Management and command in the SANDF: changing priorities.(South African National Defence Force )
Management and command in the SANDF: changing priorities.(South African National Defence Force )
Publication: Strategic Review for Southern Africa
Publication Date: 01-MAY-04
Author: Esterhuyse, AbelVictory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur
Guilo Douhet
ABSTRACT
This article * explores the relationship between the existence of a military bureaucracy and the presence of professional military knowledge within armed forces, with specific reference to the situation in the SANDF at present. The first part of the article provides a theoretical overview of this Janus-like nature of armed forces. The second part explores this duality in the SANDF. It is argued that over the last ten years the SANDF has experienced a gradual shift away from the more traditional emphasis of armed forces--that of war-fighting--towards so-called secondary or non-traditional functions. This shift in emphasis not only characteristes peacetime militaries, but is also accompanied by the increasing bureaucratisation of the military. The article concludes by emphasising the need to balance the bureaucratisation of the SANDF with the retention and further development of its professional knowledge and capabilities.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the past, it was widely accepted that the utility of the military centred on its ability to influence coercive situations, which in its purest form implies successful armed combat. This was and still is explained in political terms through the Clausewitzian idea that military force serves as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy--"war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means". (1) To be successful in coercive situations--to win wars--is still the most important requirement for modern armed forces, though it is not that primary any more. The contemporary notion that armed forces need to make war less likely has grown in prominence. World-wide, including South Africa, armed forces experience this by placing increasing emphasis on so-called 'secondary or non-traditional functions'.
A study of military history shows that there is a correlation between the successful employment of armed forces and the presence of particular constituent elements and other organisational factors. Though it is impossible to provide a complete list of these factors and considerations, some of them are relevant to the changing priorities of management and command. To begin with, armed forces, officers in particular, should have a thorough understanding of the society they serve. They should be knowledgeable about the world in which they exist; and they should have a firm grasp of the complexities of the utility of military force within the context of their domestic and international environments. Military history also indicates how militaries are organised and structured and how they are led and commanded--factors that are of critical importance for their successful employment. This also holds true for the contemporary era in which it is expected of armed forces to reduce the likelihood of war.
This article explores the relationship between the existence of a military bureaucracy and the presence of professional military knowledge within armed forces, with specific reference to the present situation in the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The first part provides a theoretical overview of the relationship between the military as a profession on the one hand, and the state bureaucracy on the other. The second part explores this duality in the SANDF, especially the question whether the SANDF's present inclination is towards the bureaucratic military world or towards the professional military world. In conclusion, an assessment is made of what ought to be done within militaries to balance bureaucratic and professional military knowledge.
2. THE JANUS-LIKE NATURE OF ARMED FORCES
Defence forces have a Janus-like appearance. On the one hand, they represent a vocational profession focused on developing expert knowledge on the use of force and, on the other hand, they also constitute a hierarchical bureaucracy focused on applying routine knowledge through operating routines, procedures and checklists. Soldiers are always confronted with this duality. They have to be true professionals in the profession of arms while at the same time--because the profession of arms is also a government bureaucracy--they also have to be good bureaucrats. Unlike professions, bureaucracies focus more on routine applications of non-expert knowledge through standing operational procedures or policies and regulations, rather than through the professional expertise of their employees. Indeed, bureaucracies usually invest very little in the professional expertise of their employees. (2) On the contrary, military professional expertise is underpinned by the professional ability to think and act creatively. (3)
This difference between the military as a bureaucracy and as a professional vocation indeed relates to everything armed forces do. Huntington for example distinguishes between those activities concerning armed forces that are related to their size and readiness and those activities that directly affect their responsibilities. (4) Van Creveldt argues along the same line when he distinguishes between those activities that arrange and co-ordinate everything an armed force requires to exist, for example the provision of food supplies and a system of military justice, and those activities that enable it to carry out its proper mission, that is the gathering of information and the planning and monitoring of operations. (5) Writing in an earlier era and referring to war proper, Burne distinguishes between those activities that take place within the 'base' and along 'the lines of communication' on the one hand, and those activities that are related to the theatre of operations on the other. (6) The activities that armed forces participate in can therefore be grouped into two categories. The first category is bureaucratic in nature and concerns the preparation for and support of what armed forces are supposed to do. The second category is underpinned by the need for professional knowledge on activities concerning the deployment and employment of military force. These two groups of activities should, however, never be clinically divorced from each other.
What is the relationship between command or decision-making in armed forces and the nature of these two groups of activities? Bureaucratic and professional decision-making are underpinned by different kinds of decisions. (7) Bureaucratic decision-making centres on so-called 'structural decisions'. Structural decisions are concerned with the procurement, allocation and organisation of personnel, financial means and material that are required by armed forces. The more important types of structural decisions, amongst others, are:
--budgetary decisions concerning the size and distribution of available funds to armed forces;
--personnel decisions concerning the number, procurement, retention, pay and posting or assignment of personnel, as well as the working conditions of members of the armed forces;
--material decisions concerning research and development on and the procurement of sufficient supplies for the armed forces; and
--organisational decisions concerning the methods and forms through which the armed forces are organised and administrated.
Decisions within the professional realm relate to what armed forces do and not to what they need to do this. These decisions are concerned with the use of force. As such they are more strategic in nature and comprise the readiness, deployment, commitment and employment of forces; war plans; the movement of forces; and military exercises. Strategic decisions address the issue whether and how military force should be utilised. Clearly, this is the realm of decisions on military doctrine, strategy, operational art and tactics. (8)
The bureaucratic or structural sphere concerns the management of resources. Within this environment the managerial abilities of officers are of critical importance. The professional or strategic sphere therefore necessitates good military leadership in order to command people in a conflict or 'war-fighting' environment. It is, however, important to understand that this distinction between the bureaucratic and strategic realms are not mutually exclusive. The bureaucratic sphere focuses on the availability and management of military resources, whereas the strategic sphere concerns the deployment and utilisation of these resources. Hence the one sphere cannot do without the other. It is nevertheless important to understand the difference between these two worlds in order to determine what is required for armed forces to be successful from a managerial and command perspective.
According to Snider this dual nature of military forces is unavoidable, though when the bureaucratic realm is more prominent than the strategic realm, immense tension is created for individual professionals and for the military as a whole. (9) Armed forces that do not resolve this tension in favour of the strategic or professional realm can indeed 'die' in the professional sense. If bureaucracy continues to dominate the defence force of a country, military professionals are forced into bureaucratic moulds, becoming, mere employees and obedient military bureaucrats. This can lead to a situation where the defence force becomes so entangled with bureaucracy that it may stand to lose the next war, in other words it will be of little or no value to society.
3. COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT: A MATTER OF FOCUS
The dualistic nature of armed forces and the emphasis at any given time within a particular armed force are also reflected in the way in which its higher echelons guide it. It is noted that some analysts go so far as to indicate that there is a difference between the personality styles of soldiers in the bureaucratic and strategic realms. The personality style of soldiers operating in the bureaucratic world is described with words like dependable, conscientious, detail oriented, punctual and selfless. They work according to the book or rules. Personalities in the strategic realm are described as adventuresome, imaginative, innovative, daring and decisive. (10) They think and act conceptually and creatively.
If the higher echelons of a particular armed force adhere to a managerial culture, it inevitably places the emphasis on the bureaucratic nature of the armed force as an organisation and how it administers its resources. Sound management is indeed a requirement for an armed force to be effective in the accomplishment of internal organisational objectives, since it contributes to the control of resources and of personnel as far as the latter is considered to be a resource Such an approach usually leads to a budget-driven focus with an emphasis on organisational structures and systems within armed forces. (11)
If armed forces want to be effective in doing what armed forces are created for in the first place, that is war-fighting or at least the successful execution of military missions, a shift in emphasis is required. The focus should be directed away from the internal managerial aspects of the military bureaucracy, towards the accomplishment of external objectives through the application of professional military knowledge. The accomplishment of external objectives, namely constitutionally driven political objectives, relates to the question of when and how to utilise military force. The answer to this question is underpinned by the demand for expert professional military knowledge in combination with dynamic visionary leadership and drive, to ensure that the military fulfils its proper function. A strong command and leadership ethos is a prerequisite for any successful application of force and thus for the attainment of the political objective through this use of armed force.
Armed force in the end is not an end in itself but a means to an end. As previously indicated, it exists in order to attain political objectives, namely to win wars or to successfully execute military missions. Looking at management and command within armed forces from this perspective, it is clear that command and leadership are the higher order concepts. All the management activities in armed forces are prerequisites for successful command. Command, according to Gray, is needed to make a strategic difference, which is to say it contributes to the overall strategic effect. He explains the difference between management and command in a simplistic way by quoting the Arab proverb that "an army of sheep led by a lion will defeat an army of lions led by a sheep". (12)
Management in the end seems to be only one of the elements of successful command. Whereas management is concerned with the more tangible issues of budgets and structures, command also incorporates intangible human characteristics such as morale, courage and motivation. During times of peace, commanders are mostly evaluated in terms of their tangible outputs--how well they manage their budgets! Indeed, peacetime militaries have a natural tendency to become more bureaucratic. The problem is that under operational circumstances, that is times of war, commanders are evaluated in terms of their operational successes. A good commander does not always do what is good, rather what is necessary. Kotter emphasises that a peacetime army can usually survive with good administration and management up and down the hierarchy, coupled with good leadership at the top. (13) During times of operational involvement, competent command at all levels is, however, a prerequisite for success. No one has, as yet, figured out how to manage people effectively in battle; in battle command is needed.
The relationship between the two military realms can be placed on a continuum (see Figure 1). The one extreme is the peacetime bureaucratic world with its emphasis on the management of resources, whereas the other extreme is the war-fighting military professional world with its emphasis on command and the employment of military resources. It is therefore possible to plot the situation within any armed force, also within the SANDF, on this continuum. Armed forces should at all times strive towards a balance between the two worlds--the centre of the continuum. If an armed force gravitates to one end and increasingly becomes more bureaucratic, it should take deliberate steps to professionalise itself and vice versa.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
This leads to some logical conclusions. Firstly, if an armed force does not deliberately focus on the retention and development of its professional knowledge base and does not place very strong emphasis on the development of a strong command ethos, it is doomed to be a strategic or operational failure. In fact, in times of relative peace the development of the professional military world is necessary. A well-managed military bureaucracy cannot alone ensure strategic and operational success. Secondly, the more bureaucratic an armed force is, the more unprofessional it becomes in terms of knowledge and command qualities. These two conclusions should be linked to the assumption that troops fight as they are trained, irrespective of whether good or bad. Consequently, if the capacity to command is exercised during times of relative stability and peace, it will automatically follow in turbulent times. The nature of operational command in any armed force can therefore be traced to the quality of its peacetime command. This poses the question whether such an emphasis on command is currently present in the SANDF?
4. THE EMPHASIS ON MANAGEMENT AND COMMAND IN THE SANDF SINCE 1994
In order to determine where the SANDF finds itself on the continuum between a managerial and a command ethos, it is necessary to consider the origins of the SANDF and what has happened within the SANDF since 1994. It is also important not to look at individual events, but rather to identify patterns or trends. The armed forces that were integrated in 1994 to form the SANDF each came from a unique environment. (14) Members of the former statutory forces were familiar with a bureaucratic armed force, whereas the nature of the struggle against the apartheid regime necessitated the absence of a centralised bureaucracy within most of the non-statutory forces. (15)
The former South African Defence Force (SADF) was nevertheless in essence a war-fighting force with an emphasis on operational and tactical matters, or as Seegers explains, "military experience counted more than intellectual or staff ability" and "the action was in the line". (16) During the 1970s and 1980s soldiers were needed 'on the border' or 'in the bush'. Therefore, the professional knowledge that members of the SADF brought into the SANDF was mainly based on tactical training and experience The SADF had no real culture of military education. The Military Academy, for example, did not even offer a course on Military Strategy until 1991. Officers that were seen to be too academically inclined were considered to be unsuitable for command positions. (17)
It is interesting to note that as early as 1980, Heitman wrote an article in Militaria, titled by the question "Is the Army Literate?", in which he concluded that the SADF neither read nor wrote and was suffering from mental stagnation. (18) He identified three possible reasons for this, namely the problem of security considerations; the absence of suitable local military journals; and the lack of incentive. The emphasis on training and experience in the SADF in the end resulted in a very tactically minded force and because officers seldom read or wrote, professional knowledge had little depth and was not disseminated and widely shared within and outside the SADF.
Most of the non-statutory forces that were brought into the SANDF came from a revolutionary environment. Revolutionary wars are political and strategic in nature. Military personnel do not become political and strategically minded through training and tactical war-fighting experience. Revolutionary armies indeed are known for their political education or rather political indoctrination. Given that military expertise is the result of the interplay between military experience, training and education, military education alone also does not epitomise real professional military knowledge. (19)
Heinecken for example emphasises the point that the insurgent forces that were integrated into the SANDF, were highly politicised. (20) For decades part of their ingrained culture had been to resist, defy, test, protest and challenge official authority. Perlmutter and Bennet explain the challenge that politicised revolutionaries pose to a bureaucratic armed force as follows:
(T)he dilemma of the military in postrevolutionary times is that the revolutionary soldiers must be politically disarmed and professionally re-armed. The transition for revolutionary soldiers is difficult, especially for those officers who become romantic and nostalgic for the heady revolutionary days. Soldiers, like party ideologists who find themselves bored and impatient with the mundane chores of government, become political liabilities for the regime, On the whole, government finds alternative roles for them; but if they insist on continued military service, they must submit to the professionalization and routinization process that engulfs the military in the postrevolutionery period. Ideally, the postrevolutionary army should become routinized, depoliticized, and professionalized". (21)
Some of the non-statutory force members did receive military training in various foreign countries. Also, some of the members of these forces gained tactical experience in revolutionary war-fighting. The question is whether this body of knowledge was incorporated into the doctrine of the SANDF and whether it really contributed towards professionalising the SANDF? The point, nevertheless, is that these non-statutory force members were not used to operating within a bureaucracy.
These forces, in short, did not know how a bureaucracy functioned. This posed a threat to their perceived competencies while it also created a sense of alienation and frustration. This produced interesting dynamics within the SANDF. Most of the former statutory force members on the other hand understood how to function within a bureaucracy. These former statutory force members found it equally frustrating having to work with people who seemingly disregarded rules even when the former statutory force members acknowledged that these rules in themselves can undermine effectiveness. The former statutory force members therefore found the current more 'flexible' management of the nonstatutory force members within the bureaucracy unsettling. (22)
Since 1994, the SANDF had been involved in an integration process and is still involved in a transformation process. Both the integration and the transformation processes are supported by various kinds of activities that are usually associated with the bureaucratic military environment, for example organisational and personnel restructuring. At their inception these processes were facilitated by a private consultation company, Deloitte and Touche. Needless to say, this company did not have real professional military knowledge in their midst, and therefore did not focus on professionalising the military through 'transformation'. They therefore thrusted the SANDF towards the bureaucratic world--to become more efficient, not necessarily more effective. This resulted in some analysts arguing that "the transformation of a military profession is not the same as that of a business or other type of organisation, and cannot be approached in the same way". (23)
The effect of this bureaucratisation of the SANDF by way of a private consultation company is noticeable throughout the Defence Force: logistic and administrative units are nowadays known as 'General Support Bases'; a 'Service Agreement' is needed for support to be rendered to a unit or formation; and artillery guns, armour regiments, infantry battalions, etc in the SANDF have become 'End User Systems'. The SANDF was charged substantial fees for the services rendered and although it helped to transform the SANDF in a bureaucratic sense, it did little to professionalise the SANDF. Future events and experience will indicate whether or not the transformation that was brought about in this manner will succeed in striking a balance between the efficiency and effectiveness that is needed in any military to do what it was ated for. It may well be that a total disequilibrium was fostered to the extent that the SANDF could become so bureaucratised that it can no longer support or sustain military operations effectively.
One of the side effects of a bureaucratised military is the development of a more centralised command structure in an effort to make it more efficient. This is caused by the fact that the management culture that underpins the bureaucracy stresses the importance of planning, budgeting and control. (24) A professional military command culture in contrast steers the military in the opposite direction towards the provision of direction and the motivation of people. This is usually achieved through a decentralised command system generally known by its German name, Auftragstaktik (mission command). (25) Executing mission orders require a mindset and value system that support independent thinking, decisive action and risk-taking. (26) The centralising of command through bureaucracy in the SANDF is an effort to ensure that the defence budget is spent in a responsible manner. In this respect it is interesting to note that unit commanders with the rank of lieutenant colonel, colonel and even brigadier general, are not allowed to authorise the spending of more than R500 from the budget of their own units. Authorisation for this is required from higher headquarters. Subsequent to the integration process, the SANDF also lost a lot of bureaucratic expertise due to resignations or retirements from the former statutory forces. Paradoxically, this lack of experience and judgement within the bureaucracy has resulted in the SANDF becoming even more bureaucratised.
The bureaucratic nature of the SANDF is also reflected in its personnel policies and the way its personnel are staffed. Personnel costs continue to consume 52 per cent of the defence budget and as a result the SANDF has not reached the desired budget ratio of 40:30:30 for personnel, operating and capital expenditure. (27) Many professional soldiers have also been lost as a result of the process of rationalisation. This can be linked to the tendency amongst serving members of postmodern armed forces to view themselves more as employees of the Department of Defence (DoD) than as professional soldiers. The SANDF had to develop a whole new personnel plan (28) in order to ensure the application of the 'up-or-out' principle within the SANDF, since many of its troops had reached an age where they were too old to be deployed. Some reports even speculated that the average age of the troops in the SANDF was as high as 32 years. (29) The bureaucratic requirement of fair labour practices also made it virtually impossible to rid the system of these members, at a time when senior professionally experienced officers were lost through the 'up-or-out' policy. The danger of these bureaucratic tendencies is aptly summarised by General Sir Michael Rose who contends that troops who have become accustomed to a peacetime regime based on civilian practices involving restricted working hours, health and safety regulations, and the right to appeal to civilian tribunals outside the chain of command, cannot be expected to make the necessary physical or mental transition in times of conflict. (30)
Another factor to consider regarding the bureaucratisation of the personnel function in the SANDF is the accepted reality amongst officers that their careers will eventually terminate in a headquarters in Pretoria. To simplify the matter: the operational units of the SANDF are understaffed and the 'tooth to tail' ratio in the SANDF is unacceptably high. This has even sparked a debate in the media concerning the number of generals in the SANDF compared with foreign military forces. (31) Some officers are also preparing themselves for a second career whilst they are serving in the SANDF For example, many junior officers in the combat arms prefer to study in economic and management science fields while attending the Military Academy, rather than in a field that is related to the professional military realm such as military history, military strategy and military technology. Senior officers are also inclined to obtain MBA degrees, in order to make themselves more marketable in the private sector.
The 'strategic management process' of the SANDF is a budget-driven process aimed at the management of the defence budget, and not a value-driven process aimed at the development and/or execution of a military strategy, Only very recently has the Directorate of Strategy of the SANDF developed a proper military strategy within the realm of a so-called 'strategic direction process'. (32) Whereas the SANDF of the 1990s has been described as "a military in search of a mission", (33) the recent development of the military strategy went a long way to ensure that the SANDF of today spends its resources on those missions that make a strategic difference, while at the same time maintaining a balance between the capabilities that are needed for the different missions. In future, all the missions of the SANDF have to be structured around three main objectives identified in its military strategy, namely defence against aggression; the promotion of security; and support to the people of South Africa. Whereas the strategic management process is bureaucratic in nature, the development of a military strategy focuses the attention of the SANDF on what it is supposed to do.
The decision-making culture of the SANDF currently gravitates towards the bureaucratic world. However, most members of the former insurgent forces were used to operating in small independent groups, with maximum freedom of action and initiative, free from rigid regulations and prescribed channels. They took their own decisions according to the situation that they were confronted with. (34) These insurgent commanders did not experience and were not schooled in the art of military decision-making within a large military bureaucracy. Like most insurgent armies, they worked independently within the broad ambit of strategic leadership. There was no need for decision-making by different people on different levels within the organisation once the strategic course was set.
In any efficient bureaucracy it is always difficult to determine who makes what decision on what level. (35) A bureaucracy may effectively function according to a system of 'command through consensus', but not necessarily a professional military. (36) An effective military requires sound decision-making. Furthermore, the cardinal sin in the military is not the 'wrong' decision, but the absence of a decision. Hence, there are only two criteria for decision-making in the military: the timeliness of a decision and the justification thereof. The first emphasises the need to act quickly, while the second requires reflection on the action that was taken in an effort to gain insight in the thought process. (37) Thus, unlike a bureaucracy, a professional military requires sound and decisive decision-making on all levels. The SANDF cannot work on a 'command-through-consensus' system.
It is concluded that the SANDF is at present inclined towards the bureaucratic world, with a result that it is somewhat 'over-managed'. Needless to say, it is accompanied by an under-emphasis of the professional military environment and command. This bureaucratisation of the SANDF has nothing to do with who is in command, also considering that bureaucratisation is a characteristic of most peacetime militaries and that in the South African case, it is the result of a number of interrelated factors. Since 1994 expectations concerning the SANDF in fact played a role in this regard, particularly the need to restructure the organisation as part of the integration and transformation processes. Throughout these processes the emphasis was on keeping the SANDF affordable, adequate, efficient, popular and politically acceptable. (36) Therefore, what can be done to rectify this disequilibrium in the SANDF and to ensure a balance between the bureaucratic and the professional military worlds?
5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMAND ETHOS IN THE SANDF
It is obvious that South Africa's interests cannot best be sewed through a bureaucratised and unprofessional defence force. Surely, the SANDF does not want to be seen as unprofessional. The South African White Paper on Defence indeed emphasised the fact that the SANDF should be a "balanced, modern, affordable and technological advanced military force, capable of executing its task effectively and efficiently". (39)
The bureaucratisation of an armed force creates two sets of problems. (40) The first relates to the creation, adaptation and appreciation of professional expert knowledge and the expertise of military professionals. Burk defines a profession as "a relative 'high status' occupation whose members apply abstract knowledge to solve problems in a particular field of endeavour". (41) An armed force should therefore be a profession focused on effectively developing abstract military knowledge and expertise, as well as its members' ability to collectively apply this abstract knowledge and expertise to new military challenges. Effectiveness is of primary concern to the professional. The only real concern of a bureaucracy on the other hand is 'doing more with less', namely being efficient. (42) It is mostly concerned with standing operational procedures, operating routines, policies, regulations, pay and bonuses. An armed force that bureaucratises its professional knowledge into procedures, checklists and forms to such a degree that it reduces the abstract knowledge and expertise of its officers, is destroying its own inherent ability for professional judgement and decision-making.
The second set of problems relates to the ethics and values of an employee within a bureaucracy vis-a-vis the values and ethics of a professional person within a profession. Any profession is based on a relationship of trust between itself and the society that it serves, in this respect Snider and Watkins argue that trust grants the profession limited autonomy to establish and enforce its own professional ethics, the maintenance of which further enhances such trust. (43) Can it honestly be said that soldierly values, for example those included in the Code of Conduct such as honour, dignity, courage, integrity, loyalty and pride, are still held in high regard in the SANDF and that an effort is made at every training institution throughout the SANDF to instil these values? The answer should bear the contention of Collins and Jacobs in mind, namely that while trust is not highly regarded in commerce or politics, it is of critical importance to the military. (44)
With these two challenges in mind, how then can a military like the SANDF be democratised? How can a situation where the SANDF is merely seen as a government department and where its members view themselves merely as employees of the state, be converted into one where the SANDF is seen as a professional organisation and its members as truly professionals? How can the SANDF convert itself from being merely a provider of work into a professional institution? In response to these questions and the challenges they pose, at least one senior officer is of the opinion that a large-scale operational deployment of the SANDF will end all its problems in this regard. (45)
But is it really this simple? On the contrary, the whole issue is complicated by a number of considerations. The first is the previously indicated view of Snider and Watkins that the transformation of a military profession is not the same as that of a business or other type of organisation, and that it cannot be approached in similar ways. (46) This rules out any further possibilities on the part of the SANDF to once again spend large amounts of money on consultants. The second is the argument of Burk that the "military profession's role has expanded over the course of the last century, widening from the management of violence early in the century to encompass the management of defence following the Second World War and the management of peace after the Cold War". (47) This also implies that mere bureaucratisation will not suffice. Therefore, the question on how to professionalise the SANDF generates different answers depending on who responds to it and when. Whatever the alternative, it seems valid to argue that all arguments pertaining to the professionalisation of the SANDF converge in two ideal-type conceptual points of reference.
The first point emphasises the further development and mastering of an abstract body of knowledge and practice-based expertise that form the bedrock of the military profession, including that of the SANDF. This requires both the creation of new knowledge and the infusion of all members of the SANDF at all levels with existing and new professional military knowledge. As indicated in the aforesaid the emphasis is, however, both on abstract knowledge and expertise. The mastery of abstract knowledge can only occur through a system of higher education--if people read, write and think. Military expertise, however, encompasses more than merely the mastering of abstract knowledge. It also relates to the necessary military training and the accumulation of relevant military experience to ensure that the abstract knowledge can be and indeed is applied. The SANDF therefore should once again evaluate its own Education, Training and Development (ETD) system in order to ensure that it provides its members with the necessary military education, military training and relevant military experience. The overarching goal of its ETD-system should be to infuse its members with professional military expertise and not bureaucratic procedures that can be learned elsewhere in the government sector.
The second conceptual reference point for professionalising the SANDF is a renewed emphasis on the preservation and development of military ethics and values. This in particular concerns the trust upwards towards leaders and laterally towards comrades-in-arms. How can the SANDF create the 'band of brothers' or the 'brotherhood for combat' that forms the moral fibre of militaries world-wide? In stressful situations there are three primary factors that determine how a soldier responds: training, leadership and cohesion. (48) Does the SANDF make a deliberate effort to create this kind of cohesion? Though it may seem as if the SANDF defines cohesion in this way, cohesion is definitely not just about getting along. Cohesion is similar to developing a sense of family in a unit, or as Negrin defines it, "a sense that everyone on the team understands his role, is competent, and is confident that the rest of the team will do its part". (49) Collins and Jacobs confirm this by emphasising:
Trust is key in the military because without it one cannot have confidence that all members will obey lawful orders in the service of the body as a whole. They may instead decide to act in their own self-interest. Any erosion of trust therefor will erode the core ethic of the military profession. Viewed this way, trust is the essential foundation for cohesion and commitment. (50)
There are still a large number of factors that create distrust among members of the SANDF, amongst others culture, language, racial imbalances, the need for representivity, affirmative action and the difference in organisational culture between former statutory and non-statutory forces. (51) This is seen by some as the biggest political challenge facing the SANDF at present. One officer is of the opinion that the SANDF is suffering from 'post-integration blues' since it is still trying to find a balance between the best traditions of the integrating forces. (52) Heinecken puts this in perspective by noting that "to date, there has not been enough stability and time to build up a common history or an institutional culture that can serve as a form of reference to bridge these difficulties. This will no doubt change over time, as more members not associated with any of the former forces join the SANDF and older stalwarts leave". (53)
Williams, nevertheless, identifies the rise in prominence of two new groupings in the SANDF. The first consists of former SADF officers who are supportive of the democratic transition and who acknowledge the importance of transforming the SANDF on all levels. The second grouping consists mainly of former MK officers, but also of officers that were drawn from other non-statutory forces, who are serious in their efforts to professionalise the SANDF. (54) The SANDF is therefore already beginning to benefit from the vision and capabilities of a mixed group of black and white officers who distance themselves from the old political prejudices that divided them and are increasingly identifying with one another as fellow officers. There is, however, still a long and difficult road ahead in the creation of cohesion and trust.
6. CONCLUSION
Over the last ten years the SANDF has experienced a gradual shift away from the traditional emphasis of armed forces--that of war-fighting--towards the so-called secondary or non-traditional functions. This shift in emphasis not only characterises peacetime militaries, but is also accompanied by an increasing bureaucratisation of the military that intends or purports to make the SANDF as a military more efficient. It therefore leads to an internal focus on the SANDF as an organisation; a focus that revolves around efforts to find better ways to budget, staff and structure the organisation. One of the most important outcomes of the bureaucratisation of the SANDF is a change in values. Bureaucracies do not attract adventuresome, imaginative, innovative, daring and decisive individuals. Rather, they rely on people who are dependable, conscientious, detail-oriented, punctual and selfless. The soldiers thus see themselves as nothing more than mere employees of the DoD. Another very important outcome of the bureaucratisation of the SANDF is the gradual loss of professional knowledge and competence. Hence the warning that if this trend towards greater bureaucratisation continues, militaries, like the SANDF, can indeed 'die' in the professional sense.
Since bureaucratisation is after all a characteristic of all peacetime militaries, the problem of and solution to it are not necessarily limited to the SANDF. The real challenge is to find a balance within the SANDF between the bureaucratic military world and the professional military world. The problem is not one of bureaucratisation, but rather how to balance bureaucratisation with the retention and further development of the SANDF's professional knowledge and capabilities, that is to balance management and control. Part of the solution lies in education, training and development within the SANDF, and this should remain a priority that should be reflected in the budget of the bureaucracy. Education, training and development therefore ought to be a budgetary priority for the SANDF if it is serious about being a professional, competent military.
* Edited version of a paper delivered at the conference on "Strategy, Generalship and Command in Southern Africa: Past, Present, and Future", at the Military Academy (Saldanha), 4-6 September 2003.
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(15.) The SANDF consists of the former statutory forces of the SADF, the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), Bophuthatswana Defence Force (BDF), Venda Defence Force (VDM), and Ciskei Defence Force (CDF), collectively known as the TBVC forces; and the former non-statutory forces of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (APLA), as well as the KwaZulu Self Protection Force (KZSPF).
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(30.) See the remarks of General Sir Micheal Rose about the British Army in this regard in the introduction to the following book: Strachan, H, The British Army: Manpower and Society into the Twenty-first Century, Frank Cass, London, 2000.
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(36.) The term 'command through consensus' was used by a senior officer in the SANDF to describe his idea of how decisions are presently made on senior level in the SANDF. SA Navy Conference, Institute of Maritime Technology Simons' Town, 13 February 2003.
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(44.) Collins, J J and T O Jacobs, "Trust in the Profession of Arms", in Matthews, L J, op cit, p 40.
(45.) Telephone conversation with Brig Gen Les Rudman, Director of Strategy SANDF, 3 June 2003.
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(47.) Burk, J, op cit, p 20.
(48.) Negrin, J, "Building Brotherhood for Combat", Military Review, July-August 2002, p 31.
(49.) Ibid.
(50.) Collins, J J and T O Jacobs, op cit, p 41.
(51.) Williams, R, op cit, p 24.
(52.) E-mail correspondence with Col Gerhard Louw, op cit.
(53.) Heinecken, L, op cit, p 17.
(54.) Williams, R, op cit, p 24.
Abel Esterhuyse
Lecturer, School for Security and Africa Studies
Faculty of Military Science (Military Academy)
University of Stellenbosch
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