Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

POST-apartheid defence policy in SA developed in an open and consultative manner. But today the assumptions underlying the original debate and its openness have been eroded.

Shortly after the 1994 elections, the government of national unity began the development of the White Paper on Defence (completed in 1996) and the Defence Review (1998).

A large gap has developed between the outcome of the defence review process and the current situation (practice).

Many problems and obstacles were encountered in translating intention into reality. The first was that plans for the integration of the former soldiers of seven opposing armed forces and subsequent demobilisation of the excess numbers proved more difficult, drawn out and expensive than expected. A second is that continued high levels of violent crime require the ongoing deployment of about 3000 soldiers internally. Finally, SA's leadership position in conflict mitigation on the continent demands ever-increasing forces for peace support missions.

Today the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) serves as an important instrument of foreign policy to a degree unforeseen by government scant years ago. T he establishment of an African common defence and security policy, an African standby force and a regional defence pact, have also served to move SA away from self-defence.

The SANDF has about 3000 soldiers deployed in Africa with a demand for more. This brings the present SANDF deployment (nationally and elsewhere) to about 6000 men and women, most being infantry soldiers significantly more than envisioned by the Defence Review. To maintain these force levels requires at the very least three times as many mission-ready soldiers to allow for rotation, contingency reserves, training and force preparation, home duty and leave.

In short, there has been a steady and pragmatic shift away from the written policy as promulgated in the White Paper on Defence and the Defence Review. Arguably the gulf has become so wide as to render some sections of these core documents obsolete. A force design predicated on short logistic lines for highly mechanised mobile forces prepared to fight in defence of the territorial integrity of the country has given way to preparations for out-of-area force projection and support requirements in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and shortly Liberia.

The development of defence policy in the 1993-to-1998 era was transparent, consultative and inclusive; this is not the case today. The role played by the parliamentary defence committees and civil society during the development of the White Paper and Defence Review is much reduced.

The time has come for an open defence policy debate. It should recognise the high level of violent crime, regional instability, the spread of civil wars, the developing African peace and security mechanisms.

In the period after the 1994 elections the defence debate in SA was an open and consultative process. Unfortunately the same is not true today.

Le Roux is from the Institute for Security Studies.