Can SANDF Meet Threat of Peace?
SA's transition to democracy meant, among other changes, adopting a new approach to defence. This process culminated in the 1996 White Paper and the Defence Review two years later. The White Paper's broad ambit made allowance for addressing the requirements for greater detail through the review to include "comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding", and represented the conclusion of the policy development process. Is it not time to review the Defence Review along with the underpinnings of the White Paper?
For the White Paper reflected the prevailing assumption in the mid-1990s that the new democratic era would ensure a period of peace, prosperity and stability. This would allow the defence budget to be significantly reduced to the benefit of social spending -- that butter would be bought instead of guns.
How would this be achieved? The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) would be downsized: a small regular force (core force) with a large reserve force for mobilisation in extremis. The army would also withdraw from internal operations (border control and co-operation with the police), helping to release forces to the envisaged but small contribution to African peace missions.
The constitution and the White Paper are quite unambiguous in defining the "primary" function of the SANDF as that of defending and protecting the state, its territorial integrity and its people. Generally interpreted to mean defence against an external military threat, this resulted in a spending concentration on conventional capabilities: hence the corvettes, Gripen fighters, submarines, and Hawk jet-trainers.
But this was at the expense of providing for peace-support operations, for which a combination of ground manoeuvrability, operational support over long distances, maritime and air transport, and a healthy dose of political will are required. The latter has been there in dollops. Hence peacekeeping occupies the centre stage of SANDF operations -- with missions in Sudan, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo -- and will probably continue to do so for at least the medium term.
Yet the Defence Review clearly states that participation in international peace support missions is a secondary function for the SANDF, and its design should be influenced mainly by its primary role, one which has to be reviewed constantly to keep it aligned with the perceived threat.
Moreover, the requirement to participate in peace support missions, be capable of dealing with a range of small-scale, short-term contingencies, co-operate with the police, assist other state departments, provide help during natural emergencies, etc, is more easily said than executed. At the heart of any force design is the necessity of deciding which league you want to play in -- and then fund at that level. There's no point in buying a luxury SUV if you can't afford to fill the tank or replace the tyres.
The emergence of an African collective security approach will also have an effect. The African Standby Force, one of the building blocks of the Common African Defence and Security Policy, is in turn based on five regional standby brigades. National commitments to the regional brigades will require planning, rotation of forces, multinational exercises and development of common doctrine. All this will take time, cost money and affect force designs.
The concept of a "nonthreatening posture" as a component of a policy supporting the continental approach of "confidence-building defence" will also influence the equipment inventory. Does the present inventory contain equipment appropriate to the threat faced, the need for joint operations with other African powers, and also sufficient for deterrence?
It was not envisaged in the mid-1990s that today SA would be deploying more than 3000 soldiers in Africa -- with the possibility that this could increase. Deployments of this magnitude are not easily sustained, particularly if the minimum international norms of a 1-in-4 rotation are applied: that to sustain 3000 troops you need another 12000 in the cycle, without allowance for unscheduled interventions, unplanned emergency assistance operations, sickness etc.
Moreover, the distances currently undertaken in peacekeeping operations make new demands on a force design that was influenced by a concept of mobile operations with relatively short lines of support, and geared to defending the territorial integrity of the country.
Finally, there is also a need to think about how the world has changed since 1996, and not just the African environment. Events of September 11 2001 and the 7/7 bombings in London last year have, inter alia, highlighted the threat of international terrorism. Moreover, Iraq and Afghanistan show how insurgencies have changed from the 1980s, from the two-dimensional (national/colonial government versus the insurgent) to exist today in three dimensions, where the insurgent faces a national government but with a range of multinational governmental and nongovernmental actors involved in the security and development effort. And the globalised, media-savvy nature of today's insurgencies contrasts with their bottom-up cellular organisational structure.
The former allows them unparalleled and virtually untrammelled access to sources of succour, recruits and advertising, while their operational structure provides security and assists in them replicating themselves and their actions without active leadership oversight. These lessons are sure to be learnt by insurgents worldwide. Thus domestic insurgencies have to be confronted internationally and in many dimensions with unprecedented demands for accurate intelligence, interoperability and flexibility, and cultural sensitivity and understanding.
With the SANDF, expectations continue to rise but the budget is not keeping pace. What is at issue here is not the costs of peace mission deployments, which are covered by additional treasury funding, but the cost of day-to-day maintenance of main equipment, infrastructure, training, administration, and force preparation. The concept of "needs-driven but cost-constrained" must be given greater clarity. Which enjoys priority, national expectations or the budget? It must be clearly understood what capacity can be provided at that level of funding.
The eight years that have elapsed since the compilation of the Defence Review have been a period of major change internationally and for SA and Africa. It is time to adapt to those changes and redesign for the future.
Rear Admiral Stead and Dr Mills are with the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation.
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31 Août 2006 à 17:42 dans
- zsandf (anglais)

