Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

Defence BATTLE FOR FORCE READINESS When embarrassing details of the SA National Defence Force's (SANDF) operational unreadiness leaked into the press last month, the news was not so much in the facts as in the source and timing of the leak.

The declining operational capabilities of the SANDF have been documented for several years, as successive defence budgets have shown a consistent disproportion in spending on personnel and capital equipment over that of operational goods and services.

The fact that the latest disclosure emanated from the SANDF itself, at a time when it is looking to press its case for a larger slice of state revenue as government prepares to deliberate the 2006 budget, was largely lost in the hubbub from government over the leak of supposedly sensitive information.

Details of the SANDF's problems were contained in its annual combat readiness report which it submitted on a confidential basis to members of parliament's defence committee.

The report paints a worrying picture of a force plagued by staffing problems and a funding shortfall of about R5bn annually, forcing it to divert funds from training and equipment maintenance to operational expenses that are rising with its growing peacekeeping burden.

The relatively low state of readiness of the SANDF conventional capability continues at a level well below that envisaged by the Defence Review, the report states. In addition, it is still below that which is regarded as prudent under the current strategic situational demands placed on the SANDF. This can be ascribed mainly to continued under-funding and the extent of external commitments that are way above that envisaged by the Defence Review. When some details of the report appeared in Beeld the following week, defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota sought to allay public concern, saying: There is no possible threat to this country that we cannot respond to. But, when pressed by DA defence spokesman Rafeek Shah in parliament, Lekota admitted the force was struggling to maintain its core capability. Shah pointed out that vehicle repairs were at their lowest levels yet, military hospitals and defence buildings were in desperate need of renovation and defence infrastructure generally was in a parlous state.

Shah maintains that the annual payments for the multibillion-rand arms deal package about 30% of this year's R22,5bn defence budget are largely responsible for squeezing the operational budget.

He points also to the unexpected R409,5m that the defence department had to redirect from its budget to support government's initial payment of R763m for a share in development of the Airbus A400M transport aircraft. Quoting Lekota's own figures, Shah points out that most of this money was taken from the budgets of landward, air and naval defence, health services, special forces and research & development that was bound to weaken the SANDF's capacity.

Lekota, however, says the treasury department has undertaken to repay the defence department every cent we have spent, and will be taking over the payments by the end of this year.

But defence analyst Helmoed-Romer Heitman says the problem is not spending on capital equipment the SANDF has serious backlogs in this regard too but the steady decline in the operational budget in real terms since the 1990s.

The problem has been aggravated by an expanding regional security role, resulting in operational expenditure that is reimbursed late and often only partially, Heitman wrote in a recent Jane's Defence Weekly report. Lekota's recent announcement of the imminent return of SA peacekeepers from Burundi is unlikely to reduce the cost of peacekeeping. The 340-odd personnel who served as bodyguards to political leaders in the run-up to the Burundi peace agreement comprise just 10% of SA's current peacekeeping commitments in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and Eritrea. And, given the shortage of skilled personnel, many of those returning from Burundi are likely soon to be redeployed elsewhere.

The shortage of trained, healthy and fit soldiers is critical, says Heitman. Ideally, a national defence force should deploy about one in six troops to peacekeeping serving six months away and 30 months back home. SA is deploying one in three eligible troops, he says, which means that most spend little more than six months home before returning to duty abroad.

The army hasn't a single battalion that could become combat-ready in less than 12 months, Heitman says.

Having a relatively small army about 30000-strong with many personnel over-age and medically unfit for active service, means the SANDF is forced to make up units by drawing from several battalions an unsuitable form of troop management.

The situation is bad, but it is not irreversible, Heitman says; even the best armies are generally no more than 50% deployable.

The extent to which the SANDF can improve, though, will depend on the ability of military and government leaders to allocate sufficient resources, in the right areas, to enable the defence force to meet its national and regional commitments.