A major fire incident occurred at the Island View Storage (IVS) on the night of September 18, 2007. Tragically, one person, Meshail Reddy, was reported missing and it has since been confirmed he was killed in the blaze. On behalf of council, I extend my sympathies to Reddy’s family.
May I begin by saying that throughout the night I was kept informed of the fire and there was no need to escalate the matter to a disaster level.
Our emergency and health teams performed incredibly well and must be congratulated for the outstanding work they did and continue to do.
It is important to explain how the incident was managed and what some of our initial observations are about how the matter was handled.
Operations of Emergency Services
The first call was received by the Emergency Communication Centre about 6.59.33pm. Response teams were dispatched immediately as is the unit’s protocol. The first responder was on site within 10 minutes. This initial dispatch turned out two rescue pumps, one foam carrier, one chemical unit and one control vehicle. A total of 24 vehicles/appliances; 13 officers; and 39 crew members were used during this incident.
By 7.18pm three storage tanks were alight and the pressure valves were venting. Back-up was called and a forward command post was set up, including the Emergency Communications Centre.
The incident commander identified the potential for further escalation and asked the SAPS and Metro Police to evacuate the immediate area adjacent to fire. An exclusion perimeter was erected and a vehicle staging area was designated in Iran Road. The wind speed and direction was noted as twenty (20) knots north easterly and the site information on chemicals highlighted the need to evacuate the residential area the smoke plume was moving towards.
The request to evacuate the residential area was made to the SANDF at 8.40pm at the forward control point.
The fire was fought from the north-west facing side involving two crews protecting tank 606 and cooling the burning tanks 604, 605, 616, and on the south-west side involving two crews protecting tanks 612, 611.
A joint operating centre was set up at Portnet offices including the Metro Fire, SAPS, Metro Police, EMRS, IVS, Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF), Harbour Master, Cutler MB, Portnet Fire and Disaster Management agencies. All chemical material safety data sheets and other technical information, sourced from the IVS representatives, informed strategic decisions made throughout the operations .
In terms of our fire services, the strategy adopted to deal with the incident involved extinguishing the *bund fire, protecting the unaffected tanks, extinguishing the base and manifold fires and cooling the shell of fully engulfed tanks allowing the product to burn off. The fire was finally confined to tanks 603, 604, 605, 615, 616.
Metro Water services were contacted at 9.37pm to boost the town’s main supply to maintain tank cooling.
The location and status of drain valves was not easily identified or accessible by personnel and the discharge of cooling water, foam, leaks, dumped fuel and uncontrolled fixed installations contributed to the filling up of the bund.
At 10.05pm the setting up of floating booms was called for by the forward control point as a precautionary measure after DWAF reported no contamination at this stage.
The inability of the site to drain exposed tanks necessitated the continued use of water to cool already venting tanks, which further contributed to the bund levels rising.
At 1.13am it became necessary to open disaster drains to reduce the bund levels. This was executed to ensure the safety of crews and prevent a total bund ignition. This was based on information that many of the spilled chemicals were water-soluble. The disaster drains did not provide for reasonably quick drainage of the high-flow rate of cooling water and foam, resulting in overflow into other tank bunds within the zone.
Additional Assistance
The Engen refinery offered assistance and made available one fire pump with three crew. The vehicle was used in the north-west sector.
Health Department
The Health Department was active throughout the incident, offering tactical support, as well as monitoring the levels of pollutants and forwarding this information to the joint operations centre. They conducted tests to determine the concentration of chemicals and health impacts on the community. Off-site they tested air quality and assisted in evacuating residents, using loudhailers.
The environmental effects are still being assessed, including water pollution in the harbour.
The health and safety of residents and workers is of primary importance and we are thankful that, except for the tragic case of Meshail Reddy, we have had no casualties. This is largely because our plan and the execution of it worked very well.
The professional way in which our emergency and health teams and their partners worked is testimony that our plan is in place and it works well.
We have learnt a lot already from this incident. For example, full details of what was contained on site were not immediately available. We are discussing this with Transnet. Dealing with the press was not properly structured. I had to field many calls late into the night when there should have been an easier process. These are some of the matters we will be taking up to ensure we operate more effectively.
Rumours
Unfortunately, in spite of communicating through radio with the public, many residents milled around spreading rumours.
We will be working on how we communicate with residents, to avoid panic and manage evacuation under instruction from the emergency teams. The safety and health of its community is the city’s priority and our plans have been developed with this in mind.
There are three levels of incident. The first are difficult emergencies (requiring operational plans to be implemented), the second are major emergencies (requiring tactical plans to be implemented) and the third are disasters (requiring strategic plans to be put into action).
Our response to this incident showed we have plans in place to deal with such incidents.
Specific plans are in place, which operate at different levels, to guide the actions of agencies responding to the incidents. These plans are based on principles derived through experience and research.
They are processes we follow depending on the circumstances. On one occasion a road may be used to evacuate people, on another it would be avoided.
In terms of communication, we continue to stress: Don’t keep calling the emergency line. Don’t listen to any unauthorised information. We work with facts.
The difficulty is that we must inform without unnecessarily alarming people when we issue warnings.
There is a fundamental distinction between an emergency and a disaster.
During an emergency it is important people stay at home and listen to their radios. If the incident escalates, we would use East Coast, Gagasi/ uKhozi to inform people.
o The bund or bund wall is a retaining wall designed to contain the contents of a storage tank in the event of a rupture or other emergency.