Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

Lessons from African wars: implications for the SANDF.(South African National Defence Force)

Publication: Strategic Review for Southern Africa

Publication Date: 01-MAY-04

At the start of the 21st century Africa is still unstable and rent by wars leading to famine, brutality, disease and failing economies. Major Western and many African nations, the latter verbalised by South Africa, seek a drastic turnaround in these appalling conditions. One of the ways to achieve change is to deploy military forces to enforce peace agreements reached on political platforms. The deploying forces obviously study the likely operational areas as best they can, doing physical reconnaissance as required. However, detailed military studies and reports are hard to come by regarding the real military aspects of African wars.

1. INTRODUCTION

Few studies of wars in Africa have been done. Firstly because the battle space is extremely disorganised and dangerous for journalists and military observers, and secondly because the wars are considered to be pre-modern conflicts. Facilities to write, store and send reports are poor, no side in the conflicts can ensure the reasonable safety of observers and for modern military organisations there is often little or nothing to learn from groups involved in what are mainly ethnic conflicts fought with mostly out-of-date weapons.

For a defence force such as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the militaries of Nigeria and Egypt it is, however, essential to note what can be learned from Africa's many conflicts. They are being asked, and consider it their duty, to help restore peace in various parts of Africa because they are African, and because Western countries are convinced that African armies for various reasons should supply the peacekeeping and peace enforcement forces for Africa. Against this background, this article attempts to draw lessons from military research done on African conflicts.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AFRICAN WARS

Measured by modern standards of warfare, most of Africa's conflicts in the post-colonial era have been in violation of the laws of war, often fought by ragged bands who operate as gangs rather than armies. Robert Kaplan, an American journalist, speaks of "reprimitivized man" and the re-emergence of primitive warrior societies. (1) In July 1993, 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were hacked to death by Somali women and, in September of the same year, Somali militia downed a United States (US) helicopter, killing the pilots, after which they dragged the bodies through the streets of the capital for all the world to see. (2)

A further characteristic of African wars which has been given wide media coverage is the extensive use of child soldiers. Much has been written to describe the evils of this practice and how it disadvantages the children involved. It also leads to a proliferation of violence and greater levels of atrocity. Unfortunately child soldiers have become a symbol of many modern African conflicts, and their presence serves as a tragic introduction to the characteristics of African wars.

2.1 Classification of wars in Africa

To classify all types of war can become extremely complicated and eventually causes more confusion than clarity. Wars could be categorised as conventional inter-state, or limited conventional inter-state, intra-state, low intensity, guerrilla, revolutionary and a host of other descriptions. For the purposes of this analysis it will be simplified to classify African wars as conventional or semi-conventional as one category, and unconventional as the other. The latter, most of which during the Cold War had a communist revolutionary character, are now best described as intra-state, political-ethnic conflicts.

Strictly speaking, conventional wars should at least involve belligerents who have an overall military strategy, an operational strategy and tactics. The last two aspects are strongly influenced by the military doctrine used to train and prepare the forces involved. On this basis the wars which could truly be classified as conventional since 1945 would be the Korean War, the Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan wars, the Iraq-Iran War and the two Gulf wars of 1991 and 2003. The Falkland War of 1982 could possibly also be included.

Studies on conventional wars hardly mention African wars. Only the Chad-Libya War and the Ethiopian wars seem to be classified as conventional wars. Interest in them has been limited for two reasons. Firstly, they were hardly advanced in modern terms and secondly, reporters and academics interested in them have limited access to the battlefields and to battle records. The little information available is skewed. Some information is available at strategic levels, but at operational and tactical levels it is more scarce, Unit histories, diaries or memoirs, to the extent that they do exist, are not readily available for scholars to study. (3)

Wars in Sierra Leone and Somalia have been categorised as 'criminal insurgencies'. Similar to some South American wars, namely those in Colombia and Peru, the 'rebellions' had no clear political aims or known spokespersons with the goal of gaining political power. The 'strategy' of the insurgents was to spread terror amongst the population so denying the government the ability to govern. The rebel gangs were thus able to rule their own territories to their own physical and economic advantage, Unfortunately government forces have been known to act as atrociously as the rebels in their efforts to suppress the insurgents' lawlessness. (4) The resultant violence and human rights abuses have often received world-wide media coverage.

The majority of African wars, which are thus best described as unconventional, seem to have made insurgency or revolutionary war doctrine irrelevant, at least for the present. They can best be described as intra-state 'ethno-political' and/or criminal conflicts. Unfortunately they tend to be very prolonged and come to no definite resolutions.

2.2 The range of weapons employed in African conflicts

Nations which provide peace support forces must be aware of the fact that relatively modern aircraft and armoured vehicles are being used to wage some African wars. This has become the trend since African states such as Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Uganda and Rwanda, to name but a few, have involved themselves in wars and armed conflict beyond their borders. These foreign interventions have also involved financing, the supply of arms from external sources and the use of mercenaries. (5)

An example of this type of escalation was the involvement of Zimbabwe in the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). To help President Kabila's government overcome a rebellion of domestic dissidents aided by Uganda and Rwanda, Zimbabwe employed 12 000 troops supported by tanks, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. As payment, Zimbabwean officials were given lucrative business contracts. (6)

Although small arms still cause the majority of the casualties, many African countries are obtaining aircraft and artillery systems which improve their capabilities to operate across their borders. Some of the planes are new such as the MiG-29s and SU-27s which were used in the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The older models such as the MiG-21s and MiG-23s are updated with improved avionics, engines and armaments. About 12 African militaries use the Russian M124 Hind attack helicopter. The T-55 tank is used extensively throughout much of Africa. (7)

Lack of finances may not preclude developing states from acquiring some revolution in military affairs (RMA) technologies, such as advanced battlefield systems and covert network surveillance software. Since the cost of electronic chips is decreasing, advanced systems will be more available and affordable. Obtaining such technologies can be revolutionary, even if African militaries are not able to integrate the systems properly by developing new doctrines and organisations. (8)

2.3 Deductions from the characteristics of war in Africa

With the RMA developments in mind the SANDF must ensure that it obtains the technology needed to gain the information upper-hand, and by doing proper training ensure that it is able to out-manoeuvre any possible opponents in the Sub-Saharan region. (9)

Soldiers in armies of responsible democratic states sent on peace support missions, must be prepared and trained to face irregular forces and/or gangs employing children as soldiers. (10) In fact they should be prepared for all the forms of extreme violence they may encounter, particularly because they may not be able to prevent or end it. Experts to facilitate the reversal of post-traumatic stress must certainly accompany units.

From the above it can be deduced that the SANDF in its role as a peacekeeping and peace enforcement force supplier, needs to be trained in the use of modern communications and weaponry. The deployment of lightly armed troops untrained in the use of conventional weaponry could be very risky indeed. They would only be able to operate in conditions where all belligerents truly seek peace. In Africa this is seldom the case. If peace enforcement is not approved, then extraction must be possible very rapidly.

3. CONVENTIONAL AFRICAN WARS

The Ethiopian wars against Somalia in 1977-1978 and against Eritrea in 1987-1988 and 1999-2000, as well as the wars between Chad and Libya, which peaked in 1988, can be classified as conventional conflicts. The wars in Angola during the South African and Cuban involvement, and also in the later phases, are deemed semi-conventional by many observers, but will not be discussed here. The Cuban-South African phase of the war has been described in detail in a number of publications and is thus well-known among students of military affairs.

In spite of the modern equipment available in the Third World, some conventional wars have the stalemate characteristics of the First World War. This is even true of the non-African Iran-Iraq War where it could be expected that their militaries were advanced enough to use air and ground forces in a mobile role. The fact is that neither side was capable of combined arms actions blending armour, infantry, artillery, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. They could only do it when operating from static defences or in the initial assault phases of an offensive. The result was a war of attrition which carried on for eight years. Some African conventional operations had exactly the same characteristics. The main factor would thus seem to be that the Arab and African armies are not able to use modern technology to its best capability. (11)

Procurement of sophisticated equipment does not always take into account Africa's relatively low educational and technical standards. The lack of technical skills in most African armies owing to relatively low levels of education, and inexperience due to the rapid recruitment of soldiers and sometimes the rapid expansion of the officer corps, make them incapable of employing sophisticated armaments correctly. (12)

The characteristic or tendency of Third World wars to end in stalemate seems to be true of conflicts where both sides are equipped with modern weapons in about the same numbers. The Chad-Libyan War of 1987 and the conventional final phase of the Eritrean struggle for independence during 1987-1988, however, had the weaker sides, namely Chad and Eritrea, employing manoeuvre and initiative to defeat an enemy superior in weaponry and numbers. The conclusion could be made that the losers, namely the Libyans and the Ethiopians, were incapable of employing their weapons effectively. Poor command and leadership with weak tactical knowledge and application, were sure to have been the overriding factors leading to defeat.

As mentioned above, conventional wars should have an overall military strategy, an operational strategy and tactics. These levels of warfare will be described briefly in regard to those wars which are regarded as conventional African wars.

3.1 Ethiopian-Somalian War, 1977-1978

(a) Overall military strategy

Initially Ethiopia's military strategy aimed at keeping the Ethiopian state together, while fending off its neighbour Somalia, which had ethnic ties with rebellious elements in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia itself. Somalia's strategy was to make war on Ethiopia to gain the Ogaden province, a territory which was populated by Somali people The Somalians assumed wrongly that Ethiopia was already so busy with the Eritrean threat to secede, that it would be incapable of effective opposition to Somalian invasion. (13)

(b) Operational strategy

Both armies were relatively primitive and any outside assistance would have advantaged whichever side received it considerably. Operations were largely confined to war on the ground. In spite of the fact that they had modern jet combat aircraft to begin with, both sides lost these assets early in the war. The Somali operational strategy consisted of attacking and overrunning small Ethiopian garrisons in the Ogaden Desert, and at the same time launching a concentrated advance on a narrow front to capture the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa. Whereas the start of the advance allowed space for manoeuvre on the part of the Somali army, the axis of advance later passed through rugged mountains which precluded flanking movement.

To avoid a battlefield defeat or attrition of its forces, Ethiopia traded space for time in a retrograde manoeuvre. The Ethiopian forces were later strengthened by Soviet advisors, Cuban proxy troops and additional armament and then proceeded to counter-attack. They carried out a counter-penetration on the same route originally used by the Somalis. The difference was that the Ethiopians could make use of heavy armour and Soviet attack aircraft. An important aspect of the advance was that the Soviet-Cuban allies also gave them the means to carry out vertical envelopments, by flying 70 tanks by helicopter over mountains into the enemy's rear. (14)

(c) Tactics

The first phase of the war, namely the Somali offensive, was characterised by extensive use of mortars by both sides in the mountainous areas. They employed about 30 000 troops each, fought mainly on the ground and had few aircraft to use. In the second phase the Cuban surrogate forces and Soviet military specialists, with air power and Cuban pilots to fly the planes, were a major factor. The Somalis retreated from firm base to firm base using fortified bunkers, but the tactical surprise made possible by using helicopters to ferry tanks into their rear, caused the Somali defences to collapse. The Ethiopians were also able to launch up to 40 aircraft sorties a day and to employ tanks and artillery, which outgunned the retreating Somalis. The force and weapons superiority enjoyed by the Ethiopians led to the final withdrawal of the Somalis from Ethiopian territory. (15)

3.2 Ethiopian-Eritrean Wars, 1987-1988 and 1999-2000

(a) Overall military strategy

Similar to its conflict with Somalia, Ethiopia's military strategy was aimed at preventing Eritrean secession and therefore maintaining the unity of the Ethiopian state. The Eritrean overall strategy was simply to gain independence from Ethiopia by following a revolutionary warfare strategy ending in the classical conventional phase. At the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, after Eritrea had won its war of independence in 1987-1988, the Ethiopian strategy had to do with border disputes between Ethiopia and Eritrea. (16)

(b) Conventional phase of the War of Independence, 1987-1998

During the concluding phase of the Eritrean war for independence in 1987-1988, the Ethiopian military' used modern weaponry and tactical airpower against the Eritrean rebels. In spite of the weapon superiority and the superiority in numbers on the side of the Ethiopian Mengistu regime, the rebels ultimately won the war using a conventional offensive as laid down in Marxist revolutionary warfare doctrine.

In December 1987 the Eritreans incapacitated about 18 000 Ethiopian soldiers. In 1988 the Eritreans had about 50 000 troops plus 15 000 Tigrean rebels to employ against 120 000 Ethiopians. The Eritreans had to rely largely on capturing Ethiopian equipment. This they accomplished so successfully, that they succeeded in carrying out an advance towards the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, using captured T-54 and T-62 tanks and B-24 mobile rocket launchers (MRLs) taken in a battle at Afabet. The final result of this offensive was an Eritrean victory against a demoralised government army. (17)

Victory meant Eritrean independence agreed upon by both sides as late as May 1993, only after the Marxist government in Ethiopia had been replaced by a new government in 1991. The delay was caused by the presence of Cuban troops stationed in Ethiopia from 1977 to 1989. The cut-back in aid from the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Cubans led to the fall of Mengistu who was exiled to Zimbabwe. The new Ethiopian government then recognised the provisional government which ruled Eritrea. (18)

(c) Inter-state War, 1999-2000

Fighting in the form of border skirmishes, artillery duels and bombing raids occurred in 1998 between the newly independent Eritrea and Ethiopia. This led to the war of 1999-2000 which was fought largely on a central front south of the Eritrean capital, Asmara. Operations were also conducted in the south-west corner of Eritrea in a semi-mountainous region.

The war consisted mainly of massive First World War-style offensives by the Ethiopians against deliberate defensive Eritrean positions. The Ethiopians had about 350 000 troops to employ against about 250 000 Eritreans. They also had some armour and tactical airpower, namely ex-Soviet MiG 29s, which they employed offensively.

The Ethiopian and Eritrean operational strategies and tactics were much like the First World War and the Iran-Iraq War of 1988. The result was a stalemate and war of attrition which lasted much longer than a war of movement would have done. The war ended when the Ethiopians broke through the Eritrean defences, took two Eritrean towns and then lost momentum. Ethiopia did not pursue the Eritrean forces far beyond the contested borders. (19)

3.3 The war between Chad and Libya, 1987-1988

The war between Chad and Libya developed out of a Chadian civil war in which Libya had become involved. Libya supplied Soviet TU-22 bombers and MiG-21s in support of a rebel faction. France intervened by supporting the opposition with 700 French marines armed with anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. The result was an agreement which saw the French withdrawing in 1984 and which assumed that the Libyans would do likewise. The Libyans broke the terms of the agreement by keeping 6 000 troops in northern Chad. This caused the previously warring Chadian antagonists to side against Libya. The war then took on the characteristics of a conventional inter-state war in 1987-1988. (20)

Combat involved about 12 000 Libyan troops against 10 000 Chadians. A major battle was fought at Faya Largeau, where 2 000 Chadian troops defeated a 4 000-man mechanised Libyan force supported by Soviet supplied aircraft. Chad captured the main Libyan air base which was defended by 5 000 Libyans and captured a great number of the defenders. The Chadian force used anti-tank missiles and machine guns. With their forces mounted on pickup trucks they launched mobile attacks using speed and flanking tactics. Without the use of artillery or mortars they defeated the Libyan armoured columns consisting of T-55 tanks and armoured personnel carriers. The major Chadian victory was due to superior tactics and morale and the clever use of sandstorms. (21)

Reportedly there were actions in which the Libyan troops never fired a single shot. In a battle at Wadi Doum, once the Chadians had breached the Libyan defences, the Libyans attempted mass escape and made no attempt to counter-attack or continue fighting,zz)

3.4 Deductions from African conventional and semi-conventional conflicts

It is of some importance to deduce why the weaker forces often won and to use these lessons for the improvement of military standards. In the case of Libya and Ethiopia both states had personal rule under a virtual dictatorship. This invariably leads to the military being politicised and de-professionalised. The outcome is usually that the forces are commanded by incompetent officers, that military proficiency is poor and morale is at a very low ebb. In contrast, the Chadian and Eritrean forces clearly had a high morale and good leadership with initiative at the lowest levels.

An important deduction which can be made from the African experience is that the side that has an effective air force available, has an advantage out of all proportion to the number of aircraft in use. It is essential to have highly trained pilots and air crew capable of flying and servicing aircraft in African conditions. Obviously an efficient logistic system must also be in place to maintain both fighter and transport aircraft. Preferably these assets should be part of own forces involved in the war, and not surrogate or hired personnel.

Sub-Saharan militaries have major problems in the field of logistics. The technical ability to use and maintain equipment is limited and since most countries are extremely poor, little financial provision can be made to carry out the logistical functions. (23) The ability to sustain intensive operations is rare, and thus a fairly effective logistic military capability in a conflict can be decisive in the outcome of operations.

The African conventional experience indicates that the SANDF needs to be a technologically advanced force, with good cohesion particularly at regimental level in the army. A suitable well-practised operational doctrine for African conditions, with sound leadership at all levels and maximum low level tactical initiative, pays dividends in Africa. The army, air force and navy need to exercise joint operations regularly, and ground and air forces, in particular, must be synchronised for effective operations.

4. UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL-ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

The collapse of the former Soviet Union and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact saw the end of the supply of masses of armament to insurgencies, and also ended the period where communism had its ideological appeal. This was especially so in Southern Africa where most insurgents advocated communism/socialism as the political and economic philosophy upon which their doctrine was based.

4.1 Reasons for the outbreak of unconventional conflicts

Since 1990 economic opportunities and not ideology attract insurgents to join armed factions. Economic gains motivate the leaders and basic subsistence sustains the rank and file in many poverty-stricken African countries. A combination of poverty, ethnicity and the availability of weaponry often encourages large numbers of factions to enter a conflict. (24)

Financially strong sources such as oil or diamonds can feed wars, as was the case in Angola. It was reported that money earned from the sale of diamonds made the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) "a far more ferocious military organization than it had been while receiving support from either the CIA or the South African government". (25)

Paramilitaries often have little discipline, know little about the internationally accepted rules of war and sometimes have to live off the land. Rwandan factions known as the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi were described as a "lumpenproletariat of street boys, rag pickers, car washers and homeless unemployed". For them the genocide which occurred in Rwanda was to their advantage. (26) In other words the economy of armed chaos was better for them than no economy at all. The catastrophe of modern Africa is that these rather typical scenarios lead to wide-scale pillaging and human rights abuses. (27)

In Africa sub-national ethnicity, often referred to as tribalism or clan loyalty, is seen by most people as their social and political identity. Opportunistic political leaders use these deeply felt loyalties to their own ends. (28) The "collapse of the state in Somalia, virtual implosion of the state in Liberia, horrific genocide in Rwanda, endemic conflict in Burundi, a seemingly never-ending civil war in Sudan, and the failure of either democratic or military regimes in Nigeria all appear to point to a massive failure to cope with ethnicity". (29)

Internal or intra-state conflicts became the norm in Africa during the Cold War and this tendency has continued to be the pattern. However, in the last decade these conflicts began to present a serious threat to regional and national security, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. Neighbouring states have become involved in conflicts for a number of reasons and when ethnic links transcend national boundaries, the destabilisation becomes more complex and dangerous. (30)

Other than economics and ethnicity, another factor leading to conflict in Africa is the fact that the former Soviet Union, the US and the People's Republic of China (PRC) supplied so much weaponry to Africa's domestic and regional conflicts. Many states had collected large arsenals before 1989. Angola evidently spent billions of oil dollars on weapons. In 1987 the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) is reported to have spent US$2,7 billion on arms at reduced prices. Somalia, a poverty-stricken state, spent US$1 billion on arms between 1975 and 1985. It is estimated that Mogadishu, a city of one million people, has 500 000 weapons awash in it. This means that there is one gun available between every two people. (31)

Although the trade in weapons has changed since the Cold War when it consisted largely of the inter-state transfers of jet fighters, tanks, transport planes, armoured personnel carriers and other capital goods, it continues as commercial trade in small arms. These arms are often acquired by factions within states. For example, former East bloc countries such as Bulgaria sell weapons to factions involved in conflicts, with no political preconditions attached. (32)

Examples of some of the major African wars in which heavy armament has been used, but which have largely unconventional characteristics, are the war in the DRC, the long struggle in the Sudan and the Angolan civil war. It would seem that the latter is over, although the return of the population to civilian normality is happening very slowly indeed. Should it drag on too long, unrest may be the result.

4.2 The war in the Sudan

The conflict in the Sudan consists basically of an insurgency on the part of the non-Islamic southern section of the country, against an Islamic-based central government in Khartoum. The government has control over the main towns in the south while the rebels control the countryside.

The war has a decidedly ethnic character involving an Arabic north against a black African south reinforced by an Islamic-Christian religious divide. Similar to some other ethnic conflicts the casualty rate has been one of the highest in modern wars. It is estimated that more than one million military and civilian deaths have resulted from fighting, massacres and starvation.

The government has used about 60 000 troops to curtail anything from 12 000 to 40 000 rebels. The weaponry has escalated to the point where even the southern rebel forces were able to employ heavy artillery and tanks as early as October 1995, thereby threatening the towns. By 1997 the south had the support of Ethiopian tanks and artillery. The south has had support from both Ethiopia and Uganda in the form of weaponry and sanctuary but without direct involvement. (33)

The central government communicates that it is prepared to satisfy the south's aspirations and that it is making all the effort needed to bring an end to the conflict. However, long-standing hostilities of an ethnic nature have a tendency to smoulder, erupt and smoulder again almost indefinitely. It is unlikely that South Africa will get involved in a conflict so far north involving Arabic Africa. That is fortunate since it is far from South Africa and ethnic conflicts which have escalated to the level of semi-conventional battles with tanks and artillery, will require more force to end them than South Africa could afford to send.

From a political point of view, involvement on the part of South Africa would be contentious. The reason being, that the war is seen by influential observers to be a jihad pursued by a fundamentalist military government in the Muslim Arab north against the black African, mostly non-Muslim south. The worst aspect is that the conflict is now as much about oil and land as it is about religion. (34) The north does not want to lose the revenues procured from these natural resources. Finding a moral reason to support peace in favour of the state would be difficult.

4.3 The ongoing conflicts in the DRC

The DRC, previously known as Zaire, has been at war for some time. It can best be described as a "military free-for-all" which "has formed the geographic centre of an interlocked series of conflicts and instability stretching from Chad and Sudan in the north to Angola and Zimbabwe in the South". It has even been described by Susan Price, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, as Africa's "first world war". (35)

As recently as 21 May 2003, a United Nations (UN) spokesperson, Hamadoun Toure, reported on the Cable News Network (CNN) that violence in the DRC had caused 230 deaths over the last few days and that 200 families were in need of food aid. On the same day the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) reported that the International Human Rights Organisation had requested that the UN should send a rapid reaction force to the DRC to put an end to the violence. The end is evidently not in sight yet.

In 1997 the regime of President Mobutu was overthrown. The insurgent Zairian forces were helped by Tutsi forces from Rwanda to launch a lengthy offensive operation virtually throughout the country, using mechanised infantry extensively. Operations thus had some conventional characteristics.

In 1998 the ongoing conflict entered into its second phase. Laurent Kabila, the victor in the previous campaign against the Mobutu presidency was attacked by his former allies, the Rwandan Tutsis and Uganda. Zimbabwe and Angola supported Kabila with tanks and aircraft and direct deployment of Zimbabwean and MPLA forces. They also helped by ferrying troops between combat areas using transport aircraft. In spite of the aid, the anti-government forces managed to take over a great deal of the eastern and south-western areas of the country. They also attacked the major cities Kinshasa and Kisangani but were repulsed. (36)

Since then numerous attempts have been made to bring peace to the region with the current president, Joseph Kabila, playing an important role in negotiations. It would seem that the DRC which is rich in natural resources was being exploited extensively by its neighbours and they are loath to stop the lucrative conditions caused by the chaos of war.

4.4 Deductions from the low intensity wars in Africa and inferences from outside attempts to bring peace

South Africans should be under no illusion. The political struggle leading to the new post-1994 South Africa, although a 'liberation struggle', was not an African war as described at the outset. The South African white minority government and the African National Congress' (ANC) Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) did not inflict massive suffering upon innocents, and where civilians were attacked, the perpetrators were, and still are, criticised soundly for lack of control and moral standards. Even the ANC-Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) conflicts in Katlehong, Tokoza and Vosloorus (Katorus) and KwaZulu-Natal, were although catastrophic by South African standards, relatively controlled. South Africa was also never a quasi-state, considering that the most violent African wars have taken place in quasi-states, sometimes referred to as failed states.

Quasi-states are incapable of governing their peoples and territories effectively. They are also incapable of defending themselves against external threats and they are domestically weak and unstable. They only exist because they have international recognition. (37) The lack of effective control and rampant poverty allows rebels to direct widespread public disillusionment and anger at self-serving unaccountable rulers. The rebels often press-gang child soldiers into their forces. They are usually able to purchase weapons and live off the population. Outside forces have very little influence or control over them. They frequently break up into splinter groups making it very difficult to negotiate with them. Their main characteristic is their lack of clear military objectives, consequently there are no coherent strategies or tactics apparent in these forces. (38) They increasingly use urban warfare to achieve their aims which makes governing ever more difficult. When the nominal rulers lose control of urban as well as rural areas, chaos is virtually complete.

The US experience in Somalia, a typical collapsed state, in 1993 should be a lesson for all good intentioned nations including South Africa. The US forces were sent on a humanitarian mission. They were under the impression that they were going to do relief work to assist the population. They appreciated that the cause of violence in the country was a clan system and thought that by arresting the clan leaders they could stop the fighting. However, there were dozens of family members ready to take the place of the warlike leaders removed.

The US simply could not understand a society in which the people did not really desire peace. They wanted power for their own clans, and were not prepared to share it with other clans in order to achieve peace. (39) On behalf of leaders who were rich, powerful and ruthless enough, the comment was made by a Somali businessman in 1997 that "anarchy is good for business". (40)

If there are any high ideals motivating current African conflicts they are hard to find. In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) conducted a military campaign aptly named 'No Living Thing' in which it used its recruits to amputate the limbs of about 30 000 civilians, raped women and press-ganged child soldiers. The Ugandan Lords' Resistance Army (LRA) is reputed to be every bit as violent. In Liberia factions committed grievous human rights violations which evidently included cannibalism. (41)

To bring peace to a country such as Burundi, which is an ethnically mixed state, would require a lot of sustained manpower on the ground in order to protect groups of civilians against armed attack by other groups. Employing overwhelming conventional force for a short time will not bring peace. (42) It would be useful if the writers of South African doctrine could spell out the implications of long term, long-lasting deployments. The politicians should be made aware of them.

5. PROFICIENCY OF AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT FORCES

According to most reports the SANDF's peacekeeping and protection forces in Africa are performing well. The media reports of instances of ill-discipline are fewer, and are now accepted as the problems of a force in transition. The numbers of troops involved have been low, consisting of specialist task groups in the DRC and sub-units on peacekeeping and protection duties. In 2002 reports of deployments of battalion strength were made in the media and on 22 May 2003 a newspaper article stated that a force of about 3 000 troops was to be deployed in Burundi by the African Union (AU) consisting of South African, Mozambican and Ethiopian contingents. (43) The UN subsequently gave its authority for the deployment to take place.

On 31 May 2003, 1 300 South African troops arrived in the DRC. They were deployed in order to perform tasks for the UN which consisted of the demobilisation and repatriation of rebel groups to Rwanda. (44) CNN broadcast detailed discussions on the UN deployments in the DRC on 1 June 2003. It was explained that the UN force was to be led by a French command group who would deploy their own troops as well. France had agreed to perform the task on behalf of the UN but had insisted that forces from other countries should accompany its own troops to make it a truly UN contingent. It was emphasised that since the DRC was extremely volatile the UN force should have an executable extraction plan in place.

It should be noted that France, a Western country, has agreed to deploy soldiers in Africa. For some time observers felt that although the West had involved itself in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, they would be loath to deploy in Africa. The blood and treasure of First World nations would not be spent there easily. In the mid-1990s after the Somalia experience, the US government concluded that conflicts in Africa would continue for a long time and that suffering in Africa could marshal public sympathy. This sympathy could lead to ill-conceived military interventions, which had to be avoided and that Africa had the prime responsibility for its own security. The US policy further exhorted that deploying African multi-national forces offered advantages which included acceptance, local knowledge and commitment. However, it warned that the force of the Economic Community of West African States, called the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which had been deployed in Liberia for peace enforcement purposes, had not been an unqualified success. This showed the dangers of inserting ad hoc and largely unprofessional African forces into combat.

It was further argued that the improvement of African military professionalism would empower African intervention forces to maintain African peace and security. It would lessen pressure on the West to supply forces and professional militaries would decrease the incidence of military coups and help newly democratising states to move through transition with the required stability. (45)

A 1997 report commissioned by the US Defence Department stated that only seven out of 46 sub-Saharan states were "capable of deploying without significant augmentation an equipped, professional battalion for a multi-national peace or humanitarian operation"; that only nine states have "strong officer corps (experienced, trained and professional)"; that six can "perform engineering tasks such as construction, bridging and water provision"; that no sub-Saharan state could "provide sustained transportation of personnel and equipment to a peace or humanitarian operation"; and that only two have a "significant naval capability". (46)

6. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is obviously one of the states which is considered to have all but one of the needs (ie sustained transportation) required to deploy a peacekeeping and/or peace enforcement force. It has been sending forces for protection and peacekeeping tasks using hired Russian transport aircraft. Since it has one of the few African militaries thought to be capable of performing the tasks required by the UN, the pressure on the South African government to take part in UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions is heavy. The SANDF will have to ensure that it can carry out peace support operations effectively without suffering heavy losses.

The only true military intervention and 'peace enforcement operation' carried out by the SANDF was Operation Boleas in Lesotho in 1998. Since then the SANDF has been involved in peacekeeping deployments in Burundi and the DRC. These have given the force valuable experience in planning and deployment, but an intervention which necessitates an invasion as was the case in Lesotho, requires sound preparation, speed in execution and excellent logistics.

In a candid briefing to the Joint Standing Committee on Defence and the Portfolio Committee on Foreign Affairs on 2 November 1998, senior members of the SANDF listed a number of weak points in their presentation of the Operation Boleas report. Some of the weak points directly relating to operations were the following: (47)

--A lack of sufficient time for proper preparation, with the result that all roleplayers were not involved in the commencement of planning. Logistic and financial staff were not informed of the operation and could thus not give effective support for it. Clearly the planning and preparation process was flawed.

--Many reasons were given for poor intelligence. One was that the military attache had been withdrawn in April 1998. Another was that intelligence was insufficiently staffed and skilled.

--Logistic weaknesses were, amongst others, that the SANDF's war reserves were at depleted levels. Stock level planning of operational reserves including medical logistical support had not been done. The vehicles and equipment of the combat units were also not ready for operations.

--There were many communication and signals weaknesses listed, such as the lack of sufficient training in the use of signal equipment and radio communications. Staff at headquarters and units were not skilled in the use of radio equipment and procedures.

The above matters if not already attended to, need urgent attention before a robust operation is undertaken again. Co-ordination between government departments is normally poor because of the nature of bureaucracies, and that coupled with time-lag caused by political indecision, could once again lead to insufficient time for preparation. To correct it politicians and government officials likely to be involved in military interventions must be earmarked for participation. The SANDF must obviously be ready within a time frame laid down by the government, as a standard operational procedure.

Former president Nelson Mandela who played a leading role in the deployment of South African troops in Burundi, is reported to have said in 1998 that "we must all accept that we cannot abuse the concept of national sovereignty to deny the rest of the continent the right and duty to intervene when, behind the sovereign boundaries, people are being slaughtered to protect tyranny". (48)

The Chief of the SANDF stated in April 2003 that "(t)he SANDF will continue to support the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) by contributing to regional and continental peace support operations. It is important that conflict should be eliminated for Africa to stabilise, develop and enjoy greater prosperity". (49)

In spite of these laudable statements it is debatable to what extent South Africa should be involved in peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa. The country has large-scale unemployment, widespread poverty, poor border control and a high crime rate as major problems. Yet the SANDF is being systematically withdrawn from ongoing internal deployments and assistance to the South African Police Service. The facts are that the SANDF is not receiving the funding to do what the politicians envision. It is essential that the UN should supply the finances to fund deployments. It is also essential that politicians, reporters and civil groups have specialised knowledge of the military, its doctrine, strategy, tactics, equipment and its deployability.

At present the SANDF is not able to deploy more than two battalions in the field for which it would need about ten battalions in reserve. The soldiers should also be fit and HIV-free. The first HIV/AIDS casualty deployed in Africa was reported in the South African media on 19 June 2003. (50) The particular soldier should never have been deployed and it may well complicate relations with UN officials should it occur frequently.

During the 2003 defence budget debate in the South African Parliament, Ms Thandi Modise, the chairperson of the Parliamentary Defence Committee, and some representatives of opposition parties warned that external military operations such as those taking place in the DRC and Burundi should not become South Africa's 'Vietnam'. She said that the Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states should form a force capable of quick deployment to handle crises but the SANDF had to ensure that forces were available to defend the country at all times. She is also reported to have said that the budget of R20,5 billion was not adequate in the light of the deployments and duties required of the Defence Force. Lastly, it was recommended that the Minister of Defence should have a serious discussion with the President's Office and the other government departments who willy-nilly tasked the Defence Force. (51) It is clear that the chairperson of the Parliamentary Defence Committee has a good grasp of the risks and costs involved.

At a media briefing on 9 September 2003, the Minister of Defence responded by reporting that an appreciation by the SANDF had led to the conclusion that about R2 billion in addition to the current budget was needed to enable the force to do what was required of it. The issues of maintenance and sustainability had been prime factors in the estimate. (52)

7. CONCLUSION

A major armed conflict can be defined as the use of armed force between two or more armed groups, resulting in the battle-related deaths of at least 1 000 people in a year and in which the conflict has to do with the control of government, territory or communal identity. (53) Based on this definition it is reported that there were six major armed conflicts in Africa, and nine in Asia, in 2002. The vast majority of conflicts in 2002 occurred in these two regions. In 1998 and 1999 there were as many as 11 major conflicts in Africa and the average per year from 1990 to 2002, was slightly more than seven conflicts at any one time. (54)

Elsewhere it is reported that in 2003 a greater number of wars were being fought on the African continent than on any other continent. In 2003 there were 11 major conflicts taking place at once with dozens of smaller conflicts also being waged at the same time. (55) There is no definite indication that peace is in the offing. The economic situation in most countries is such that the leaders in the conflicts often do not seek peace and merely negotiate a prolongation of conflict. Their subordinates do not seek peace since the weapons they carry give them status and a means of earning a living.

Although war is evil, the use of military force does possess some utility. It can settle political conflicts quickly and lead to peace. Politicians and their advisors should, however, avoid the emotional impulse to let their countries become involved in other countries' wars.(56) Sometimes involvement merely prolongs the conflict and the suffering caused by hostilities. Even if such logic seems void of sensibilities, it is at least advisable to make a detailed political, financial and military appreciation of the results of intervention before doing so.

Military companies have been used to intervene in conflicts in order to end them. Such companies have proved capable of achieving immediate strategic objectives. However, they are unable to solve the political and social issues which started the conflict in the first place. (57) This being the case, reputable professional companies could well be employed to achieve specific operational aims, but the political issues would have to be addressed by nation states' governments. In Africa where a lot of turmoil is in fact criminal thuggery, intervention by military security firms staffed by intelligence, policing and military experts, may well be the most effective means to bring peace where turmoil is caused by criminality.

In both low-intensity conflicts and in conventional or semi-conventional conflicts, some forces in Africa are using relatively advanced technology. Some of the weaponry can even be used by children. (58) Deploying lightly armed troops for peace support operations between belligerents who have no wish to cease hostilities could thus well be foolhardy.

The security of African states has deteriorated since 1989, when the Cold War ended. Insurgents often gained power and some states involved themselves militarily in their neighbour's affairs. Diminished foreign interest, a change in the nature of African conflicts and personal dictatorial rule in many African states have been the main causes of deterioration. (59)

Many African wars are rooted in ethnic conflicts. They are caused by the nature of the African state and systems of government which have been forced on peoples not ready to live within the borders inherited by them, in a system not suited to the societies involved. Personal rule by African leaders, coupled with the fact that most African nations have militaries with cultures that do not readily accept civilian and parliamentary supremacy, further leads to ongoing strife. To make matters worse, Africa's population is the poorest in the world. It has an annual population growth rate of three per cent which means that it could double by 2025. This growth rate is likely to cause more poverty and will certainly not curtail it. (60)

It is clear from the foreign policy statements made by the South African government that the RSA will remain militarily involved in Africa. It will do so for political, economic and moral reasons. However, it is imperative that the government departments involved in decisions regarding deployments, should do formal appreciations to estimate the financial costs and the military risks pertaining at the time. It is also imperative that the South African public should be well informed in regard to military deployments and the reasons for them. Failure to inform the people may well lead to a common feeling, in view of the country's internal problems, that the SANDF has become irrelevant.

The military should write and publish an open doctrine with no security classification, laying down the specifications for military involvement outside the borders of South Africa. It must specify the procedures for deployment in the SADC region, Africa as a whole, and deployments further afield. The specifications should cover typical reasons for deployment, financial arrangements prior to and during deployment, and unclassified standard operational procedures. Prior to publication the doctrine should be debated by Parliament and subsequently approved as a national policy.

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(3.) Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, Warfare and the Third World, Palgrave, New York, 2001, pp 43, 115 and 308.

(4.) Snow, D M, Uncivil Wars, International Security and the New Internal Conflicts, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1996, p 78.

(5.) Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, p 318.

(6.) Howe, H M, Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2001, p 98.

(7.) US Defence Intelligence Agency, African Military and Security Issues, pp 5 and 6, in Howe, HM, op cit, p 101.

(8.) Jordaan, E and F Vrey, "Ideas on the revolution in military affairs and the nature of low intensity conflict", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXV, No 1, May 2003, pp 115, 118 and 119.

(9.) Vrey, F, "The contemporary revolution in military affairs: A theoretical perspective on its contribution to solving Sub-Saharan conflicts", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXI, No 2, November 1999, p 15.

(10.) Singer, P W, "Caution: Children at War", Parameters, US Army Quarterly Vol XXXI, No 4, Winter 2001-02, pp 49, 50, 51 and 53.

(11.) Cordsman, A and A Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume 2, p 423, cited in Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, pp 164 and 174.

(12.) Dudley, B J, "Decolonization and Problems of Independence", Cambridge History of Africa, p 93, cited in Howe, H M, op cit, p 42.

(13.) Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, p 127.

(14.) Ibid, pp 141-143.

(15.) Ibid, pp 173-174.

(16.) Ibid, p 127.

(17.) Ibid, p 218.

(18.) Encarta 1995, Microsoft Corporation, Funk and Wagnalls Corporation, 1994.

(19.) Harksvy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, p 162.

(20.) Ibid, p 217.

(21.) Ibid.

(22.) Ibid, p 233.

(23.) Mortimer, D, "The challenge of effective Sub-Saharan ground forces", in Du Plessis, L and M Hough, Protecting Sub-Saharan Africa: The military challenge, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1999, p 110.

(24.) Howe, H M, op cit, pp 88-89.

(25.) "UN sees violation of a Diamond Ban by Angolan Rebels", New York Times (New York), 11 March 2000.

(26.) Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, p 231, cited in Howe, H M, op cit, p 85.

(27.) Kaldor, New and Old Ways, p 95, cited in Howe, H M, op cit, pp 85-86.

(28.) Jackson, R and C Rosberg, "The Marginality of African States", in Carter and O'Meara (eds), African Independence, p 51, cited in Howe, H M, op cit, p 76.

(29.) Welsh, D, "Ethnicity in Sub Saharan Africa", International Affairs, July 1996, p 489.

(30.) Glynne, E, op cit, p 7.

(31.) Howe, H M, op cit, p 80

(32.) Ibid, pp 4 and 80.

(33.) Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, pp 217-218 and 226.

(34.) Belt, D, The World of Islam, Official Journal of the National Geographic Society, Vol 201, No 1, January 2002, p 79.

(35.) Howe, H M, op cit, p 1.

(36.) Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, p 219.

(37.) Huliares, A, "The Viability of Somaliland: Internal Constraints and Regional Geopolitics", Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol 20, No 2, July 2002, p 174.

(38.) Snow, D, op cit, p 109.

(39.) In Coker, C, op cit, pp 65, 74 and 150.

(40.) Bowden, M, "African Atrocities and 'The Rest of the World", Policy Review, June and July 2000, p 57.

(41.) Howe, H M, op cit, p 92.

(42.) Glynne, E, op cit, p 83.

(43.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 22 May 2003.

(44.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 31 May 2003.

(45.) Howe, H M, op cit, p 247.

(46.) Defence Forecasts International, "African Capabilities for Peace Operations", prepared for OSD/ISA/African Region, 17 October 1997, pp 6, 9-10 and 58.

(47.) Southern African Development Community, "Background to Operation Boleas", Combined Task Force Boless, 2 November 1998. (http://www.mil.za/Secretariat/Boleas/Boleas-6.htm)

(48.) Cape Times (Cape Town), 10 June 1998, cited in Howe, H M, op cit, p 97.

(49.) South African Soldier, the official monthly magazine of the SA Department of Defence, Vol 10, No 6, June 2003, p 4.

(50.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 19 June 2003.

(51.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 14 June 2003.

(52.) GCIS Media Briefing, Defence Ministry, 9 September 2003. (http://www.pmg.org.za/briefings/sept2003/030909defence.htm)

(53.) Seybolt, T B, "Major armed conflicts, armaments, disarmament and international security", SIPRI Yearbook 2002, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp 23-24.

(54.) Eriksson, M, Sollenberg, M and P Wallensteen, "Patterns of major armed conflicts, 1990-2002", Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, SIPRI Yearbook 2003, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp 110-111.

(55.) Saif al Islam al Qadhafi, "An African Answer to an African Problem, Keeping the African Peace in the 21st Century", African Armed Forces Journal, March 2003, p 17.

(56.) Lutwak, EN, "Give War A Chance", Foreign Affairs, Vol 78, No 4, July-August 1999, pp 36 and 44, cited in Harkavy, RE and SG Neuman, op cit, p 298.

(57.) Shearer, D, "Private Armies and Military Intervention", Adelphi Paper 316, IISS, Oxford University Press, London, 1998, p 10.

(58.) Harkavy, R E and S G Neuman, op cit, p 191.

(59.) Howe, H M, op cit, p 77.

(60.) Cochran, E S, "The Pivotal State: Post-Apartheid South Africa", Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Vol XXX, No 4, Winter 2000-2001, p 89.

Brig Gen George Kruys (ret)

Research Associate

Institute for Strategic Studies

University of Pretoria