Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

It is clear to any military observer that the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) is in trouble.

There are enough good officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers to allow it to turn itself around. But that will require a clear decision on what is necessary, and the willpower to follow through.

First, we must focus on the primary function of the SANDF – to provide combat forces that can execute missions briskly and efficiently, with the absolute minimum of casualties. Everything else is secondary.

Second, we must bring back the fundamental principle of command. The Chief of the Army is the chief, in charge and responsible.

The officer commanding a battalion is in command, in charge and responsible. Such officers must be trusted, allowed and required to command, not regarded and treated as some sort of supermarket floor walker with no authority or discretion. If they fail, replace them.

Third, we must reinforce this by putting the administrators back into their proper place. Staff are there to support and assist commanders, not to control or command them.

Fourth, we must implement an absolutely ruthless focus on competence, integrity and discipline. Soldiers of any rank must be worthy of respect and trust.

Fifth, we must stop talking of “human resources”. We must talk and think of people. Soldiers are people. They have lives, concerns, peculiarities and preferences.

Sixth, we must focus more strongly on education and training, particularly field training for the SA Army, operational flying training for the SA Air Force, and operational sea training for the SA Navy. The supporting services and divisions must do the same, which will require some additional funding.

Seventh, we must optimise the SANDF for its operational functions, not to suit administrators.

The SA Army is already heading there. The SA Air Force could, with profit, look to group its units in operationally coherent wings.

The SA Navy, with a different set of needs, could revive the flotilla system.

Eighth, we must find a way to enable the SA Army to stand down some units to allow them two years to stabilise and train up to full operational standard. These can then be deployed, while others are stabilised and brought to operational standard. The dangerous, self-destructive habit of deploying ad hoc units must be broken.

Ninth, we must review our officer corps. We should establish a real military academy that educates and trains career officers; a university entrance system for those requiring a technical or other specialised education (the Military Health Service is already doing this); a bursary system that funds tertiary education after a short-service tour; and a direct entry system for graduates. We must also develop an attractive, medium-term service system.

Tenth, we must review our NCO corps. We must provide them with a proper career path, one that will give young NCOs frequent promotions without too much responsibility too soon, and senior NCOs real challenges worthy of their experience and maturity.

We must also develop a bursary and vocational training system to enable NCOs to find a second career if they leave the military.

Eleventh, we must review the Military Skills Development System. It is a good idea that has not been taken far enough.

The two-year system means that the military does not get enough real service in return for the training, while the soldiers do not receive enough vocational training to have a trade when they leave. A five-year system would allow a useful period of active service and full trade or career training.

Twelfth, we must find a place for soldiers who cannot or do not want to be promoted or cannot continue in the rank and file for reasons of age and fitness but do not want to leave.

The 13th point I wanted to emphasise is that the SANDF must insist that the government remembers it has a duty not to misuse it. An obvious issue is the “over-stretch” caused by operational deployments that exceed capacity.

It also has a duty not to abuse the military. Obvious issues are under-funding that makes proper training and maintenance impossible, and political pressure that interferes with appointments and promotions.

And finally, the SANDF must insist its design meets the government’s strategic demands

To base the SANDF’s strength and design on the budget the National Treasury might deign to disburse, and then demand more than it can safely deliver, is to set it up for strategic failure.

l Helmoed Römer Heitman is the southern African correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly.