Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

Preparing for operations other than war: how equipped is the SANDF to deal with "soft missions"? *.(South African National Defence Force)

Publication: Strategic Review for Southern Africa

Publication Date: 01-JUN-02

Armed forces across the world are increasingly deployed in operations where they are required not to fight, but to protect, help and save. Yet, most are still trained primarily for warfighting. Thus, the question is whether the education, training and development SANDF officers receive matches the numerous tasks they are expected to fulfil, given their extensive deployment in military operations other than war. A survey conducted among SANDF officers indicates that whilst their training largely fits such missions, certain difficulties and shortcomings are experienced with respect to their education and mental preparation for these missions. Other problems relate to the sustainment of forces in terms of equipment, logistics and administration, partly due to budgetary constraints, but also due to the fact that the military is still staffed, equipped and trained for conventional roles. Besides these concerns, HIV/AIDS is seen as another factor that will impact on the SANDF's ability to deal with the wide range o f issues it is tasked to contend with.

1. INTRODUCTION

During the past decade, referred to as the post-Cold War period, the armed forces of most Western democracies have been used for what has been called "interventions of a policing type". These have ranged from classic peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, through more muscular peace enforcement operations abroad, to rendering assistance to police in controlling mass immigration, ethnic conflicts, urban terror and criminal activities within their own territories. All these missions have two things in common -- firstly, they take place within the civil society of the own or another country; and secondly, they are non-war fighting military missions. In South Africa, it is precisely in these non-traditional military roles that armed forces have been historically and are presently deployed.

The question is whether the armed forces are the proper instrument for handling these kinds of policing operations in and out of area. The classic task of armed forces is national defence. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Act 108 of 1996), Article 200 (2) for example states that the primary object of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) "is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of international law regulating the use of force". The first and primary role of the SANDF is defence against external aggression and it is for this core function that it is funded, structured, trained and equipped. However, it is for its secondary functions, to defend and protect its people in accordance with the Constitution and principles of international law, that the SANDF is most operational.

A growing tension appears to be developing on whether the execution of these secondary roles with the collateral utility derived from the primary function, is sound logic. The following questions arise: "Are the armed forces adequately trained, equipped and prepared for these secondary roles, where they are asked not to fight, but to protect, help and save?" (1) "Are they able to deal with the entire spectrum of potential tasks associated with these soft missions?" "Should the SANDF continue to do as present, train for war and then down-train for missions which require a more restrained use of force?" (2) "How do soldiers experience these missions -- do they find it difficult to adjust, or are the skills and qualities required in conventional operations equally applicable to operations other than war?"

This leads to the question: "How equipped is the SANDF to deal with these soft missions?" To answer this, all the components that contribute towards the effective execution of these missions need to be considered. These include, firstly, force preparation, namely the education, training and development (ETD) members receive for such missions; secondly, the force employment component, namely the extent of current deployments in operations other than war (OOTW) and the challenges these missions pose for members on the ground; and thirdly, the aspect of force sustainment, for no matter how prepared the forces are, without the necessary support no mission can be effectively executed. In conclusion, it is also necessary to consider a new type of "enemy", namely that of HIV/AIDS. Thus an attempt is made to outline anticipated human resource challenges and the potential impact this disease may have on military effectiveness.

2. FORCE PREPARATION

2.1 Education, training and development (ETD)

The basic pillars of ETD have remained virtually intact during the post-Cold War period even though there has been a shift in organisational structure from one based on conscription to an all-volunteer force. The procedure for recruitment and selection to the officer corps has not changed significantly, (3) nor has the structure for military education and training -- although as will be shown there has been a definite shift in the focus of what is being taught since approximately 1996. The changes that have been introduced have closely followed the guidelines stipulated in both the White Paper on Defence, 1996 and the subsequent Defence Review. (4) An overview of the ETD of SA Army officers from the formative to the strategic level illustrates the relative weight given to ETD for OOTW compared to ETD for conventional training. The focus is on the officer corps, as the leaders and managers of the armed forces, and on the SA Army, as the landward forces are most extensively deployed in OOTW.

Starting with the Formative Course presented to officers upon commencement of their careers, only a fraction of the time is devoted to peace support operations (PSOs) as part of the Art of War module. (5) This module is devoted almost exclusively to the principles and dimensions of conventional warfare, given that this is still considered the primary role of the SANDF. (6) Of interest is the shift in recent years in subject content away from revolutionary warfare (associated with the threat perception of the former South African Defence Force -- SADF) to PSOs (future missions). The next major course in the officer's career is the All Arms Battle Handling Course, a 14 week course which strives to equip the young officer with the knowledge, attitude and skills to act as a sub-unit commander or a staff officer grade two (S02) in mobile warfare operations. Essentially, this course is at the tactical level and is aimed at conventional operations with only a small component of the course addressing PSOs. (7) It is only on the Junior Command and Staff Duties Course (JSCD), when the officer has the approximate rank of major that he/she receives more ETD in OOTW. (8)

The six-month JSCD course is compulsory for all Army officers for the promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel and serves to qualify selected officers as operational all arms unit commanders and staff officers grade one (SO 1). (9) The course is divided into three main modules, namely the Unit Commander module covering mobile (conventional) operations (with an approximate instructional time of 56 per cent), area defence operations (11 per cent) and PSOs (seven per cent); the Staff Officer module (13 per cent) that includes formation operations theory and decision-making (problem-solving techniques); and the General module (13 per cent) that covers aspects such as civic education, equal opportunities, the law of armed conflict, military law and labour relations.

Although most of the allocated instructional time is devoted to the primary function of the SANDF, namely the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the modules covering area defence operations and PSOs make up a substantial component of the course. The Area Defence module, covers a range of internal conflict operations including internal war, revolution, revolutionary war, insurgency, civil war, guerrilla war, terrorism, rebellion, insurrection, riots and unrest; border protection including border control, operations on the border, operations in the interior and inter-departmental co-ordination; area protection including community safeguarding, infiltration, intelligence and maintaining law and order; and collateral service including maintaining law and order in co-operation with the South African Police Service (SAPS), safeguarding life, health and property, and supplying and maintaining essential services. The PSOs module focuses on the planning and execution of such operations. Detailed at tention is paid to the role and function of the United Nations (UN) in peacekeeping; the legislative framework including international, regional and national conventions and regulations within which such operations take place; and the various facets of PSOs.

The lectures are presented by both course qualified staff officers and by civilian lecturers who are specialists in their respective fields. The educational aspects of the course are balanced with training exercises, where officers are evaluated on the application of their knowledge, and various practical case studies, two of which relate to OOTW. For example, the area defence exercise Templer sketches a scenario where officers must plan and apply their all arms battle handling skills and knowledge acquired in the Mobile Operations module to a case study relating to an internal unrest situation where there is a high incidence of political and taxi violence, petrol bombing and gangsterism. The PSO exercise Gratitude similarly relates to different problems at the tactical level where officers have to get supplies to a refugee camp located between two belligerent parties. The task is to create a buffer zone to enable supplies to reach the refugees, giving due recognition to available resources and terrain, as we ll as the legal context in which the officers have to operate.

On the Senior Command and Staff Duties Course (SCSD) many of the modules presented relate to both conventional operations and OOTW. The Military Studies module (21 per cent of allocated course time), for example, includes lectures on the role of the military and the media, the law of armed conflict, geo-political studies, political science, history and economics and civic education. The module on Problem Solving (14 per cent) and a dedicated module on combined and joint planning, similarly apply to both the primary and secondary functions of the SANDF. However, as with the JCSD, a substantial portion of the SCSD is devoted to the theory of warfare (14 per cent) covering all the different types of operations. In addition, approximately seven per cent of course time is devoted specifically to area defence operations and secondary and collateral tasks, typically associated with OOTW whereas four per cent of course time is allocated to PSOs.

A requisite of the course is that officers apply the theoretical knowledge to certain case studies, two of which relate to OOTW. Exercise Labi Rint, an area defence operation, requires officers to evaluate the various facets of border safeguarding; identify and evaluate the division of responsibilities between the army, police and other departments; and apply these aspects and responsibilities to a map exercise. In another area protection exercise officers have to apply and design an area protection plan dealing with community safeguarding, crime prevention, and other forms of internal and external conflict handling.

Exercise Pegasus is a PSOs exercise where officers plan and apply the lessons of previous peace missions to a specific case study, typically an African scenario. To execute this exercise effectively, a solid knowledge, grasp and understanding is required of the historical development of peacekeeping; of the various UN operations and the UN system with respect to the conduct of such operations; of the dynamics of African peacekeeping; of the various regional role players; and of government policy and the SANDF doctrine on PSOs. Other aspects taken into consideration in the execution of this exercise are legal considerations, handling of the media, and information and logistical arrangements related to PSOs.

In essence both the area defence and peace support exercises are theoretical in nature and focus on the planning for these operations. A shortcoming, expressed by a senior officer involved in exercise Pegasus, is that although a number of simulation tools are used to assist in the planning to establish possible contingencies, time constraints prohibit the practice of simulated execution and control in such operations. The view was expressed that the exercise also tends to be driven from a military perspective, with insufficient consideration of the impact other role players, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and politicians, have on the execution of such operations. (10) Also, that more exercises that test the ability of officers to deal with unexpected incidents and to execute plans under tight time constraints, are necessary to develop the decision-making skills of officers.

The most senior course in the SANDE is the Joint Staff Course, renamed the Executive National Security Programme (ENSP) in 2000. Since 1995 the emphasis of the Joint Staff Course has shifted from a focus on departmental military strategy, to that of national security strategy. The aim of this course is to provide a broad overview of the strategic environment in which the SANDF has to function and does not specifically address OOTW or aspects relating to conventional warfare, but covers a broad range of national security issues that impact on the strategic level. The National Security module includes discussions on the theory of national security, strategy and conflict, of which the latter includes among others presentations on international law, the law of armed conflict, international humanitarian law and conflict resolution. This is followed by the Republic of South Africa and its Domestic Affairs module, covering aspects that relate to the functioning of the state; human resource issues (demography, health , culture) that impact on national security; perspectives on the role of the economy; infrastructure; the potential for domestic conflict; as well as the causes and effects of, and tools available to, conflict management. The Strategic Neighbourhood module shifts the focus of the course beyond the borders of South Africa, to an evaluation of the national security concerns of countries in the region. This includes an assessment of the region's economy and infrastructure; of collective and regional security; as well as of the nature of regional and African conflict. The final area of study, the Global Trends module, deals with factors influencing the security of the region and Africa. (11)

Besides the education and training officers receive at the various Staff Colleges, the South African Military Academy also provides contextualised military degree courses to young officers in all four arms of service during the formative phase of their careers. Recently, the entire academic programme has been restructured to present a more contextualised degree course. Most of the changes in subject content have occurred in the Human Sciences. In the Political Sciences greater emphasis is placed on the relationship between security and political economy; civil-military relations; and the challenges facing the developing world. Industrial Psychology introduced a module on peacekeeping psychology, hostage negotiations and military values and ethics. Almost 33 per cent of the third year Military History course is now devoted to contemporary warfare and internal and low intensity conflict, with specific reference to sub-Saharan Africa. Military Strategy recently introduced a section on PSOs as part of their natio nal security module. Additional modules on international law and the principles of law of armed conflict were also introduced into the law curriculum.

These revisions, at both the Staff Colleges and Military Academy are the combined outcome of changes in the international environment, for example the end of the Cold War; the national environment, for example constitutional requirements and the changed political dispensation; and the transformation of the SANDF, for example policy guidelines, restructuring, budgetary constraints and shifting mission definition.

2.2 Exercises in peace support operations

Besides the training received at the Services Colleges, the SANDF has sent personnel to attend a wide range of peacekeeping courses in the region and abroad with the aim of establishing a pool of knowledge and expertise among career officers and soldiers. Personnel also undergo simulation exercises that enable troop contingents to practice and test their operational plans, decision-making and resource allocation skills as close to the real situation prior to deployment. In this regard, the most noteworthy exercises in PSOs have taken place with other regional actors.

The first exercise, Blue Hungwe (Fish Eagle), was held in Zimbabwe during 1997 and involved the armed forces of eight Southern African countries. (12) This had a follow-up in exercise Blue Crane at the South African Army Battle School in April 1999, which to date is the biggest multinational peacekeeping exercise ever held in Africa. Between 4 000 and 5 000 participants, at a given time, took part in this exercise which included several other role players and non-governmental actors typically associated with peace missions, as well as international advisers with PSO experience. The main aim of exercise Blue Crane was to enhance the peacekeeping capacity in Southern Africa and to improve regional co-operation among members of the South African Development Community (SADC). Every facet of command, control and operation was practised within a PSO scenario where a cease-fire agreement had been reached between warring parties. This included exercises in the basic skills required for peace missions, humanitarian re lief operations, required planning and logistical support, and the handling of the media.

In essence this was a classic exercise in traditional peacekeeping, practising the resolution of conflict through peaceful means; monitoring compliance with an agreement between warring factions; practising impartiality; applying constraint in the use of force; and fostering cooperation with belligerents. (13) While most observers agreed that this was a good exercise in enhancing regional co-operation and the capacity of SADC states to participate in international peace missions, the concern was raised that in Africa such missions rarely occur under the "ideal" Blue Crane environment. A further concern was the "warrior" ethic that prevailed, which is understandable considering that the troop contributions for PSOs come from the SA Army's hard-core fighting components--the infantry, armour, artillery and parachute battalions. (14)

3. FORCE EMPLOYMENT

If the time devoted to ETD for OOTW is analysed, it remains comparatively little relative to conventional training, especially in the formative phase of an officer's career. However, it is early in their careers that officers in the ranks lieutenant to major are responsible for the execution of these missions and for the actions of those under their command. The question is: "Do these types of operations require different professional performances of the officer than those needed for traditional war operations?" This section outlines the scope of deployments in OOTW * and discusses some of the shortcomings officers experience in their ETD for such operations with reference to survey findings (15) and interviews with senior officers. (16)

3.1 External operations

3.1.1 Peace support operations

Although the SANDF has been preparing for participation in PSOs for a number of years, it has not as yet made any large-scale troop contingents available for deployment. Where this has occurred, it has been mainly in support of UN missions in a specialist capacity. Even the recent deployments of SANDF personnel for the UN Missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and the UN Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), have involved only specialist teams. For example, currently a total of nine members have been deployed to Ethiopia/Eritrea, namely two military liaison officers, two military observers, two operations duty officers, one planning officer, one information officer and one engineer cell warrant officer.

A large contingent of SANDF personnel is deployed as part of the UN operation MONUC II in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Ninety six members are deployed in the following categories: seven staff officers, 21 members in a contingent command and support unit, 48 air cargo handing team members, 14 air crash rescue and fire-fighting members and six aero-medical evacuation team members. (17) Besides these specialist teams, no battalion has been deployed on peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions, although an estimated 3 000 troops have been trained and prepared for this task.

There are several reasons why South Africa has refrained from deploying PSO troops. One is the cost of sustaining these members in the field and another, according to senior officers, is the controversial issue of HIV/AIDS. The concern was expressed "that the SANDF will not be able to deploy a homogenous battalion for a UN mission requiring HIV negative personnel at short notice". Current policy does not permit training commanders to know the HIV status of members until the time of deployment. Presently, conventionally trained soldiers are earmarked for PSOs and it takes approximately 18 weeks to "down-train" for PSOs -- for soldiers to have "the right mindset".

Apart from these immediate internal challenges affecting the operational preparedness for PSOs, it is expected that the challenges will multiply as South African forces deploy with other military contingents. Inadequate training of other national contingents; differences in doctrine; and inter-operability of equipment are some of the challenges the SANDF will have to face. Not only will the SANDF need to overcome practical problems of differences in training, doctrine and inter-operability, but also that of language, cultural differences, communication difficulties, rivalries with officers from other contingents, and different interpretations of missions and ethics. These are typical problems experienced by Western countries on UN missions. Hence the challenge is even greater within the African context, considering the prevalence of ethnic and tribal divisions and the poor infrastructure within which to carry out these operations.

There are also other challenges at a more personal level. An officer, commenting on the SANDF's experience in MONUC, stated that the issue of "relative deprivation in terms of allowances" in UN missions is contentious. There is a need for a national policy on how members participating in PSOs are to be remunerated. Another grave concern is the "opportunity for criminal activities, for bribery". The temptation is often great and troops need to know the consequences, should they succumb. These are all factors affecting morale and discipline and ultimately, the operational effectiveness of such missions.

3.1.2 Military intervention/peace enforcement

Externally, Operation Boleas, a "military intervention", was the most notable international deployment of the SANDF since 1994. The objective of this mission was to restore law and order in Lesotho after it had became destabilised by dissident members of the Lesotho Defence Force, following the alleged rigging of election results. The Lesotho Prime Minister appealed to SADC for assistance, after which a combined task force (CTF) of 600 South African troops and (later) 200 troops from Botswana were deployed in Lesotho, primarily in the capital Maseru. (18) Although the CTF expected some hostility, the intervention was planned as a peacekeeping operation with the instruction to use minimum force. As with many such operations, this changed almost instantly to a peace enforcement operation when upon entry into Maseru, snipers opened fire without warning, killing eight and wounding 17 SANDF soldiers. (19)

Operation Boleas served as a valuable lesson for South Africa in respect of the realities of African conflicts; the importance of intelligence; adequate time for preparation; the suitability of equipment; logistical support; the role of the media; and the need for sound decision-making and leadership skills. It also brought to the fore typical problems associated with OOTW in dealing with the civilian population, local authorities, NGO's, the media and the police. For example, one officer deployed in Operation Boleas stated that: "It is difficult to deploy in an area where the local population and the police and the people from the foreign country stand together. They [the SANDF] become the victims in townships. More emphasis must be put on the situation that you and your troops are walking into. All aspects of that foreign country must be handled with the people deploying there. Language was a big problem". Another officer involved in the execution of Operation Boleas commented that one of the main problems he experienced was not with his training, but knowing "who the enemy was, who to trust, when to use force and not to, who to speak to and who to collaborate with", typical challenges facing decision-makers in such missions.

3.1.3 Disaster/humanitarian aid

Through the years, the SANDF has been involved in numerous disaster relief and search-and-rescue operations within the region. To name but a few, during the 1994-1995 period humanitarian aid was rendered to Rwanda by transporting medical supplies, food and clothing, and-evacuating refugees caught in the ethnic genocide. In 1996, humanitarian assistance was given to Tanzania to help with the recovery of casualties from a sunken ferry in Lake Victoria, as well as to Lesotho following heavy snowfalls, when the SANDF airlifted people trapped in the Lesotho highlands. There have also been several flood relief operations, for example in Mozambique in 1997 and again in March 1999 and 2000. The latter was the most catastrophic, resulting in over 14 399 people rescued and 960 800 tons of food and medical supplies delivered to the disaster stricken areas. Assistance was also given to the Royal Swazi Police (Swaziland) to track down illegal dagga (marijuana) plantations.

Other relief operations included the evacuation of a training team of 720 Tanzanian People's Defence force members from Kamina in the DRC to Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. Also in the DRC, the SANDF evacuated US embassy personnel from Kinshasa. Following a request from the UN (New York), the SANDF deployed eight engineers to Angola to assist in supervising a demining operation. Besides these disaster relief operations, assistance was also given to Mozambique and Lesotho during elections. These activities burden South Africa's defence budget to such an extent that, after the assistance given to Mozambique during the recent floods, flying and training time of the SA Air Force was virtually brought to a halt.

Again, most of these missions have involved specialised teams and the SANDF has received high acclaim for its efficiency. One concern expressed by a senior staff officer involved in external operations is not the SANDF's ability to conduct such operations, but the lack of command-and-control mechanisms to execute these operations within a sub-regional context. This affects rapid response and mechanisms need to be developed and put in place to promote regional security.

3.2 Internal operations

Internally, the SANDF continues to be deployed extensively in border control operations and in support of the SAPS in combating crime and violence within the country. (20)

3.2.1 Borderline protection

Although borderline protection is the responsibility of the SAPS, it continues to be a task performed by the SANDF since it often requires low-grade force, or the threat of force to enforce protective measures. The main aim of the continual deployment of troops along the borders is to prevent illegal border crossings, arms and drugs smuggling, contraband goods crossing the border and crime prevention. In the order of 12 companies (approximately 1 680 members) are deployed daily for borderline control operations along the Namibian, Lesotho, Mozambique and Botswana borders.

Since 1994, it is estimated that between two to eight million illegal immigrants have entered South Africa. (21) For example, to illustrate the extent of illegal immigration, for the period January to June 2000 a total of 26 094 illegal immigrants were arrested (see Table 1). Many more cases go undetected as budgetary and manpower constraints limit the ability of both the military and police to counter the influx of persons across the border. An officer responsible for borderline control expressed his frustration that, "even though the SANDF is capable of catching illegal immigrants, the system is not effective in deporting those caught. There is also little clarity as to how to deal with the illegal immigrants and what the SANDF's mandate is in arresting these persons". Reports are that the same person can be caught up to five times and the feeling of the soldiers on the ground is often one of hopelessness with respect to their effectiveness.

Borderline control currently poses a crisis for the SANDF in terms of its co-operation with the SAPS. Currently, the SAPS is the lead department in border control and in some instances the SANDF cannot act unless requested by a policeman. This implies that the SANDF cannot use force or arrest trespassers unless ordered to do so by the SAPS, creating problems of both command-and-control and the effectiveness of the forces to react rapidly to given situations. The ideal, according to a senior officer, is to give the SANDF specific responsibilities with a clear mandate, rather than continue to deploy the military and police shoulderto-shoulder in such operations. Another problem experienced with frequent deployments of troops for borderline control, especially where there is no close supervision, is that of corruption. A Senior Staff Officer reported that that soldiers are offered substantial rewards to smuggle goods or allow people into the country illegally. (22)

3.2.2 Support to the South African Police Service

In addition to the troops deployed for border control, the SANDF renders extensive support to the SAPS in the maintenance of law and order and in high-intensity anti-crime operations. During the 1998-1999 period, the SANDF conducted 98 high-density operations with the SAPS throughout the country. Six platoons and six companies (a total of 1 050 members) are also deployed daily in support of the police throughout the country as part of Operation Pother. As part of Operation Intexo a further 12 companies (1 880 members) are deployed for rural protection in trouble spots in the Western Cape which has been subject to ongoing gang warfare, drug trafficking and taxi violence, as well as four companies in KwaZulu/Natal, where faction-fighting continues to threaten peace and stability in the area. In Mpumalanga and the Northern Cape the SANDF also provides assistance to combat crime, farm attacks and other illegal activities. (23)

The operational successes of the SANDF in support of the SAPS have been considerable (see Table 1). Together, border control and operations in support of the SAPS cost the SANDF R169 million per annum.

3.2.3 Disaster relief/humanitarian aid

Besides these activities, the SANDE is constantly called upon to assist with various internal disaster/humanitarian aid missions. These include fire fighting operations; search-and-rescue operations resulting from maritime disasters; locating hikers and mountaineers; and disaster relief operations during floods and other natural disasters. Where requested, assistance is also given to other government departments, for example strike relief in the essential services; protection of diplomats; fisheries patrols; assistance during elections; and erecting temporary shelters and repairing damaged infrastructure. Recent examples of such missions include the flood relief in Mpumalanga; medical support during the outbreak of several cholera epidemics; and the assistance provided to combat the spread of foot-and-mouth disease in KwaZulu/Natal.

3.3 Shortcomings and difficulties

One of the features of OOTW is that political and military considerations mingle at the tactical level. The command action often has a political dimension that requires a greater understanding of the particular political environment in which the officer is deployed. Although most SA Army officers responding to the Cemis Survey indicated that they could easily adapt to these missions where a restraint in the use of force is required, a number of shortcomings became evident in their ETD.

Both the quantitative and qualitative findings on the match between education and training and OOTW engagements, substantiate these shortcomings. One officer, for example, expressed the view that it is "vitally important that those deployed in OOTW undergo thorough training and be well informed of the current situation as well as of the politics of the country and that this training must be done down to the lowest level". That everyone must be fully conversant with "the law of armed conflict and know the degree of power and authority that they are allowed to exercise". Another officer reported: "I experienced a total lack of training in terms of the political situation in the country ... I was not trained for this ... I was expected to stabilise a situation in an unrest area with just about no background". Such sentiments are reiterated throughout and it is apparent that officers express the need for greater understanding of the dynamics that underlie the conflict they are expected to manage.

The need for greater awareness of the political and social environment can be ascribed to the fact that OOTW take place within civil society, which brings soldiers into direct contact with the civilian population. In this regard, almost 66 per cent of the SA army officers responding to the Cemis Survey reported that they "sometimes or always" experience difficulties interacting with civilian counterparts during these missions. This applied mostly to their interaction with the civilian population, local authorities, local belligerent factions and the media in the course of their duties. Most of the problems relate to language and communication difficulties and having to deal with people who have "a different mindset". The desire for some knowledge, even elementary, of the local languages in order to "understand the people" and of the local political situation in the course of the mission, is reported repeatedly (see Figure 1).

Concerning mindset and modus operandi, numerous officers expressed frustration in working with the police. As a senior commander explained, "the police are reactive, while the military is proactive in their thinking and this affects things like joint planning of operations and decision-making". Similarly, another officer explained the different mindset as follows: "(T)hroughout our military training we are taught to outmanoeuvre the enemy- to find out who the enemy is. The police are reactive and focus on not disturbing the crime scene, they have a docket approach. They have a different approach to intelligence and confuse intelligence with evidence". Ultimately, the difference between police and the military is one of culture associated with the primary function of the respective forces. For soldiers these policing missions require not only a greater empathy to deal with civilians, but a greater understanding of the legal implications of their actions and what constitutes human rights violations.

A number of senior officers expressed the view that "it is not normal for the military and police to be deployed shoulder-to-shoulder". The ideal is either to create a third force, a para-military force like the French gendamarie, or to assign specific tasks to the SANDF for which it is funded, equipped and supported. This will ensure that the SANDF does not "tap into" the funds assigned for its primary function, as is presently the case, or turn "soldiers into policemen". The problem of using soldiers in these policing roles is even more crucial in rural areas where police are understaffed and the territorial reserves (commandos) are called in at short notice. In such instances, they are deployed not behind the police, but "in the face of the public" armed only with assault rifles. One commander stated that this "not only affects the image of the military, but the seriousness of the job is not properly addressed and does not take place in a structured way". The main problem occurs when crowds start looting a nd soldiers respond with fire-power to protect life and property.

For the military, in OOTW where the enemy is not clearly defined and the mission uncertain or seemingly unattainable, the lack of recognition at home and in the media increases the level of frustration and stress experienced by those serving in these operations. In this regard, more than 60 per cent of SA Army officers reported that they sometimes or frequently face difficulties in managing the psychological stress of soldiers whilst deployed. (24) Problems emanate from several sources, amongst others from lengthy and frequent deployments; the risk the mission poses to life; uncertainty with respect to the law and when and when not to use force; and relative deprivation concerning pay and equipment. An example quoted by a senior commander suffices: "Troops are told only to react to hostile acts, but when a civilian spits his face -- is this a hostile act. The troop is not armed with a baton, teargas, rubber bullets ... but with live ammo, an assault rifle, but if he uses it, shoots and kills someone its murde r". For a young officer in command of a small unit it is often extremely difficult to know what constitutes a hostile act and to decide what kind of reaction is required.

The difficulties and stress officers experience, both personally and in managing subordinates, are to some extent reflected in the deficiencies identified in their education and training. More than 50 per cent of the SA Army officers indicated that there were some shortcomings in their education, specifically with respect to language training; intercultural management techniques; negotiation and conflict handling skills; knowledge of international law; and mass communication techniques. Also, but to a lesser extent, they indicated shortcomings in subjects such as Sociology and Psychology. Most stated that while their training was good, it did not always help them in the execution of OOTW. A particular comment made was that "there were no language courses, no public relations, no public communications, no current political information or even education about the influence of politics on the defence force in my training. I would say it focused on the practical part and not on the MIND part of doing any ops". Th us, the general sentiment is that officers are prepared "practically" but not "mentally" for operations.

Across the spectrum, many officers responding to the Cemis Survey felt that the briefings or simulation exercises just prior to deployment did not prepare them sufficiently for the planning and execution of OOTW. According to some of the comments of SA Army officers: "(T)oo much is left to on-the-job training" and not enough is done to prepare members before deployment. One officer remarked that the short training programme provided before deployment is not sufficient as "it does not change the attitude of members, or prepare them psychologically" for the challenges they are to face. Further comments were that where "proper mission (specific) training is not provided, it is difficult to plan and prepare for such operations" and to know what to actually do in some cases; that "too much emphasis is placed on conventional operations"; and that "the short training they received before deployment is insufficient". A typical comment was: "I strongly feel that I should get more exposure in OOTW to better my orientat ion and frame of mind". In an interview with a senior commander, he explained this as follows: "I receive combat ready troops -- conventionally trained. I then need to deploy them in the townships in support of the police and often, I do not have enough time to prepare them for the situation they are going to face". Thus, the general opinion is that more mission-specific training to prepare officers for the wide array of tasks, both operationally and mentally, is required.

Despite these shortcomings, most officers who had served OOTW judged the results of OOTW missions and their leadership and involvement in these missions positively, irrespective of the emphasis that is placed on conventional training. Some officers did, however, feel that their training did not allow them to be "thinking officers" and that this was a problem in OOTW that requires a greater degree of "flexibility and lateral thinking". This comment relates more to education, than to training. Very few officers have a tertiary education and only 10 per cent pass through the Military Academy. There is no doubt that a sound education in the Human Sciences in terms of OOTW does provide officers with the knowledge to take more informed decisions. As one officer commented: "(M)y education at the Military Academy helped me tremendously in understanding the bigger picture, our role in it and how people are affected. People are the most important part of our business, everything we do involves people".

Education becomes even more important in OOTW where officers have to operate in remote environments, without direct supervision and where they have to execute decisions relatively independently. Unlike conventional operations where the rules are fixed, where the mission is "cut and dry" and where the command is top-down, OOTW take place in an environment where the rules are changeable and little is predetermined. In such operations officers need to be flexible and able to make decisions based on the demands of surrounding environment, often at short notice. For this a greater sensitivity and knowledge of the context in which they operate, is required to guide their actions.

4. FORCE SUSTAINMENT

From discussions it is evident that the issue of force sustainment, namely the ability to clothe, feed and equip officers and troops deployed in both internal and external missions, pose the greatest challenge. The problems include budgetary constraints, the suitability of equipment, lack of logistical support and administrative deficiencies. As an example, the current support rendered to the SAPS is funded out of the present budget for the primary role which, according to an officer responsible for internal operations, is less than three per cent of the defence budget. The SANDF requires more than double this to cope with the current need for internal operations.

While the SANDF has sufficiently qualified and trained troops, it does not have the funds to sustain personnel during deployment. This is even more crucial for the reserve and territorial forces upon whose operational capability the SANDF relies heavily for internal operations. One report claims that "a reserve battalion will have to function for a year on little more than that allocated to a full-time private" which is R39 000 per annum. (25) Similarly, budgetary considerations impact on the availability, suitability and inter-operability of equipment.

Availability is currently affected by the lack of funds to maintain and purchase new equipment. Much of the SANDF's equipment is old or has high mileage, which in turn places a higher demand on maintenance. There is also the reluctance of units to make available equipment for operations, knowing that they have no funds to maintain or replace it. Shortages are being experienced in crucial areas, with no funds to purchase new equipment. For example, the opinion was expressed that "the SANDF does not have an adequate strategic airlift capability to sustain or remove personnel deployed in PSOs", especially if the deployment of battalions is considered. Across the board it is the opinion of commanders that they find it difficult to provide the basic equipment needed to fulfil their operational requirements.

Suitability of equipment refers to its appropriateness for the missions for which it is to be used. Much of the SANDF's equipment is designed for conventional operations on the African battlefield. As such, vehicles amongst others, are not suitable for PSOs or internal operations, which as a general rule require greater flexibility, mobility, manoeuvrability and protection against small arms or mines, rather than sheer fire power. To quote a typical dilemma expressed by a commander: "When we deploy troops in the townships we use Mamba bullet-proof personnel carriers. These vehicles were designed for the African battlefield and are difficult to manoeuvre. Alternatively, troops must go on the back of a Samil, but we do not have enough body armour. If the troop does not feel safe, the stress level rises, he feels insecure and there is a reluctance to do what is expected. It is then when they abuse their fire power or resort to intimidation tactics". Light tanks and wheeled armoured personnel carriers, light infa ntry fighting vehicles and reconnaissance vehicles are more suited to the variety of tasks required in these missions.

Inter-operability of equipment, especially for external operations, is another growing concern. The SANDE has a range of specialised equipment. The fact that civilian contractors are largely responsible for the maintenance of this equipment, brings another dimension to the fore -- especially where maintenance support is required at the frontline. Many officers expressed the view that "we tend to over-speck" and feel that the SANDF will be better off obtaining equipment off-the-shelf, which is easily serviceable and compatible with Western equipment. The greatest problem that is foreseen is in the event of an SANDF deployment with other SADC contingents. This was already identified as a major problem during exercise Blue Crane, due to the incompatibility of communication equipment, ammunition, weapons and vehicles, since national contingents were previously supplied either by the East or the West.

Other concerns affecting force sustainment are logistics and administrative support. Material and organisational factors have often undermined the effectiveness of UN missions. (26) and this seems to be a major concern, even in respect of internal operations conducted by the SANDF. Officers report (often blamed on transformation) that there is "a lack of structure from the tactical to the operational level on how to support and sustain forces on the ground". Presently, with the general support base structure (GSBs) not yet fully functional, it is not clear who is responsible for what. Several senior commanders stated that they "rely on the old boys net to make things work and get the job done" and this is "not the way a military should operate". There appears to be an administrative overlap of who budgets for what and who is responsible for providing support in terms of rations, equipment, medical support and allowances.

Previously, a commander had control over the management of resources for force preparation, employment and sustainment. These responsibilities are now split and impede a commander's ability to execute functions effectively. This affects even the most minor operation, especially those requiring rapid deployment in areas where support facilities are not at close range. The frustrations are not limited to force employment, but also impact on force preparation. The operating budgets of many training units have been cut by 50 per cent and there are insufficient funds to provide ammunition, fuel and equipment for those under training. The full implications of these "deficiencies" caused by budgetary cuts are daunting, as they not only erode competency, and lower confidence and morale, but also reduce the overall operational capabilities of the SANDF.

5. HUMAN RESOURCES

Another problem of an entirely different nature, one that threatens to undermine force preparation, force employment as well as force sustainment, is that of HIV/AIDS. Already commanders are expressing their concerns about staffing and members having to "double up" to bridge the gaps of sick members. For both internal and external operations, combat readiness is compromised if key posts are vacant, or suddenly vacated without prior warning. With no immediate cure and in the absence of anti-retroviral drugs to contain the disease, the human resource implications are immense, affecting all generic personnel processes ranging from personnel planning, staffing, utilisation, ETD to ultimately separation.

Currently, almost 40 per cent of all chronic illnesses in the SANDF are linked to HIV/AIDS. With the alarming rate of HIV infection, the SANDF tests members to determine the state of force readiness. All recruits applying for a position as a uniformed (not civilian) member of the SANDF are tested for HIV/AIDS as part of their medical fitness profile. Those in service undergo tests every six to 24 months, depending on their mustering. However, to avoid human rights violations, HIV testing is strictly voluntary. Those who refuse are medically reclassified and not used for cross-border deployment. (27)

Because the epidemic is still in the infection stage, with few physically ill or dying from HIV/AIDS, the real impact on the SANDF will only manifest within the next five years. Estimates are that by 2005, 25 per cent of the labour force will be HIV positive and this may even be higher for the SANDF given its status as a high-risk sector. As current regulations do not permit the severance of serving SANDF members based upon their health status per se, the SANDF has no option but to devise means to manage the increasing number of health non-compliant members. This includes determining what posts require a "certain" health status; whether members are to be retrained and at what cost; whether HIV status should be a consideration in career advancement and attendance of promotional courses; and at what point the services of a member should be terminated. At present there are no clear policy guidelines on these issues and how they are to be managed.

Without doubt, the cost of training and retaining in future will be insurmountable. For example, on average it takes an SA Army officer five to seven years (age 23-25) before he/she can be promoted to captain, eight to 11 years (age 25-30) to major, 12-15 years (age 30-35) to lieutenant colonel and 16-19 years (age 35-40 and higher) to the rank of colonel. Rank promotion of military personnel is influenced by the completion of compulsory military courses applicable to their specific utilisation within the services. (28) The age group most affected is 23-32 years with up to 50 per cent of the almost 38 per cent with chronic illnesses in the age group 25-29 infected, according to the recent voluntary concurrent health assessment conducted among the combat forces in July 2000. This age group provides the largest number of operationally deployable members and typically officers and noncommissioned officers in this rank group perform highly skilled, supervisory and management functions. The potential shortage of q ualified and experienced members in these ranks will inevitably lead to a "hollowing out" of the organisation at the level of middle management. Besides the loss of continuity of command, this encourages the rapid promotion of younger inexperienced members, which in turn affects morale, discipline and cohesion and overall competency of the armed forces.

The biggest challenge lies with having to accommodate large numbers of HIV positive persons who are no longer capable of performing the tasks for which they have been trained. Presently, persons who are ill or in key positions cannot be replaced until they "physically die". There is no staffing policy in place that allows replacement of these members temporarily or permanently until the actual post is vacated. The inability to dismiss and the option of having to utilise unfit, untrained personnel in support functions will inevitably erode organisational and operational effectiveness, unless the issue of staffing is addressed. Complicating the placement of HIV compromised persons is the number of posts available as many of the support posts have either been civilianised, rationalised or outsourced, or are in many cases already overstaffed.

In the short- to medium-term the only viable solution, (which may be subject to human rights violations) is the employment of members on a rolling contract system, with renewal based on the individual's ability to meet the SANDF's medical health standards. This is a controversial area and the "medical specifications" for particular occupations will need to be clearly defined if this is to be "non-discriminatory" and if the SANDF is not to unnecessarily exclude qualified persons who may still have many productive years, despite their health status. What remains elusive without accurate data, is whether there will be sufficiently qualified, medically fit personnel to feed into the medium-term (10-year contract) and long-term service system as a result of this epidemic.

South Africa supports the UN's recommendations only to deploy medically fit soldiers who are HIV negative, but even for internal deployments, the SANDE faces a number of challenges. An officer involved in force preparation for external operations expressed the following concern: "Current policy does not allow us to know who is HIV positive. Only the General Officer Commanding of the unit knows. I continue to train and retain members for PSOs, but when the actual day comes for deployment, certain members will be removed on the basis of their 'health status"'. There are also no clear guidelines of what to do with those left behind. Concerning internal deployment of HIV positive soldiers an officer commented: "The policy of sending HIV negative soldiers externally, but deploy HIV positive internally is a violation of our Constitution. Is it not our duty to protect our nation first -- or do we hold the citizens of other countries in higher regard than our own". His concern goes further to the willingness of membe rs of own forces to assist each other if injured, and to the legal implications if found that a HIV positive soldier infected a civilian in the course of his/her duties.

There are also diplomatic concerns. These include, amongst others, healthy peacekeeping forces being infected by disease-carrying forces and local populations; inadequate health care facilities in host countries; and the high-risk behaviour of military personnel. Until now the perils of committing forces to PSOs in high HIV prevalence countries have not been given serious attention, despite the indisputable evidence that troop deployment for peacekeeping and other purposes increase HIV transmission to and from host countries. In this regard, South Africa with its high infection rate may become increasingly controversial.

6. CONCLUSION

With respect to force preparation, the overall consensus is that although the SANDF's ETD still focuses primarily on conventional training, these skills to a large extent apply equally to OOTW Both ETD and OOTW require effective command-and-control, sound leadership, and disciplined and highly trained personnel capable of rapidly and effectively handling a wide variety of tasks. However, judging from the opinions expressed by those directly deployed in OOTW, there appears to be a need for more mission-specific training and mental preparation for OOTW -- skills not acquired in the course of conventional training. The general feeling was that more time is needed to down-train for OOTW, especially as the execution of these missions are less clear and demands a greater degree of flexibility and understanding of the political context.

In essence, this relates more to education than training and the need for a broad-based education in the Human Sciences, given that OOTW take place mostly within civil society. An appropriate knowledge of languages -- local indigenous languages and French (for PSOs in Africa) -- that will enhance communication with civilian populations, is essential. A greater sense of cultural diversity and a general understanding of those socio-political factors that underlie the disputes and conflicts officers are expected to manage, appear to be a definite requirement. To some extent, subjects covering these aspects are increasingly incorporated in course curricula, but it is the briefings on the immediate social environment in which they are deployed, that needs to be addressed to give soldiers enough time to adapt and prepare themselves. Because these missions differ from operation to operation, the different rules of engagement and how they have to be applied to the concrete situation, is of growing concern, particular ly when military personnel are deployed in policing roles.

This is another area upon which greater clarity will have to be obtained should the SANDE become more involved in security problems that neither the police nor the military can deal with alone. Command-and-control seems to be at the core of the problems being experienced in these "shoulder-to-shoulder" deployments and this is primarily due to the type of issues being dealt with. The type of criminal activity and violence that have to be dealt with, requires a mix of both centralised and decentralised control. The military currently does not have the mandate nor the flexibility to handle these new missions as effectively as it could. Short of creating a "third force", this is clearly an area that needs closer examination if the SANDF is to be used more extensively in these secondary roles.

The greatest challenge facing the SANDF, both in respect of force preparation and force deployment, is the sustainment of forces in terms of equipment, logistics and administration. Operating budgets of some units for force preparation have been affected significantly and this will no doubt impact negatively on the quality of the preparation of the forces, irrespective of the missions in which they are used. At all levels there are insufficient funds for operating, maintaining and sustaining equipment. On the issue of inter-operability of equipment, this is not an immediate problem for UN missions. Where external deployments have taken place, functions are grouped and the SANDF provides its own equipment for this purpose. The concern lies more with the maintenance of specialist equipment Weapons and equipment renewals are generally long-term processes and the suggestion is that the SANDF, especially with the more extensive deployment in OOTW in mind, obtains "off-the-shelf" equipment that is easily obtainable and serviceable. Purchasing of such equipment for secondary functions will basically depend on what politicians decide the SANDF will be used for.

Currently the greatest frustration seems to lie with logistical support and centralisation under the GSBs, which have not only confused command-and-control, but also the allocation of resources and financial management of the support function. Across the board, as a result of financial constraints and the administrative shortcomings presently experienced in the system, units battle to provide the necessary support for operations. One area commander stated quite categorically that "he cannot say that there is a guaranteed combat readiness, primarily due to financial constraints and the present divisions in tasking". Specifically amongst those commanders having to deploy troops, there is the feeling of being disempowered.

As regards HIV/AIDS, clearly this is an area that the SANDF has to address as a matter of urgency. The impact of the disease on recruiting and staffing, should receive specific attention. More research is needed in this area in order to formulate policy to manage the impending crisis, giving due recognition to human rights issues and the necessity to have combat ready forces. HIV/AIDS also has several implications for diplomatic and foreign relations. What if South Africa cannot deploy healthy troops at short notice or, as was the case with Operation Boleas, do not have time to test troops before deployment? What if South Africa is forced to deploy troops with other national contingents, with known high HIV prevalence and who do not honour the UN recommendations of deploying only HIV negative troops on external missions? How will this impact on regional security?

In conclusion, an affirmative answer can be given to the question: "How prepared are the armed forces for soft missions?" With a little more mission-specific training and mental preparation, OOTW pose no problem. In fact, the South African armed forces have extensive experience in such operations, more so than most nations. However, as to whether these operations will be executed effectively or not, there are doubts, given the present logistical and administrative shortcomings. No matter how well-trained and educated the armed forces, no mission can be successful if the support for those executing the mission is lacking.

Table 1     Operational Successes in Support of the Police: 1 January to 19 June  2000                 Activity                  Amount     Illegal immigrants arrested           26 094  Firearms confiscated (pistols,         2 007  handguns, AK47 rifles)  Drugs: Mandrax tablets                12 759  Marijuana (in kilograms)              62 792  Criminals arrested (various crimes)    3 988  Stolen live stock recovered              690  Vehicles recovered                       448     Source: Department of Defence, "Crime Prevention Operations in Support  of the Police",  http://www.mil.za/old_sandf/media/operat...   ntion/police/2000%20jan%20%April.htm, accessed 7 August 2000.  Figure 1     Difficulties Experienced with Civilian Counterparts        Media                18%  Local factions       39%  Civilian population  56%  Local authorities    41%  Civilian officials   10%     Source: Centre for Military Studies, 2000     Note: Table made from bar graph 

REFERENCES

(1.) Williams, R, "Against Meta-narratives? The Strengths and Weaknesses of Modernism within Contemporary South African Defence Thinking", Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol XX, No 1, May 1998, p33.

(2.) Franke, V. "Warriors for Peace: The next generation of U.S. Military Leaders", Armed Forces and Society, Vol 24, No 1