The all-race general election in 1994 represented not just a transformation of domestic politics but a shift in South Africa’s position internationally. At the regional level, economic and political co-operation is driven by Mr Mbeki’s vision of an “African Renaissance”. South Africa actively engages with its African neighbours at both the political and commercial level, both bilaterally and as a member of regional bodies such as the African Union (AU; previously the Organisation of African Unity—OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). However, South Africa has to tread a fine line. There are mixed feelings among business people and politicians in Southern Africa about the country’s dominant role in the region. These range from hopes that the neighbourhood giant will spark off a region-wide recovery, to fears that South Africa will steal a competitive march on the nascent industries of other countries.
At a political level, South Africa has had to play a non-intrusive yet firm role to encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi, and, most recently, Zimbabwe. Although neither Burundi nor the DRC has yet found a lasting political settlement, South Africa’s efforts to date show that African-led negotiations can help to solve African problems—a point that the president will continue to make a central principle of foreign policy. Of these initiatives, the peace effort in Burundi is the more advanced: 600 South African peacekeeping troops are already in the country, and more are likely to be deployed. In June Mr Mbeki flew to Kinshasa to hold talks with the president of the DRC, Joseph Kabila, about establishing a transitional, power-sharing government.
New Partnership for Africa’s Development
The government won the approval of the OAU conference in Lusaka to present Mr Mbeki’s Millennium Africa Plan (MAP) to the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001. Although driven forward by Mr Mbeki, the MAP was strongly supported by the presidents of Algeria and Nigeria. The MAP was then merged with the Omega Plan—which was put forward by the Senegalese president, Abdoulaye Wade—and presented in Genoa. It was agreed there that a high-level liaison officer would be appointed to work with committed African leaders to develop a concrete plan of action to be presented to the G8 summit in Canada in 2002. The plan has been renamed the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (Nepad). It received overwhelming support at the G8 summit in 2002, where the group detailed an Africa Plan of Action that commits G8 countries to assisting the promotion of Nepad.
Nepad argues that Africa needs to involve itself much more closely in the global economy. To do this it needs to implement a series of reforms, which will be supported by the G8 through a combination of external debt relief and improved trade access to the developed world. Increased financial aid is mentioned, but is deliberately downplayed to emphasise that the thinking behind the plan is that responsibility for the success of the plan lies with African leaders. The key reforms proposed by Nepad include:
A central idea of the plan is that although none of the above is a new idea or concept, African governments should not think of them as being imposed by donor governments, but as the basic rules of the new global economy. Not surprisingly, scepticism about Nepad abounds, particularly of the idea that it will be driven forward by peer pressure centred on clearly agreed timetables and targets drawn up by African governments. The idea that this will encourage many older, and essentially autocratic, African leaders—such as the presidents of Gabon, Kenya, Togo and Zimbabwe—to implement reform is probably fanciful. However, that should not consign the plan to failure. Mr Mbeki has constantly stressed that, although his goals may be ambitious, there is still a strong moral obligation to push such ideas forward and strive to promote African development. Moreover, though many African governments may be recalcitrant, if some countries do adopt Nepad’s prescriptions and start to grow rapidly, they will serve as a trailblazer for others to follow. African countries could then act in mutual support of each other, promote African issues on the global agenda and talk to other African leaders from a much stronger political and economic base. Promoting Nepad will be an important part of South Africa’s foreign policy in the medium term.
Zimbabwe crisis remains a major problem
The political turmoil in Zimbabwe is a key foreign policy challenge for the ANC government as it continues to cast a shadow over the government’s attempts to attract foreign direct investment inflows to South Africa and to the region. Following the visit of the US president, George Bush, to South Africa in July, Mr Mbeki is under growing pressure to help force a solution to the ongoing political crisis in Zimbabwe. Both the South African president and his Nigerian counterpart, Olusegun Obasanjo, are keen to try and reach some sort of progress to end the political stalemate in the country prior to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meetings to be held in Abuja, Nigeria, in December. If no progress has been made by then, it is all too likely that the issue of Zimbabwe will end up dominating the summit, which is something that neither president would like to occur and which would also damage the credibility of Nepad. Nonetheless, worried that the lack of progress in Zimbabwe may lead the EU and US to withhold support for Nepad, they are keen for a breakthrough. If Mr Mbeki can convince the Zimbabwean president to at least retire his presidency of his party, the Zimbabwean African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), this could pave the way for talks between ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and the drawing up a new constitution—rather than a transfer of power—which both the MDC and ZANU-PF could claim represented a victory of sorts. Once a new constitution had been agreed (including safeguards for free and fair elections) and passed by parliament, which would require an agreement between the two parties, it would be possible to hold fresh parliamentary and presidential elections under the new constitution, perhaps by the beginning of 2004, although 2005 would seem a more realistic date.
South African National Defence Force
Since the end of apartheid the greatest challenge for South Africa’s armed forces has been the integration of former members of the ANC’s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). This began slowly and has generated some resentment among MK cadres. An estimated 35,000 members of MK and other South African resistance movements—as well as 11,500 members from former homeland forces—were to be absorbed into the South African National Defence Force (SANDF), but only 28,000 were taken in, of whom only about half remain. The SANDF has nevertheless undergone a substantial transformation since 1994, and 70% of its soldiers are now black (African, coloured and Indian). However, more than 60% of senior officers are white, and the apparent disorganisation of SANDF troops when they entered Lesotho in September 1998 was attributed to a lack of cohesion in the army. The task of the chief of defence staff, General Siphiwe Nyanda, who was appointed in 1998, has been to accelerate transformation, maintain professionalism and renew antiquated equipment, despite much-reduced defence budgets. Although the army has received a controversial R30bn (US$3.6bn) new weapons package, it has warned that budget cuts may force the closure of three air force bases, and that most of its units are at less than 50% readiness. The issue of HIV/AIDS in the army is also an increasing source of concern. Moreover, the overstrecthed SANDF forces have participated as part of the regional peacekeeping missions in DRC (1,400 soldiers plus 120 technical and support staff), Burundi (1,600 soldiers), and more recently, Liberia.
