Mon séjour en Afrique du Sud (Cape Town)

Warning of 'downward spiral' in SA's military Peace role 'under threat' if staff crisis persists Sapa THE South African National Defence Force (SANDF) will have to solve staff problems before it can begin to address funding and operational shortfalls, a strategy document says.

A new version of the defence department's Human Resources Strategy 2010 was released recently in Parliament.

It said that unless drastic changes were made to personnel administration, staff costs would continue to gobble up more than half the military's budget. The force would continue on a downward spiral, less and less able to deploy peacekeepers in support of President Thabo Mbeki's ambitions for Africa.

"The strategy itself is based on the premise that it must provide solutions to solve the main (human resources) problem areas which, if not addressed, will lead to the deterioration of the (force's human resources) composition and thereby the inability of the (force) to execute its mission," the document said. It recommended a radical change in personnel policy. "This calls for a new employment ethos for uniformed personnel which is in line with international practice, discarding the inherited 'cradle-to-grave', stagnation-riddled and unproductive employment ethos in favour of a more flexible and developmental-focused way of serving," it said. The document said this would release more funds for operational commitments while also ensuring a regular throughput of well-qualified personnel.

Having completed a period of military duty, staff would be able to "assume meaningful occupations in the civilian sector".

The approach would also bring to life the "one force model" expounded in the defence white paper and defence review, to which the SANDF has thus far paid only lip service.

The "one force model" foresaw a SANDF with a small regular force and a large reserve component, which potentially allowed for a large military - when needed - at low cost.

At present the SANDF can deploy only about 3000 or 5% of its 59000 regulars and hardly any reservists on peace support missions. About that number are already deployed and government is keen to deploy more.

The document said this was partly because the defence employment model, called the flexible service system, had never been properly implemented, causing stagnation, low morale, low staff performance and serious disciplinary problems among the rank and file.

Within the regular force, more than 50% of privates and junior noncommissioned officers were between 30 and 60 years old. "Services, particularly the South African army, carry significant numbers of combat personnel whose effective deployment potential is restricted as a result of their age." Older personnel were generally reluctant to leave their properties unattended, were married and had family responsibilities and were less amenable to hard physical training.

The strategy also noted that the poor state of health in the SANDF had been a "strategic issue" since 1999.

"The deterioration of the (defence) personnel health status, primarily as a result of HIV/AIDS, constitutes the biggest single threat to the deployment potential and operational effectiveness of the SANDF, even over the long term or until such time as an HIV antidote/vaccine is found," the report said. It said as HIV prevalence was more prominent in the 25-29 age group - the age bracket that should provide the largest number of deployable personnel - the SANDF needed to compensate with a constant rapid throughput of young, fit and healthy personnel.

The new approach the document recommends draws on the experiences of several countries including the US, Britain and Germany.

In order to train better officers, it proposed adopting the US reserve officer training corps system under which the defence paid selected students to study at universities in exchange for a period of military service after graduation. Such a system would encourage volunteers to join the reserves, rejuvenate their leadership and supplement the SANDF's pool of expertise. Grants would be offered to high performing school leavers who wanted to qualify in disciplines that "will benefit the SANDF's advanced combat and technical domains". They would have to pass officer's selection and would have a specific Reserve Force service commitment.

Another suggestion was adopting a US-style "up or out" promotion system in which noncritical staff who failed to reach certain ranks by specified ages were automatically retrenched.

Except for university graduates, volunteers for military service would have to be matriculants between 18 and 22 years. The maximum age for privates in the regular and reserve forces would be 28 years, for staff sergeants and majors between 40 and 45 years while retirement age would be 55 years.

"To prevent stagnation, a 'tenure in rank' policy is in place that specifies the maximum term that can be served in each rank." Special provision was to be made for staff whose tenures were tied to functional ranks, for example professional health practitioners and pilots.

The document borrowed the German idea of preparing soldiers throughout their service for a return to civilian life.

"The framework should facilitate the redeployment of members whose tenure of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised." A defence redeployment agency would offer counselling, career advice, aptitude assessment and retraining. Where possible, this would include re-employment in the force or another state department.

Former soldiers would be encouraged to join the reserves, enjoying better pension benefits, a specified payment for every full year of service completed, payment for of all leave due, post-separation medical benefits, a one-off resettlement allowance and service bonuses.

Also to be introduced was an independent defence service commission or defence remuneration board, analogous to the UK's Armed Forces Pay Review Body, which makes periodic recommendations about service conditions.