The SA National Defence Force will have to solve its staff problems before it can begin to address its funding and operational shortfalls, a Department of Defence (DOD) strategy document says.
A new version of the DOD's Human Resources Strategy 2010 (HR2010) was recently released in Parliament.
Unless drastic changes were made to personnel administration, staff costs would continue to gobble up over half the military's annual budget. The SA National Defence Force (SANDF) would continue on a downward spiral, less and less able to deploy peacekeepers in support of President Thabo Mbeki's ambitions for Africa, according to the document.
"The strategy itself is based on the premise that it must provide solutions to solve the main HR (human resources) problem areas which, if not addressed, will lead to the deterioration of the DOD's HR composition and thereby the inability of the DOD to execute its mission," the document's anonymous writers said in an introductory paragraph.
They recommended a radical change in the DOD's personnel policy.
"This calls for a new employment ethos for uniformed personnel which is in line with international practice, discarding the inherited 'cradle-to-grave' stagnation-riddled and unproductive employment ethos in favour of a more flexible and developmental-focused way of serving..."
The writers said this would release more funds for operational commitments while also ensuring a regular throughput of well-qualified personnel.
Having completed a period of military duty, they would then be able to "assume meaningful occupations in the civilian sector".
The approach would also bring to life the "one-force model" expounded in the Defence White Paper and Defence Review, to which the DOD had thus far only paid lip service.
The "one-force model" foresaw a SANDF with a small regular force and a large reserve component, which potentially allowed for a large military -- when needed -- at low cost.
At present the SANDF can only deploy about 3000 of its 59,000 regulars (five percent), and hardly any reservists on peace support missions.
About that number are already deployed and the government is keen to deploy more.
The document explained this was in part because the DOD's employment model, called the flexible service system, had never been properly implemented, causing stagnation, low morale, low staff performance and serious disciplinary problems among the rank and file.
Within the regular force, over 50 percent of privates and junior non-commissioned officers were between 30 and 60 years old.
"Services, particularly the SA Army, carry significant numbers of combat personnel whose effective deployment potential is restricted as a result of their age."
Older personnel are generally reluctant to leave their properties unattended, are married and have family responsibilities and are less amenable to hard physical training.
HR2010 also noted that the poor state of health in the SANDF has been a "strategic issue" since 1999.
"The deterioration of the DOD's personnel health status, primarily as a result of HIV/Aids, constitutes the biggest single threat to the deployment potential and operational effectiveness of the SANDF, even over the long term or until such time as an HIV antidote/vaccine is found."
The report added that as HIV prevalence was more prominent in the 25 to 29 age group -- the age bracket that should provide the largest number of deployable personnel -- the SANDF needed to compensate by a constant rapid throughput of young, fit and healthy personnel.
The new approach the document recommends draws on the experiences of several other countries, including the USA, Britain and Germany.
In order to train better officers, it recommended the adoption of the US Reserve Officer Training Corps system. Under this system the DOD pays selected students to study at universities in exchange for a period of military service after graduation.
Such a system would encourage volunteers to join the reserves, rejuvenate the reserves' leadership and supplement the SANDF's pool of expertise.
Grants would be offered to high performing school leavers who want to be qualified in disciplines that "will benefit the SANDF's advanced combat and technical domains." They would have to pass officer's selection and will have a specific Reserve Force service commitment.
Another suggestion is adopting a US-style "up or out" promotion system where non-critical staff who fail to reach certain ranks by specified ages are automatically retrenched.
Except for university graduates, volunteers for military service would have to be matriculants between 18 and 22.
The maximum age for a private in the regular and reserve forces would be 28, for staff sergeants and majors between 40 and 45, and for retirement, 55.
"To prevent stagnation, a 'tenure in rank' policy is in place that specifies the maximum term that can be served in each rank."
Special provision is to be made for staff whose tenures are tied to functional ranks, for example professional health practitioners and pilots.
The document borrows the German idea of preparing soldiers throughout their period of service for their return to civilian life.
"The framework should facilitate the redeployment of members whose tenure of service expires or who can no longer be effectively utilised."
A DOD Redeployment Agency would offer a counselling, career advice, aptitude assessment and retraining. Where possible this would include re-employment in the DOD or another government department.
Former soldiers would also be encouraged to join the reserves and would also enjoy better pension benefits, a specified payment for every full year of service completed, payment of all leave due, post-separation medical benefits, a one-off resettlement allowance and service bonuses.
Also to be introduced is an independent "DOD Service Commission" or "Defence Remuneration Board", analogous to the Armed Forces Pay Review Body in the United Kingdom, which is mandated to make periodic recommendations to Parliament about service conditions.
"This is necessary in order to attract and retain scarce expertise, especially in view of the staffing requirements that the main equipment being acquired through the Strategic Defence Package will pose..." the document says.
While the writers do warn that HR2010 is not an implementation plan, the document makes it clear its success is critical for the success of the DOD and the SANDF as a whole.
"Most of the ways to achieve the stated goals will require significant effort and the will to execute. The success of this strategy is dependent on the support of all commanders and managers at all levels, as well as the support of stakeholders in civil society," it concludes.