Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

EARLIER this year, peacekeepers from the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) serving in Sudan took part in the largest capitulation of our national forces since Tobruk 64 years ago. Thirty-two South African soldiers, deployed as part of Operation Cordite, were ambushed and disarmed by about 200 Sudanese militia. In return for their freedom, they negotiated the handover of four vehicles, 34 assault rifles, three machine-guns, several radios, their flak jackets, and thousands of rounds of ammunition. Not a shot was fired, and the South Africans drove away in one remaining vehicle, unscathed but disarmed.

While this constitutes a victory for the negotiating skills of the young lieutenant leading the group, this is little better than a disaster for the reputation of South African peacekeepers and an indictment of the conditions under which they have been expected to carry out their tasks.

The African Union Mission in Sudan (Amis) is the only external military force allowed in Darfur. Even though it is viewed as insufficient to contain the violence in the western Sudanese province, proposals to allow a larger, better-equipped United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, as proposed for September 2006, have not been implemented due to continued Sudanese government intransigence. Instead, the mandate of Amis has been extended until this month while diplomats try to find an acceptable solution.

Under UN Security Council resolution 1564 of September 2004, Sudan was given an ultimatum to accept the African Union (AU) force or face sanctions on their oil industry. The 7000-strong Amis was deployed to "closely and continuously monitor, liaise and co-ordinate ... at all levels" with the 10000-strong UN mission in Sudan charged with monitoring the January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Nairobi between the Khartoum government and the southern-based Sudanese People's Liberation Movement. Amis was also mandated to assist with securing the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of refugees.

The Status of Forces Agreement, a nonnegotiable requirement in multi-national operations such as Amis, within which the rules of engagement are embedded, has been concluded between the AU and the Sudanese government, regulating the conduct of the deployed force. The terms of this agreement explains why the SANDF troops were patrolling in soft-skinned vehicles without air cover, armour and heavy firepower, when relatively safe, armoured Casspirs remain lined up outside Pretoria with a place to go but no agreement to allow them to be deployed in Sudan.

The reason why there is not a tougher mandate -- and, indeed, why there is no UN agreement on what to do about Darfur despite the enormous and continuing loss of life in the province -- is simply that the UN Security Council cannot engineer a tougher consensus among its members.

As of the middle of this year, SA had almost 3500 peacekeepers on duty in Africa. These are made up 1518 (of a total of 2432) in Burundi on Operation Fibre where they have been since 2004, 1389 (of 16802) in Operation Mistral in the Congo, six in Operation Espresso as part of the 3845 military and civilian UN personnel monitoring the ceasefire between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 432 soldiers as part of Cordite, and the 74 assisting with security sector reform and the reintegration and training of forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo under Operation Teutonic. Until recently there were also 46 troops in the Ivory Coast bolstering President Mbeki's peace-brokering efforts.

There are a few basic principles that must be adhered to when deploying troops in the spectrum of peace missions, from war-fighting on one end to peace-building on the other. Peacekeepers have a mission to protect, as the leitmotif goes. Yet their first responsibility is to protect themselves. Preventing the humiliation that befell the South African forces in Darfur requires not putting them in harm's way without the means to protect themselves. If the military is going to be employed in support of a peace mission, it has to be given the tools and the mandate to do its job. If the political agreement does not allow this, then do not send them.

Second, effective use of military formations in peace-support operations also requires identification of decision points and ongoing assessment and reassessment of the changing military role at these junctures. Politicians and the public alike have to think beyond military tools in reacting to threats to stability and security. As former UN secre-tary-general Dag HammarskjA¶ld observed, "Peacekeeping is not for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it."

When the circumstances alter, the military's role and utility must be re-assessed. For example, the Burundi mission has shifted on the spectrum from peacekeeping to peacebuilding. It is unclear what the SANDF's role should be in this evolving context, and whether, indeed, it is best equipped of all government agencies to take the leading role.

It also demands understanding the military's role as the interface between government and civilian agencies. How might the military best contribute to stabilising the often anarchic nature of the situation wherein vested institutional, personal and political interests drive governments and nongovernmental bodies alike to operate in war-torn environments? And it also requires judging the most appropriate moment for the military's exit from operations.

Third, military deployments in support of political solutions are not, in themselves, an end state. In many postconflict environments there will be, almost by definition, little or no governance, infrastructure, functioning services including the provision of medical facilities, fuel supplies, sanitation, water, and electricity. Postconflict peacebuilding is a long-term process, demanding resources beyond the military and its capabilities, and is invariably as fraught as the politics and reconstruction needs of the country into which it is deployed. This explains why -- from Afghanistan to Burundi and Somalia to Congo -- external agents need always to prioritise their goals and set their sights low. Put differently, in complex processes of peacebuilding and state-building, there is a need to think small. Small is beautiful.

Putting young soldiers in harm's way to support political processes will always be a difficult decision. But adherence to these principles reduces the risks of failure, casualties and capitulation.