In the light of reports of a crisis looming in the navy, Helmoed Römer-Heitman examines the problems facing the SANDF
Bad news makes good news stories, and the SA National Defence Force has generated its share of those. Before examining some of the underlying critical problems, it is worth bearing in mind that there is good news.
While the defence force is undoubtedly in trouble, it still functions, and has performed extremely well under pressure.
The SA Air Force’s rescue of 14 000 people during the 2000 floods in Mozambique comes to mind.
In 2001, the SANDF deployed a battalion-strength protection force to Burundi with less than two weeks’ notice, and last year the army provided an ad hoc battalion with something like 72 hours’ notice for deployment to the Comores.
Both of these would be credible achievements for any defence force. For its part, the navy is bringing its new ships into service rather more smoothly than some other navies with similar projects.
The defence force is still functioning and able to respond to demanding challenges. The problem lies in the word “still”, because it faces severe problems that will prove catastrophic if they are not addressed soon, comprehensively and vigorously. Failing action, South Africa will have an entirely hollow defence force, with a veneer of capability that barely conceals an echoing emptiness.
The core problems all relate to personnel, because thoroughly trained and experienced people are the critical element of a defence force. Doctrines and tactics can be adapted to meet new challenges, and equipment can be acquired or upgraded. But there is no way to get around a lack of properly trained and experienced people.
The five critical problems that the defence force faces in that regard are normal peacetime personnel turnover, operational overstretch, severe under-funding, poor discipline and political pressure to achieve “representivity” at any cost.
First, the problems of peace. A strong economy causes retention problems for any defence force. Military service offers challenges, excitement and retirement benefits, but does not pay well, demands frequent moves and involves risk.
Most civilian careers pay better, offer a stable home life, and carry no risk. In times of peace, people join, serve for a time and move on. Pilots and technical personnel are the most difficult to retain, having very marketable skills.
These normal attrition factors have been aggravated first by the cuts following the end of the border war, which caused people to doubt their future in the services, and then by voluntary severance packages taken up by the very people the defence force needed. With them went critical expertise, experience and general institutional memory.
Secondly, the defence force suffers from considerable “overstretch”, with too many peace support commitments relative to deployable strength.
An ideal rotation would be six months every three years. A one-in-four rotation can be safely sustained for a while. If the operational tempo is any higher it begins to cause serious damage. Units cannot train up properly, individuals cannot attend promotion courses, equipment is not properly maintained and family life is badly disrupted.
The reality is that many soldiers are deployed for six months in 18, and some specialists for six months in 12. That is not sustainable. After a few years of carrying the load and watching others promoted past him – often those not competent or fit to be deployed – the soldier will leave the service, taking expertise and experience along with him.
Thirdly, the defence force is badly under-funded. The government has bought equipment for the air force and navy, and projects are in hand for the army. But it has not provided the funding for adequate training and maintenance.
Frequent and intensive training is essential if a defence force is to be effective. Army battalions and brigades must conduct manoeuvres, pilots must fly, ships must spend time at sea. That is the only way to become competent and to learn to work effectively with each other. The harder and more frequent the training, the easier the fighting, and the fewer the casualties.
The defence force does not train adequately. The reason is quite simple: too little money. The price of this is going to be paid in casualties.
In the interim, this is also causing people to leave, pilots because they do not get to fly enough, naval personnel because they are frustrated by being alongside, and not a few in all of the combat services because they do not intend to be deployed on missions for which they lack the training.
Too little money also means that the defence force does not maintain equipment and facilities properly, with the predictable results.
Fourthly, discipline has suffered. That is partly because many white, coloured and Indian officers and NCOs are reluctant to discipline black subordinates lest they be accused of racism, and partly because many black officers and NCOs are reluctant to do so because they are wary of the response and because they suspect they will not be supported by their superiors.
This is not just a case of sloppy saluting. On a recent visit to defence headquarters, I was trapped inside because no one was on duty at the security gate after 5.30pm.
Try to find another country where that could happen. At a practical level, sloppy discipline also results in sloppy training and poor maintenance. The final result will, once again, be casualties.
These four problems are not unique to South Africa, nor are they insurmountable.
l The common retention problems of peace can be addressed with a little determination and imagination.
l The “overstretch” problem by providing the funds to expand the army to a strength that matches its commitments.
l The under-funding by providing the funds to allow proper training and maintenance, which is readily affordable.
l The discipline issue needs only a clear decision to support officers and NCOs.
Then there is “representivity”. The problem here is not the concept that the defence force should broadly reflect the population. That is obvious. The problem lies in the attempt to achieve this quickly at the cost of competence. This article looks only at the impact on the officer corps, but the problems also apply throughout the defence force.
The first challenge came with the formation of the new National Defence Force. The primary problem was that few MK and Apla officers had training or experience relevant to a regular army, let alone an air force or navy. That demanded “affirmative action”, which envisaged giving preferential access to promotion courses to members with potential, and some “fast-tracking” through the normal career path, cutting a few corners where it was safe. It did not envisage appointing and promoting incompetents; nor was it envisaged as lasting for ever.
Unfortunately the combination of representivity and the affirmative action pro-cess has turned into a seemingly immortal monster that overrides rational thought.
That is primarily a result of political pressure. It is not what the service chiefs want; it is not what the late Joe Modise envisaged; nor is it what Defence Minister Mosiuoa Lekota wants. It is the result of politicians listening to the bleating of the incompetent, inept and lazy who see no other chance of advancement.
To quote from a 1999 interview with Lekota in Jane’s Defence Weekly: “The temptation to speed up promotion by fair means or foul must loom large. But I would hope that we will avoid that.
“To have someone placed in a command appointment who is not properly trained and qualified would be like putting people into an aircraft flown by a half-trained pilot. It would border on criminality to entrust the lives of men and women in a war situation or in a peacekeeping operation to under-qualified leadership.”
More recently Lekota has argued that the time for affirmative action has passed; but he was shouted down by the politicians and others.
This drive for representivity at any cost leads the defence force to shoot itself in both feet: the air force cannot select the best-suited pilots for fighter training, but must select the best-suited black pilots.
The army must have 40% female students in every course, regardless. The navy is under pressure to produce black captains of ships, regardless of whether they have the experience to do the job well.
The battlefield, the sea, and the laws of physics that govern flight are all relentless and unforgiving equal-opportunity killers. You foul up, you die. Regardless of gender and race. Experienced soldiers understand that, and they have two simple requirements of their officers: competence and integrity. They could not care less whether their officers are male or female, black or white or polka-dotted.
The choice is not between white officers and black officers. The choice is between those who have the competence and integrity to carry the president’s commission as officers, to be responsible for the lives of their subordinates, and those who do not. That should be an easy choice to make.
That will not result in a white officer corps. It will result in an officer corps that is both competent and representative.
l Helmoed Römer-Heitman is an independent defence analyst, and SA correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly and several other periodicals.