South Africa risk: Political stability risk
SUMMARY
South Africa's political outlook has been transformed by the resignation of Thabo Mbeki (after he was recalled by the ruling African National Congress-ANC) in September and his replacement, in a caretaker capacity, by Kgalema Motlanthe, the party's deputy president. Mr Motlanthe, an intellectual and a conciliator, is widely respected but is due to step down after next year's election-and will most probably be replaced by Jacob Zuma, the ANC president, although this is not guaranteed. The switch of president means that the transition to the new left-leaning ANC leadership (elected at the party congress last December) has taken place much more quickly than had been expected. This is broadly positive, as it will now be possible to make an assessment of the new team's performance (with the proviso that it is an interim administration) without waiting until mid-2009.
SCENARIOS
Prospect of a breakaway cannot be ruled out
Low likelihood; Moderate impact; Intensity =6
The centrist members of the ANC are all too aware of the growing ascendance of the left-leaning leadership that took control of the party last Handing the interim presidency to Mr Motlanthe (and not, as had been rumoured, the speaker of parliament and party chairwoman, Baleka Mbete) is an astute move in many ways and maximises continuity: Mr Zuma was not eligible for the post as he is not a member of parliament. The ANC had already been preparing for a Motlanthe presidency next year in the event that Mr Zuma’s legal battles overwhelmed him, and earlier pushed through his appointment to the cabinet (as minister without portfolio) to help smooth the transition. The transition process has simply happened far sooner than had been anticipated and, if Mr Zuma falters, could mean that Mr Motlanthe’s tenure lasts much longer than an interim nine months. Judging from moves thus far to promote reconciliation between the party’s left and centre, Mr Motlanthe—an intellectual rather than a populist—is also well-placed to keep the cabinet relatively intact (the ANC’s express aim). However, companies operating in the country need to be aware that the centrist members of the ANC are all too aware of the growing ascendance of the left-leaning leadership that took control of the party last December, and a breakaway cannot be ruled out in future.
Zimbabwe’s crisis remains a problem for South Africa
High likelihood; High impact; Intensity =16
South Africa's leadership transition will not have a significant impact on foreign policy (the foreign minister remains in place) but the departure of Mr Mbeki, who was deeply involved in foreign policymaking and execution, especially in Africa, signals a shift to a more inward-looking phase as the country focuses on internal challenges such as poverty and inequality. Nevertheless, South Africa will not retreat from high-level engagement on the continent, especially in the medium term, and will continue to remain closely involved in trying to find a solution to the crisis in neighbouring Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) have signed a power-sharing agreement but negotiations to form a national unity agreement remain deadlocked. Zimbabwe's economic pressures are becoming increasingly severe, with GDP expected to continue to fall in 2009. About half the population is now being fed by donors and another dire agricultural season is in prospect for 2008/09. This is making Mugabe's rule increasingly untenable. If the stalled power-sharing deal agreed on September 15th can be resuscitated Mugabe is expected to stay as president pending his party’s choice of a successor to take over the reins sometime during 2009 or possibly in 2010, when he would step down. If the agreement collapses altogether, the ruling Zanu-PF party will still have to find a new leader over the next year to 18 months, also pointing to his exit by end 2009 or mid-2010. However, this process can be hastened with a suitable "exit package" for the president.
Mr Zuma is not yet in the clear
Moderate likelihood; Moderate impact; Intensity =9
Mr Mbeki's demise is directly linked to Jacob Zuma's corruption trial—after a judge pointed to political interference in the prosecution process—and the fall of one man is matched by the rise of the other. Mr Zuma is not yet fully in the clear, however—the judge did not rule on his "guilt or innocence"—and the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) intends to appeal the latest ruling and may charge Mr Zuma for a third time. However, Mr Zuma's prospects of becoming president in 2009 have improved significantly, and it now seems unlikely that the judicial process will derail the succession. Even if Mr Zuma were to falter (or to pull out for any reason), the ANC's fallback candidate—Mr Motlanthe---will already have presidential experience and could continue ruling in a seamless transition. In fact, many people who are nervous about having the flamboyant and populist Mr Zuma as president would prefer Mr Motlanthe to stay in power. Companies need to note that there is some scope for potential competition between the two men but they appear to be working in co-operation, at least for now.
A new opposition party will be a serious challenge for ANC
Low likelihood; Low impact; Intensity =4
South Africa's opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), headed by Helen Zille, hopes to drag the party away from its white, middle-class roots, and attract black and other voters by adopting a more inclusive approach, including alliances with other parties. With 16% of the popular vote, representing mainly white and mixed-race voters and South Africans of Indian descent, the DA is not expected to pose a major challenge for the ANC. However, if South Africa's former defence minister, Mosiuao Lekpta, a close ally of Mr Mbeki, can get a serious movement off the ground and form a new party--consisting of disaffected members of the ANC, who are political and to a lesser extent ethnic differences--it would reduce the ruling ANC's two-thirds majority in parliament.
BACKGROUND
(Updated: May 16th, 2008)
Political Forces
The dominant party in South Africa is the ANC, the main party of extra-parliamentary opposition to minority rule since it was founded in 1912. A defining feature of the ANC has been its commitment to non-racial democracy. However, it is a coalition of diverse interests. Differences are apparent between members associated with the movement in exile, such as Thabo Mbeki, and those who worked in the underground movement and the United Democratic Front (UDF), which acted as a domestic political surrogate for the ANC in the late 1980s.
The ANC has a long tradition of exceptional leaders. Most attention has focused on Nelson Mandela, who was imprisoned from 1963 to 1990, but many other members are also impressive. Mr Mandela's successor, Mr Mbeki, virtually ran the day-to-day business of government during the final year of Mr Mandela's presidency. He was one of the architects of the government's growth, employment and redistribution strategy in January 1997, and was elected unopposed to the ANC presidency at the party's congress in December 1997.
Since Mr Mbeki's assumption of the presidency, there has been more tension in the organisation around the leadership than during Mr Mandela's five years in office. A significant minority within the ANC and its alliance partners feel that Mr Mbeki has shown poor judgment on a number of issues. These include, most recently, the handling of the Zimbabwe situation, the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the controversial arms deal and racial reconciliation, on which Mr Mbeki has been more Africanist than Mr Mandela.
However, Mr Mbeki's control over the ANC remains strong, as reflected by the fact that little critical public debate or discussion takes place on controversial policy issues within parliament. This is a significant departure from the historical culture of the ANC. Moreover, it seems that Mr Mbeki's power in the ANC is unlikely to be challenged in his second and final term in office.
One of the most important non-party political forces is the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which emerged during the mid-1980s as a force of political opposition while the ANC was banned. Its most talented leaders have been absorbed into the government, leaving COSATU with a weak leadership. The South African Communist Party (SACP) has lost a significant proportion of its membership since the ban on the ANC was lifted in 1990, but it continues to provide intellectual arguments for the left. However, both COSATU and the SACP have a number of ministers in the present government who actively defend the conservative economic framework within which the government operates; this illustrates the complex relationship between and within the three organisations.
Tensions between the ANC, the SACP and COSATU have been mounting in recent years as the ANC's partners have demanded a stronger voice in policymaking and criticised the ANC's policies on macroeconomic policy, labour reform and privatisation. Such dissatisfaction was evident in the mass public-sector strike in June and early August 2007, which was backed by the SACP and COSATU. Although primarily aimed at achieving wage increases, the strike was designed to put pressure on the regime to drop allegedly business-friendly policies and take stronger action against poverty and unemployment; it was tactically timed for the run-up to the ANC policy conference in July 2007 and the leadership elections in December 2007.
However, so far the issues keeping the alliance together have been stronger than their differences, suggesting that the alliance will continue in its present form. This acts as a drag on the government's desire to reform the labour market, increase the pace of privatisation and make South Africa more open to international economic forces.
The Democratic Alliance (DA) is the official opposition party and was formed in June 2000 from two parties, the Democratic Party (DP), which became the official opposition after the 1999 general election, and the New National Party (NNP). The partnership between the DP and the NNP followed a marked shift to the right by the DP in the 1999 election, when it attracted much of the NNP's conservative support base. However, in 2001 the NNP left the DA in order to form an alliance with the ANC. The DA's efforts to develop its support among the black population have not had much success: it has been largely whites and the middle class, rather than poor blacks, who have backed the party. The long-standing DP leader, Tony Leon, resigned in May 2007 and was replaced by Helen Zille, the mayor of Cape Town. Relations between Mr Mbeki and the DA were frosty under Mr Leon but may improve under Mrs Zille (even though the ANC tried to oust her from the mayoralty in 2006). However, the DA cannot hope to pose a serious challenge to the ANC's hegemony.
The previously influential political groups of the white right (such as the Conservative Party and the openly racist Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging) have become marginalised. The Afrikaner cause, including the establishment of a volkstaat—a white homeland within South Africa—has been promoted since 1994 by the Vryheidsfront Plus party. However, none of these groupings carries any significant political clout outside their narrow support bases. At the other end of the political spectrum, the radical Pan Africanist Congress and the Azanian People's Organisation performed dismally in the 1999 general election.
Main political figures
Thabo Mbeki: The president, a technocrat and a pragmatist, will be obliged to stand down in 2009, after two five-year terms, under the current constitution. He is also expected to stand down as leader of the African National Congress (ANC) at the national conference in December 2007, but faces no time limits in this case and may seek another term, especially if his left-wing arch-rival, Jacob Zuma, is a contender to succeed him. Mr Mbeki's economic record is sound. He also takes a prominent role in foreign affairs, especially conflict resolution and integration within Sub-Saharan Africa.
Trevor Manuel: Mr Manuel has distinguished himself as one of South Africa's better finance ministers, and his fiscal discipline in the face of often intense pressure from the ANC rank and file has won him the respect of the financial markets. Nowadays it is difficult to believe that, when he took over as finance minister in 1996, there was an adverse market reaction to his appointment. Mr Manuel's macroeconomic orthodoxy has made him very popular with local businessmen as well as in international financial and economic management circles.
Tito Mboweni: The governor of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB, the central bank) since 1999 has earned a reputation for sound judgement by helping to build foreign-exchange reserves to record levels in the face of rand volatility, and can take some credit for the rebound in economic growth. His policy decision not to intervene to defend the rand in late 2001 when the currency was under intense pressure on world markets has been vindicated, although the sharp rebound in the rand's value in recent years has been at least partly blamed on his non-interventionist approach. Under his leadership, the SARB has eliminated the net open forward position, or uncovered foreign-currency-denominated debt, which had stood at US$25bn when the SARB had attempted to defend the rand against speculators in 1998. In addition, the strength of the rand has allowed the SARB to engineer a shift in the inflation rate, which has remained mostly within its targeted band of 3-6%. Any change at the top of the SARB would be as likely to cause market jitters as a change at the head of the finance ministry.
Jacob Zuma: An ANC loyalist and front-runner for the national presidency. Having been acquitted of charges of rape, and following the collapse of corruption charges against him in 2006, he has staged a comeback. He and his followers are engaged in a fierce rivalry with Mr Mbeki and his supporters; this could spark a large-scale power struggle.
Helen Zille: The new leader of the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), Mrs Zille was elected in May 2007 to replace the long-standing, Tony Leon. She is the most effective opposition leader, and proved her mettle when she emerged victorious from a major stand-off with the ANC provincial government, which had attempted to win control of Cape Town city council by replacing the mayoral system with an executive committee system that would have stripped her of most her powers. She has taken over the leadership of the DA at the height of its national support, but faces competition from the Independent Democrats (ID) and their charismatic and fiery leader, Patricia de Lille; they are offering a new home for South African liberals. Mrs Zille also faces a considerable task in trying to attract more support from the black population and to shed the DA's predominantly "white" image.
Zwelinzima Vavi: The influential general secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) faces the task of preventing a collapse in union membership while ensuring that organised labour continues to have political clout. Mr Vavi has the intellectual capacity to maintain pressure on the government on behalf of workers and the poor, and the trade union movement may be able to extend its political influence if Mr Zuma runs for president. An opponent of the ANC's macroeconomic blueprint, Growth, Employment and Redistribution, Mr Vavi has worked tirelessly to persuade the ANC to abandon the strategy in favour of a state-interventionist approach. He faces a difficult task in keeping some of the more militant COSATU unions in check while seeking to bolster COSATU's influence in government.
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka: Appointed to replace Mr Zuma as vice-president in 2005, she is thought to be Mr Mbeki's preferred choice for the top job when he steps down in 2009, especially given his view that a woman should now fill the role. She supports the economic reforms that Mr Mbeki, Mr Manuel and Mr Mboweni are trying to push through.
Political Development
South African politics have been dominated by the succession issue since 2005. A key unknown factor is whether or not the president, Mr Mbeki, will seek a third term as ANC leader. The constitution bars him from standing again for the national presidency (which is limited to two terms), but there is no barrier to the number of terms that can be served as party president. If Mr Mbeki were to seek another stint as party boss he would be difficult to defeat, but this would create an awkward situation in 2009, raising questions about who would represent the party at the polls and how that person would be chosen.
One of the main factors pushing Mr Mbeki towards standing again is the desire to keep out his arch-rival, Jacob Zuma. Mr Zuma's ambition to become president took a serious blow in 2005 when charges of rape and then corruption were laid against him. However, his standing rebounded in 2006, following his acquittal on the rape charges in May and his subsequent return to the ANC deputy presidency, and the collapse in September of his trial on corruption charges (the prosecutor's evidence was found to be inadmissible). Mr Zuma's supporters have long alleged that both cases were politically motivated and see the outcome as vindicating that belief, but he is not yet in the clear. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is still gathering evidence with a view to reinstating the corruption allegations (which relate to kickbacks from an arms contract). This would undoubtedly compromise Mr Zuma's prospects at the ANC's December conference.
Mr Zuma's charismatic and populist approach appeals to workers, communists, young people and fellow Zulus, although he has never espoused a particularly radical vision. He seeks the ANC leadership (and, he hopes, the presidency) but the renewal of corruption allegations could scupper his chances, although he would still remain a key "kingmaker".
The prospect of Mr Mbeki standing down and the uncertainty surrounding Mr Zuma has raised speculation about other candidates who could emerge as leader of the country's largest party. Potential contenders include the following prominent figures.
Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka: Appointed to replace Mr Zuma as vice-president in 2005, she is thought to be Mr Mbeki's preferred choice for the top job when he steps down in 2009, especially given his view that a woman should now fill the role. However, Mrs Mlambo-Ngcuka is a relative lightweight, without a large support base, and holds little appeal for the left. The foreign minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is perhaps a better-placed female contender, having cultivated the left with an accommodating approach to the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe.
Tokyo Sexwale: The politician-turned-businessman is a possible compromise candidate acceptable to the Mbeki camp and the left—as both a successful entrepreneur and an anti-apartheid veteran—but he has not confirmed that he will return to the political arena. Moreover, many on the left remain suspicious of former comrades who went into business and benefited from black economic empowerment (BEE) policies, and Mr Sexwale cannot be sure of support from the entire Zuma camp.
Cyril Ramaphosa: Another politician-turned-businessman who played a key role in the independence struggle, he faces the same problems as Mr Sexwale, if not more so, as he has benefited even more from BEE. Mr Ramaphosa, like Mr Sexwale, has the advantage of being a well-known public figure, but both men could face resistance from the political establishment because of their previous exit from politics. It is believed that Mr Ramaphosa, not Mr Mbeki, was Mr Mandela's preferred successor in 1999.
Other, less likely, candidates for the ANC presidency include the party secretary-general, Kgalema Mothlanthe; the long-serving finance minister, Trevor Manuel; the central bank governor, Tito Mboweni; a presidential adviser, Joel Netshitenzhe; and the parliamentary speaker, Baleka Mbete.
The ruling ANC gained 66% of the votes cast in the country's municipal elections, held on March 1st 2006, while the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) secured just 15%. Although the ANC lost direct control of Cape Town, no party gained outright control—the DA won 41%, the ANC 39% and the Independent Democrats just 11% of the votes—and the DA now leads a coalition in the city (the location of the South African parliament). The IFP and its ageing leader, Chief Buthelezi, retained control of 18 municipalities (with 7.6% of the vote), all in the party's KwaZulu-Natal heartland. Although the ANC remains largely unchallenged politically, the 2006 municipal elections generated more public debate than any previously held, owing to the government's failure to deliver promised improved services to many poorer communities. This is particularly apparent in poor townships, where lack of service delivery has led to a rash of violent protests since 2004, and in former crossborder municipalities, where provincial boundaries have been changed against the wishes of local residents. New local parties or independent social movements have been founded and are contesting elections in many of these areas.
Local government elections
(support for the three main parties)
% support Seats won % of seats
Party 2000 2006 2000 2006 2000 2006
African National Congress (ANC) 60.7 66.3 5,031 5,718 54.7 61.5
Democratic Alliance (DA) 20.4 14.7 1,414 1,017 1.3 11.9
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 9.7 8.0 913 738 10.2 7.9
Source: Independent Electoral Commission.
The ANC overwhelmingly defeated its opponents in the national election on April 14th 2004. The ANC managed to secure a two-thirds majority of the votes, boosting its share from 66.4% in 1999 to 69.7%. Total votes cast as a proportion of total registered voters resulted in a 76.7% turnout but, when the number of eligible voters is considered, only about 58% cast votes. The election was generally considered free and fair, with only a few isolated cases of intimidation and no violence, even in KwaZulu-Natal, which had been a problem province in the past, with clashes between the ANC and the IFP.
Parliamentary forces(a)
1994 1999 2003 2004
% of vote Seats % of vote Seats FC % of vote Seats
African National Congress (ANC) 62.7 252 66.4 266 275 69.7 279
Democratic Alliance (DA) 1.7 7 9.6 38 46 12.4 50
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 10.5 43 8.6 34 31 7.0 28
New National Party (NNP) 20.4 82 6.9 28 20 1.7 7
United Democratic Movement (UDM) – – 3.4 14 4 2.3 9
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 0.5 2 1.4 6 7 1.6 6
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) – – 0.8 3 3 0.8 3
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) 1.3 5 0.7 3 2 0.7 3
Freedom Front (FF) 2.2 9 0.8 3 3 – –
Federal Alliance (FA) – – 0.5 2 2 – –
Minority Front (MF) – – 0.3 1 1 0.4 2
Afrikaner Unity Movement (AEB) – – 0.3 1 – – –
Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) – – 0.2 1 1 0.3 2
Keep It Straight and Simple (KISS) – – – – – 0.04 –
Socialist Party of Azania (SOPA) – – – – – 0.1 –
Nasionale Aksie (NA) – – – – – 0.1 –
Independent Democrats (ID) – – – – – 1.7 7
Peace and Justice Congress (PJC) – – – – – 0.1 –
Organisation Party (TOP) – – – – – 0.05 –
New Labour Party (NLP) – – – – – 0.09 –
United Front (UF) – – – – – 0.08 –
Employment Movement of South Africa (EMSA) – – – – – 0.07 –
Vryheidsfront Plus (VF Plus) – – – – – 0.9 4
Christian Democratic Party (CDP) – – – – – 0.1 –
(a) The table shows the percentage of votes and shares of seats obtained by the various parties in each...
The votes received by both the ANC and the combined opposition have fallen since 1994—votes for the ANC from 12.2m in 1994 to 10.9m in 2004, and the combined votes for other parties represented in parliament from 7.1m in 1994 to 4.5m in 2004. Opposition parties have therefore lost more ground than the ANC. However, between 1999 and 2004 the ANC gained 277,000 votes and the DA 404,000 votes, with the new Independent Democrats (ID) registering 270,000 votes (1.7% of the poll). Losers were the New National Party (NNP), the IFP and the United Democratic Movement (UDM). The DA consolidated its position as the main opposition party, obtaining 12.4% of the vote as against 9.6% in 1999. The IFP lost ground, polling 7% as against 8.6% in 1999, while the NNP (the successor to the National Party, which ruled South Africa for 46 years from 1948 until 1994) almost disappeared, its support falling from 6.9% in 1999 to 1.7%. The UDM's share of the vote slid to 2.3%, from 3.4% in the previous election, but the party still claimed nine seats.
For the first time the ANC was in control, either singly or as the major coalition partner, in all nine provinces. As expected, it easily retained the seven provinces that it had previously controlled, but emerged for the first time as the single strongest party in KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape. In KwaZulu-Natal the ANC won 38 of the 80 seats, but, with the support of the Minority Front (MF), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) and the UDM, was able to lead a coalition with 43 seats, as opposed to the 37 of the IFP-DA coalition. In the Western Cape the ANC won 19 seats but in coalition with the NNP was able to command 24 seats in the 42-seat legislature. The losers were the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal.
In 2003 South Africa introduced legislation to allow elected politicians to "floor-cross" to different parties during specified time windows. In a British-style political system such a concept is somewhat alien. The legislation clearly benefits the ANC. At municipal level the window opened in September 2004, close on the heels of the decision of the NNP leadership to, in effect, submit to ANC control. The Independent Electoral Commission reported that three-quarters of NNP local councillors had defected in September 2004, most of them to the ANC, leaving only 60 of the previous total of 351 still under the NNP label. In 2005 the period for floor-crossing at parliamentary and provincial-legislature level, September 1st-15th, predictably led to the ANC's gaining new representatives at the expense of the opposition parties. It also resulted in the establishment of a number of new parties, mostly motivated by personal ambition and with minimal chance of long-term survival. The DA was the main loser in the September exercise; ironically, it initially gave enthusiastic supported for the legislation. By contrast, the ANC has become even more impregnable as a result of the legislation, and gained 14 seats, bringing its total to 293 of the 400 seats (73%) in the National Assembly. The DA was hit particularly hard by the defection of three black members of parliament (MPs), which cut its black representation drastically and lends strength to ANC claims that the DA is a mainly white party in which blacks cannot be comfortable.
Floor-crossing is now widely criticised by opposition parties and analysts, who realise that it makes a mockery of the principle of proportional representation. The dominant party dispenses patronage and thereby gains members, while the smaller parties lose elected representatives and revenue under the funding formula. Given that the legislation stipulates that a minimum of 10% of a party's representatives have to cross the floor for their actions to be valid, larger parties—in effect, only the ANC—are protected at the expense of smaller ones. According to the legislation, floor-crossing is permitted only twice in an electoral term, in the second and fourth years after the election, from September 1st-15th. The next floor-crossing window is in 2007. However, the ANC could accede to opposition requests to abolish the floor-crossing mechanism in a bid to pre-empt defections and the formation of a new leftist party during the forthcoming floor-crossing period, or it could simply not activate the mechanism.
Parliamentary parties: impact of floor-crossing
Party Before After Net effect
African National Congress (ANC) 279 293 +14
Democratic Alliance (DA) 50 47 -3
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 28 23 -5
United Democratic Movement (UDM) 9 6 -3
Independent Democrats (ID) 7 5 -2
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 7 4 -3
New National Party (NNP)(a) 7 0 -7
National Democratic Convention (Nadeco) 0 4 +4
Freedom Front Plus (FF+) 4 4 0
United Christian Democratic Party (UCDP) 3 3 0
Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) 3 3 0
Minority Front (MF) 2 2 0
United Independent Front (UIF) 0 2 +2
Azanian People's Organisation (Azapo) 1 1 0
United Party of South Africa (UPSA)(b) 0 1 +1
Federation of Democrats (FD)(b) 0 1 +1
Progressive Independent Movement (PIM)(b) 0 1 +1
Total 400 400 –
(a) Disbanded in 2005. (b) Established in 2005.
Source: Parliamentary Monitoring Group.
Important recent events
April 1994: The African National Congress (ANC) wins a clear majority in the country's first fully democratic general election, the new National Assembly elects Nelson Mandela as president and the three-party Government of National Unity coalition is formed.
December 1997: The ANC congress elects Thabo Mbeki as head of the party, to replace Mr Mandela, and Jacob Zuma as deputy head.
June 1999: South Africa's second multiracial general election is won easily by the ANC. The Democratic Party (DP) becomes the official opposition. Mr Mbeki is sworn in as president and the coalition with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) is renewed.
June 2002: South Africa's parliament passes the controversial Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Bill. The government—backed by black economic empowerment (BEE) groups, trade unions and various left-wing political lobbies—regards the legislation as a key part of its transformation and BEE policies. The legislation is designed to ensure that "good-quality ore currently in the hands of the big mining houses passes into black hands" within a decade.
September 2003: Schabir Shaik, the former financial adviser to the deputy president, Mr Zuma, is charged with corruption. Although Mr Zuma is not charged directly, he is indirectly implicated in the charges. The police investigation is centred on whether Mr Zuma had solicited bribes from a French arms contractor, Thomson CSF (now called Thales), one of the main companies involved in a R43.8bn (US$7.2bn) arms deal in December 1999.
June 2004: Mr Mbeki's claim to be able to broker a resumption of talks between the Zimbabwean government of Robert Mugabe and the opposition fails to produce the desired results.
May 2005: A series of demonstrations and street protests over the failure of the local authorities to deliver housing and services hits South African cities and towns.
June 2005: Mr Mbeki dismisses Mr Zuma, the deputy president and front-runner for the top job, following a damning verdict in the fraud trial of Mr Shaik. Despite not having been on trial himself, Mr Zuma is found to have been in a "generally corrupt relationship" with Mr Shaik, and the head of the National Prosecuting Authority, Vusi Pikoli, announces that legal proceedings will be brought against him. The president appoints the minister of minerals and energy, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, as deputy president, succeeding Mr Zuma.
July 2005: Mr Zuma is reinstated as a member of various ANC committees, and continues to chair the national deployment committee, which makes key ANC appointments at all levels of government, the various legislatures and parastatals.
December 2005: The emergence of rape charges against Mr Zuma in late November forces the former vice-president to withdraw from the ANC's party structures (although he retains the vice-presidency of the party) for the duration of the trial. Mr Zuma is charged with raping the 31-year-old daughter of a family friend.
March 2006: The ANC gains 66% of the votes cast in the country's municipal elections, held on March 1st, while the opposition Democratic Alliance (DA) secures just 15%.
May 2006: Mr Zuma is acquitted of rape by the High Court and is reinstated to the position of deputy president of the ANC.
September 2006: Mr Zuma's trial on corruption charges collapses as the prosecutor's evidence is found to be inadmissible.
May 2007: The long-standing leader of the DP, Tony Leon, resigns and is replaced by Helen Zille, the mayor of Cape Town.
June 2007: A nationwide strike is staged by one million public sector workers, demanding a double-digit wage increase. The strike lasts over a month.
Mr Mbeki proposes the possibility of splitting the ANC leadership and national presidency into two separate positions at the ANC's policy conference, held in the same month.
July 2007: Mr Mbeki gave his clearest sign to date, at the ANC non-voting policy conference, that he would be willing to serve a third term as ANC leader (if nominated). He may prove hard to beat, but many in the party are opposed to having two centres of power.
International Relations and Defence
The all-race general election in 1994 represented not only a transformation of domestic politics but also a shift in South Africa's position internationally. At the regional level, co-operation is driven by Mr Mbeki's vision of an "African Renaissance". South Africa engages with its neighbours at the political and the commercial level, both bilaterally and as a member of regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, it has to tread a fine line. There are mixed feelings among businesspeople and politicians in Southern Africa about the country's dominant role. These range from hopes that the neighbourhood giant will spark off a regionwide recovery to fears that South Africa will steal a competitive march on the nascent industries of other countries.
At the political level South Africa has had to play a non-intrusive yet firm role to encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi, and, most recently, Zimbabwe. With the exception of Zimbabwe, solid progress towards lasting political settlements in these countries shows that African-led negotiations can help to solve African problems—a point that the president will continue to make a central principle of foreign policy. South Africa's "quiet diplomacy" approach to brokering an end to the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe has proved a failure, with nothing likely to change as long as its 83-year-old president, Robert Mugabe, hangs on to the reins of power. Increasing frustration internationally and within South Africa has led to calls for Mr Mbeki to take a bolder approach. However, there is also a strong reluctance to interfere in the political affairs of neighbouring countries within the SADC, which continues to back Mr Mbeki's mediation attempts. As a result, Mr Mbeki is unlikely to adopt a hardline policy towards Mr Mugabe.
The government won the approval of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) conference in Lusaka to present Mr Mbeki's Millennium Africa Plan (MAP) to the summit of the leaders of the world's eight leading industrialised nations (G8) in Genoa, Italy, in July 2001. Although driven forward by Mr Mbeki, the MAP was strongly supported by the presidents of Algeria and Nigeria. The MAP was then merged with the Omega Plan—which was put forward by the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade—and presented in Genoa. It was agreed there that a high-level liaison officer would be appointed to work with African leaders to develop an action plan to be presented to the G8 summit in Canada in 2002. The plan was renamed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (Nepad). It received overwhelming support at the 2002 G8 summit, at which the group detailed an Africa Plan of Action that commits G8 countries to assisting the promotion of Nepad.
Nepad argues that Africa needs to involve itself much more closely in the global economy. To do this it needs to implement a series of reforms, which will be supported by the G8 through a combination of external debt relief and improved trade access to the developed world. Increased financial aid is mentioned but deliberately downplayed to emphasise that the thinking behind the plan is that responsibility for the success of the plan lies with African leaders. The key reforms proposed by Nepad include:
the establishment of civil order and more democratic government;
the prevention and reduction of conflict throughout Sub-Saharan Africa;
greater respect for human rights;
increased investment in human resources through health and education;
policies aimed at diversifying African economies and boosting trade with the rest of the world;
measures to enable Africa to adopt new technologies; and
the combating of the range of diseases that afflict the continent, from AIDS to malaria.
Mr Mbeki has stressed, that although his goals may be ambitious, there is a strong moral obligation to push such ideas forward and strive to promote African development. Although many African governments may be recalcitrant, if some countries do adopt Nepad's prescriptions and start to grow rapidly, they will serve as trailblazers for others to follow. African countries could then act in mutual support, promoting African issues on the global agenda and engaging with other African leaders from a much stronger political and economic base. An encouraging development is that a number of countries have agreed to submit to Nepad's peer review process, which envisages the assessment of each government by a council of Africa's "wise men", including Chris Stals, a former governor of the South African Reserve Bank (the central bank). However, the peer review of South Africa (conducted in late 2006) proved particularly critical, and the report's publication was delayed by six months as the government put forward its objections; this gave rise to a perception that South Africa had rejected the peer review. The government strongly denied that it had rejected or delayed the report, but at the very least its grudging acceptance of the report has the potential to damage the credibility of the peer review process.
Since the end of apartheid, South Africa's armed forces, known as the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), consists of the forces of the old South African Defence Force (SADF), and the former members of the ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). The integration process began slowly and has led to some resentment among MK cadres. An estimated 35,000 members of MK and other South African resistance movements—as well as 11,500 members from former homeland forces—have been absorbed into the SANDF, of whom only about one-half remain. The SANDF has nevertheless undergone a substantial transformation since 1994, and 70% of its soldiers are now black (African, coloured and Indian). However, more than 60% of senior officers are white, and the apparent disorganisation of SANDF troops when they entered Lesotho in September 1998 was attributed to a lack of cohesion in the army. Although the services have received a controversial R30bn (US$3.6bn) new weapons package, they have warned that budget cuts may force the closure of three air force bases and that most of their units are at less than 50% readiness. The issue of HIV/AIDS in the army is also an increasing source of concern. Moreover, the overstretched SANDF forces are under pressure to support, with personnel on the ground, Mr Mbeki's desire to rely increasingly on African forces for peacekeeping on the continent.
Comparative military forces, 2006
South Africa Zimbabwe Nigeria Algeria(a)
Army 41,350 25,000 67,000 120,000
Air force 9,180 4,000 10,000 10,000
Navy 5,801 0 8,000 7,500
Total 62,331(a) 29,000 85,000 137,500
Paramilitary forces n/a 21,800 82,000 187,200
Defence spending (US$ bn) 3.3 0.1 0.8 3.0
(a) Includes 6,000 serving in military health service.
Source: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007.
-
20 Octobre 2008 à 12:18 dans
- zsandf (anglais)
