, tradition, the adversary's military doctrine, and the peculiarities of the specific decision-making process are among the factors affecting the formulation of doctrine. (19)

The promotion of national security is seen as the point of departure for the formulation of military doctrine. The formulation of a national security policy and national security strategy would therefore constitute the framework for doctrine and strategy at lower levels. (20)

5. DOCTRINE, FORCE POSTURE AND STRATEGY

Military doctrine could be seen as the theoretical foundation of force posture (the means by which military policy is carried out). Doctrine therefore provides guidelines for force posture, for example size, organisation and armaments. (21) In the past doctrine was often adapted to existing military organisation and operational capabilities, often resulting in separate doctrines for each service instead of a single national doctrine. Currently, there is a tendency to divide the military according to missions. A second component would involve the determination of a specific force posture for each of the main arms of service. (22)

Force posture includes the ways in which forces are mobilised and deployed, and resources allocated. Different patterns may be identified regarding the relationship between military doctrine and force posture. Military doctrine can periodically be used to rationalise force posture which is seen as primary; developments in military technology may provide a guideline for changing force posture; or doctrine and posture may continuously mutually influence each other. In all the cases, force posture and doctrine may not, during a certain period, correspond. Military doctrine is of course not the only factor influencing force posture. For example, other factors are the issues of political guidance regarding the use of military force and scarcity of resources. (23)

Although strategy and doctrine are often treated as synonyms, and are in fact closely related, they can be analytically separated, especially on higher levels. Nevertheless, Murray and Viotti state that "(m)ilitary strategy or doctrine can be defined as a methodology that describes the environment within which the armed forces must operate and prescribes the methods and circumstances of their employment", (24) thus effectively equating doctrine to strategy.

In contrast to equating doctrine to strategy, Drew argues that doctrine is one of the factors influencing strategy. He provides a basic definition of doctrine, namely that "(m)ilitary doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs". (25) In his view, the principle source of doctrine is experience (although interpretations are also relevant). However, doctrine is constantly evolving as a result of new technology and changed circumstances. The principles of war are again seen as doctrinal beliefs that have been raised to higher levels of abstraction and have become axiomatic. (26)

Doctrine therefore provides a "knowledge base" for strategic decisions. "Without doctrine, strategists would have to make decisions without points of reference or guidance." (27) However, doctrine often does not control strategy. Civilian leaders have for instance contended that traditional military doctrine is incompatible with the concept of limited warfare and, in the case of the Korean and Vietnam wars, civilian decisions about the conduct of war often conflicted with military advice. Economic and political factors may in certain circumstances weigh heavier than doctrine in shaping decisions about strategy. The significance of doctrine for the decision-maker is therefore an important factor in assessing the influence that it will exert. The relationship between doctrine and strategy is, however, a mutual one. Doctrine influences strategy (or should influence strategy) and the results of strategy reinforce existing doctrine or initiate the development of new doctrine. (28)

The US Army Field Manual of 1993 states that doctrine derives from various sources such as history, technology, the nature of threats, inter-service relationships, political decisions, as well as strategy. (29) Strategy is officially defined as "(t)he art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force", (30) while doctrine is viewed as a set of fundamental principles guiding the actions of military forces. (31) A distinction between doctrine and strategy is therefore clearly made.

6. MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THE PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY STRATEGY

Doctrine, when related to the principles of military strategy (or principles of war/warfare), indicates a different concept to that previously discussed as a "system of military views officially adopted in a certain country". In the context of the "principles" of war, doctrine refers to a "body of basic views in military art, shared by military scholars of various countries (or of one country) in a given period". (32) Doctrine in this sense may therefore be seen as either a body of universally applicable principles of war, or as being based on the principles of war. In the latter case, unlike the former, doctrine may change while the principles remain constant.

Another interpretation of doctrine is that it refers to a comprehensive set of principles of war proposed by a specific scholar or scholars, and which could or could not be accepted by a country or specific countries. Douhet, Mahan and others created such doctrines, often relating to a specific aspect of warfare such as the use of air power. (33)

Regarding the link between the "principles" of war and doctrine the US FM 100-5 of 1993, for instance, includes an appendice that provides a list and description of the principles of war. The following is stated regarding these principles:

The nine principles of war provide general guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine. The US Army published its first discussion of the principles of war in a 1921 Army training regulation. The original principles adopted by the Army, although slightly revised, have withstood the test of time. Today's force-projection Army recognizes the following nine principles of war: objective; offensive; mass; economy of force; maneuver; unity of command; security; surprise; simplicity. (34)

Although the link between doctrine and the principles of war are not discussed in detail in the manual, the emphasis on concepts such as flexibility, initiative, clearly-defined objectives, etc, where for instance air-land battle doctrine is concerned, clearly links doctrine to the principles. The US Army Field Manual of 1993 also links doctrine with the principles of war by stating that "(d)octrine describes how these forces think about applying the basic principles of war and operations other than war ...". (35)

The mutual influence of the principles of war (or rather warfare) and doctrine is illustrated by the view that these principles, although guiding doctrine, have themselves changed repeatedly since their introduction in US Army regulations in 1921. "These changes were necessary to ensure that the principles maintained pace with doctrinal changes, changes themselves in part driven by advances in technology, adaptations by adversaries and potential adversaries, better understanding of military theory, and revisions in national strategy". (36)

Although it is stated that the principles of war "form the basis of much current strategic thought and are reflected in the military doctrines of most modern armies", (37) certain principles have been questioned specifically as a result of post-Cold War views on security. At the Second Vienna Seminar on Military Doctrine held in 1991, it was for instance concluded that "offensive postures or doctrines are no longer desirable or fail-safe". (38) It is also stated that improvements in technology alone do not constitute a revolution in military affairs. Profound changes in military doctrine and organisational practice are also required (39)

The relationship between doctrine and the principles of war is depicted in Figure 2.

With reference to the draft of the successor to the 1993 US Field Manual, which similar to the 1993 version leaves the traditional nine principles of war in unaltered form, Glenn states that "(p)erhaps there is a belief within the service that the durability of the principles provides an anchor for Army doctrine". (40) This statement again supports the view that doctrine is at least partially derived from the principles.

The 1993 US Field Manual also contains a set of "principles of operations other than war", including peace support missions, disaster relief and drug interdiction. Principles such as legitimacy and restraint are included, while it is stated that doctrine for war complements that for operations other than war. (41)

7. THE CURRENT STATUS OF DOCTRINE IN THE SANDF: AN OVERVIEW

The South African Defence Review of 1998 states that operational doctrine "consists of the main principles and concepts by which armed forces guide their actions in support of national objectives". (42) It also states that doctrine derives from and should be consistent with defence policy and posture. (43) This reference to the "main principles" is obviously a reference to the principles of war, as previously discussed. The level at which doctrine is positioned is however unclear, as reference is only made to the operational level.

The Defence Review continues to state that SANDF doctrine should inter alia reflect the international prohibition on acts of aggression and a defensive strategic posture. The basis of SANDF doctrine is described as a policy of non-aggression and a commitment to international law regarding the initiation of armed hostilities, excepting the right of selfdefence. Although the strategic posture will be defensive, at operational level offensive capabilities will be required to contain certain offensive actions against South Africa. Deterrence, with specific reference to collective (regional) capabilities, is also specifically referred to. (44) These statements seem to be a mixture of policy, force posture and aspects of general military doctrine, rather than operational doctrine.

The White Paper on Defence of 1996, establishing the concept of the "core force" approach, contains little reference to doctrine and states that "(t)he Defence Review will address in more detail the implications of the core force for the size, doctrine, posture ... of the SANDF". (45)

In the 1994/1995 Annual Report of the SANDF, few references were made to doctrine. The Army, for instance, stated at the time that its doctrine was being updated. The Navy stated that doctrine was primarily formulated at Naval Headquarters and that the doctrine for air sea operations had been formulated and approved. (46) The 1995/1996 Annual SANDF Report stated with regard to the strategic managemeni process (SMP) that"(t)he SANDF conducts a particular SMP to formulate, implement and control the military strategy". (47) No specific reference was made to doctrine. The report continued to state that arms of the service strategies focus more on internal issues and on inputs to the SANDF SMP. (48) Overall, the Defence Secretariat is also involved in the "co-ordination of DoD policy positions on peace support operations DoD policy on regional security initiatives defence posture and doctrine ...". (49)

With regard to the Navy, the 1997 Annual SANDF Report stated that "changes in the operations environment have necessitated the reestablishment of NATO doctrine with respect to the conduct of combined exercises. The SA Navy is increasingly involved in exercises with foreign navies and doctrine for combined operations is a prerequisite for the safe conduct of exercises". (50) Increasingly, emphasis seems to have been placed on the concept of joint and combined doctrine. Subsequently the 1998/1999 Annual SANDE Report stated that from 1 April 1998 responsibility for the conduct of all operations was to be transferred to the Chief of Joint Operations, and that "this change necessitated that all doctrine with respect to naval forces be revised". (51) The 1999/2000 annual SANDF report contained the following regarding the "joint concept of operations":

Conventional. In the event of a conventional military threat against South Africa the broad overall joint Concept of Operations will be as follows:

-- Landward operations. The SANDF will conduct offensive, proactive and reactive landward operations that are directed at stopping and destroying the enemy before it can penetrate significantly into South African territory.

-- Air operations. Enemy air power will be neutralised mainly through offensive counter-air operations assisted by airmobile land operations aimed at destroying the enemy air force on the ground.

-- Maritime operations. Enemy maritime forces will be attacked at range whilst the defence of own and friendly shipping will be enhanced by defensive patrols and escorting.

Non-conventional. The broad non-conventional concepts of operations are as follows:

-- Restoration of law and order. In its peacetime internal roles the SANDF subscribes to the employment of its conventional capabilities in focused high-density military operations in the event of the need to restore law and order.

-- Support to the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order. Support to the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order will be provided by general support tasks and focused rapid reaction operations that are directed against priority crime and the conduct of special operations.

-- Border Control. Border control will be exercised on land, sea and air borders by high technology surveillance supported by rapid reaction forces.

-- General Area Protection. General area protection will be provided by a combination of high density and rapid reaction operations. (52)

It is notable that the offensive is emphasised in the above, despite previous emphasis on the defensive. However, a strategic defensive posture does not seem to exclude offensive tactics.

During August 1998, a doctrinal development section of the Chief of Joint Operations was established to develop, manage, co-ordinate and monitor all joint doctrine for the SANDF. Some aspects of doctrine (rules of engagement) for SANDF participation in international peace support missions were also set out in a White Paper in 1998. (53) Following this, the South African Navy for instance stated that a concerted effort had been initiated in the Navy to develop doctrine for peace support operations. This would lead to a joint South African Development Community (SADC) doctrinal publication on peace support operations. (54)

The increased involvement of the SANDF in "secondary" roles, for example assisting the South African Police Service (SAPS) in combating crime and disaster relief, has also led to certain aspects of doctrine being formulated in this context. (55)

Finally, the development of military doctrine in the SANDF is ultimately derived from national security policy and national security strategy. Following the combined intervention of South Africa and Botswana soldiers in Lesotho during 1998 to prevent an alleged military coup (Operation Boleas), the SANDF stated that the national security policy was not fully defined and that the necessity to perform a military intervention "came as somewhat of a surprise" to the SANDF. (56) Aspects of national security policy do appear in the White Paper on Defence, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, and a Draft National External Security Strategy document circulated in the mid-1990s, but there does not seem to be any definitive co-ordinated formulation in this regard. In the 1998/1999 SANDF Annual Report it is stated that the Directorate Operations Policy of the SANDF "sought to initiate with other government departments the beginnings of a national security policy" (57)

Given the possibility of further military interventions of the Lesotho type, it is obvious that aspects of intervention doctrine will have to be developed in the SANDF and in the SADC. The same would apply as far as the issue of combined doctrine is concerned, should greater security and defence co-operation between member countries materialise in accordance with the objectives of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. In this regard, Glen argues that there should be one set of principles for all military operations although every principle would not apply in equal measure to every activity, and some may not apply to given contingencies at all. (58)

8. CONCLUSION

Although military doctrine differs from country to country, as determined by factors such as history, technology, ideology, terrain, weapon systems and human resources, it is clear that the "principles of war" have served as broad guidelines for the formulation of doctrine in many instances. Likewise, doctrine is one of the factors shaping strategy and force posture. Military establishments in their formulation of military doctrine and strategy are obviously not entirely independent and, depending on the specific situation, national policy and national strategy, serve as points of departure for military doctrine.

In the case of South Africa, it is clear that the new political dispensation following the 1994 elections has affected military organisation, threat perception, military doctrine and military strategy in various ways. However, except for doctrine at the tactical level, military doctrine is obviously still in a state of development. An important issue in this regard, as referred to, is the absence of a co-ordinated national security policy and strategy which could serve as a point of departure for military doctrine.

(*.) Updated version of an article initially published in the Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXII. No 1, June 2000.

REFERENCES

(1.) Holsti, K J, International Politics: A framework for analysis. Seventh edition, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1995, p 275.

(2.) Louw, M H H (ed), National Security: A modern approach, ISSUP, University of Pretoria, 1978, p 25.

(3.) Lider, J, Military Theory: Concept, structure, problems, Gower, England, 1983, pp 354-355.

(4.) Ibid, pp 355-356.

(5.) Ibid. pp 226 and pp 356-357.

(6.) USA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Official Dictionary of Military Terms, Hemisphere Publishing Co, 1988, pp 76, 118, 196 and 237.

(7.) USA, Headquarters Department of the Army, FM 100-5, June 1993, Preface and Chapter 1, p1.

(8.) Lider, J, op cit. pp 306-307.

(9.) Ibid. p 309; and Beaufre, A, An Introduction to Strategy, Faber and Faber, London, p 31.

(10.) Robertson, D, A Dictionary of Modern Defence and Strategy, Europa Publications Ltd, London, 1987, p 105.

(11.) lbid, p 106.

(12.) Ibid, pp 105-106.

(13.) Drew, D M and D M Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems, Air University Press, Alabama, 1988, p 168.

(14.) Ibid. p 169.

(15.) Ibid, pp 169 and 170.

(16.) USA FM 100-5, 1993, op cit, Preface, and Chapter 1, pp 3-4.

(17.) Ibid, Chapter 4, p1.

(18.) Dutton, J R, "The Military Aspects of National Security", in Louw, M H H, op cit, p 110; and Lider, J, op cit, pp 310-311.

(19.) Dutton, J R, op cit, p 110; and Lider, J, op cit, p 311-313.

(20.) Dutton, J R, op cit, p 110.

(21.) Lider, J, op cit, p 358.

(22.) Ibid, pp 358-359

(23.) Louw, M H H, op cit. p 26; and Lider, J, op cit, pp 359-360.

(24.) Murray, J M and P R Viotti, The Defence Policies of Nations, John Hopkins, Baltimore, 1982, p 482.

(25.) Drew, D M and D M Snow, op cit, p 163.

(26.) Ibid, p 164.

(27.) Ibid, p 172.

(28.) Ibid, pp 172-174.

(29.) USA, FM 100-5, 1993, op cit, Preface.

(30.) Official Dictionary of Military Terms, op cit, p 346.

(31.) lbid, p 118.

(32.) Lider, J, op cit, p 225.

(33.) Ibid.

(34.) USA, FM 100-5, op cit. Chapter 26, pp 1-3.

(35.) Ibid, Chapter 1, p 1.

(36.) Glen, R W "No more principles of war?", Parameters, Vol XXVIII, No 1, Spring 1998, p 53.

(37.) Malik, J M, "The evolution of strategic thought", in Snyder, C A, Contemporary Security and Strategy, Macmillan, London, 1999, p 47.

(38.) SIPRI Yearbook 1992 World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, 1992, p 504.

(39.) Latham, A, "Re-imagining warfare", in Snyder, C A, op cit. p 227.

(40.) Glen, R W, op cit, p 49.

(41.) USA, FM 100-5, op cit. Chapter 13.

(42.) RSA, South African, Defence Review, 1998, p 8.

(43.) Ibid.

(44.) Ibid, pp 8-9.

(45.) RSA, White Paper on Defence, 1996, pp 17-18.

(46.) RSA, National Defence Force, Annual Report 1994/95, pp 66 and 96.

(47.) RSA, Department of Defence, Annual Report 1995/96, p 20.

(48.) lbid, p 21.

(49.) Ibid. p 13.

(50.) RSA, Department of Defence, Annual Report 1997, part 5, p 7.

(51.) RSA, Department of Defence, Annual Report 1998/99, Part VI, p 8.

(52.) RSA, Department of Defence, Annual Report 1999/2000, "Strategic Overview", p 2.

(53.) RSA, White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions, 1998.

(54.) Annual Report 1998/99, op cit, Part VI, p 8.

(55.) Bestbier, A, "The South African National Defence Force Crime Combating: Achievements and Prospects", ISSUP Bulletin, 2/2000.

(56.) SADC Combined Task Force, BOLEAS, 2 November 1998.

(57.) Annual Report 1998/99, op cit. Part II, p 6.

(58.) Glen, R W, op cit, pp 56-57.