SA National Defence Force A BATTLE FOR SURVIVAL Defence force starts a new recruitment and service system to tackle its manpower crisis The SA National Defence Force (SANDF) is locked in its biggest battle since the apartheid war - a battle for its own survival.
It is no exaggeration to say that if its battle plan - a new recruitment and service system that began tentatively this year - fails, our defence force could face functional collapse.
If that sounds melodramatic, consider the dire state of the ageing, unfit, unhealthy SA military - especially the army, which is nearly 1l times bigger than the air force, navy and health service combined, and makes up 45% of the full-time defence force.
The average age of a private, lance corporal and corporal - the arms, legs and guts of any army - is 33 years. It should be 24.
"No private should be older than 28, says SANDF director of human resource planning Brig Gen Dries de Wit. The problem lies not just with the lower ranks. At least 38% of the entire force has an unacceptable rank-to-age profile, he says. Not only are older soldiers less fit than their younger counterparts, but many have families and are unwilling to serve on peacekeeping missions or risk their lives in disaster relief work, currently the SANDF's prime functions.
Force reduction is a political hot potato. Natural attrition has brought the regular, or full-time force down to 75670 from a high of 101000 in 1995/1996 when the old SADF, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the African People's Liberation Army (Apla) and the four bantustan armies were combined. But the attrition rate is far too slow to solve the SANDF's dilemma. Also it is mainly younger soldiers who are leaving; the old ones stay for security of income. So the average age keeps rising.
Defence minister Mosiuoa Lekota and defence chief Gen Siphiwe Nyanda want to pare down the force to around 65000 regulars. But they also need to get rid of redundant troops - 15000-20000 of them. While they remain, keeping the personnel bill sky-high, the defence force can't afford to hire fresh recruits. And they can't simply dump the old soldiers, many of whom dedicated their lives to the anti-apartheid struggle. Most have no skills beyond the military, and if rendered jobless could turn to crime or add to the state's welfare burden. "We must be careful not to solve one problem and create another," says the head of parliament's joint standing committee on defence, Thandi Modise.
While the politicians have dithered the defence force's woes have worsened. But things may now be changing for the better, as we shall see further on.
A major problem is that MK and Apla combatants, who make up a large proportion of the redundant troops, spent up to 30 years or more in exile without pension plans. Their SANDF plans have not had time to accumulate enough capital for retirement.
But the logjam may have been broken. Last month parliament approved amendments to the Government Employees Pension Act and the Special Pension Act to give MK and Apla cadres the same retirement benefits as SADF soldiers. Why it has taken this long is anyone's guess. But once the bill is enacted, the laying off of redundant personnel is bound to gather pace.
"There are many people on standby, just waiting for it to be implemented so that they can go," Lekota says.
De Wit says the state pension fund has enough money to cover the expected surge in pensions, and the SANDF has an exit management system to control who leaves and when.
The challenge does not end there, though. Personnel costs consume a gigantic 53% of the defence budget, excluding special payments for strategic weapons. The 1998 Defence Review, which contains the force design and rationale for the SANDF, recommends a 40%:30%:30% split between personnel, operating costs and capital renewal.
"The force design proposed in the Defence Review is clearly not affordable, given the budget allocation to Defence," states a hard-hitting internal review of the personnel situation, Human Resource Strategy 2010, compiled by De Wit's staff.
There is also the health issue. Along with age, HIV/Aids and other diseases are driving up SANDF mortality. In 1996, when the armies amalgamated, 40% of all defence force deaths were due to medical causes. Now they account for 70%, says De Wit. In the year to August 2003, most deaths occurred among soldiers aged 26 to 39.
Racial representivity is also skewed. Nearly 90% of privates are black African while just 4% are white. Conversely, the "management" ranks - major, lieutenant colonel, colonel and brigadier general - are filled mostly by whites. The technical musterings - pilots, engineers and the like - are as heavily white-dominated, if not more so, than their private-sector equivalents.
When the corvette SAS Amatola sails into Simon's Town harbour on November 4, it will symbolise a new era for the defence force - the start of a hugely expensive strategic re-equipment that had been held back for decades by international sanctions and since then the budgetary constraints of a post-war society in need of social repair.
The Amatola will not be ready for service until 2005, after its computerised combat system is installed and functioning. But its presence here will be the first tangible manifestation of the R50bn strategic defence package. Over the next several years three more corvettes, three submarines, 52 jet fighters and 30 utility helicopters are due to replace the outdated and fatigued equipment currently in service. What use will it all be if there are not enough skilled people to fly, sail and maintain them? Or if there is not enough money for fuel with which to operate them? At last politicians and military planners have begun to act on the crisis. And there is a glimmer of hope that they will succeed. The key is an ingenious human resource strategy that may, over the next six or seven years, turn the SANDF back from the brink and begin restoring it to functional efficiency.
The "new service system concept" (see graphic) is a complete revision of the way the defence force recruits personnel and retains their service. The three-tier system came into effect in January and nearly 2100 volunteers have already begun two years of basic training and service under what is called the "military skills development system" (MSDS).
The aim is to raise this volunteer "call-up" to 7000 recruits a year as quickly as budgets allow, and eventually stabilise it at 10000 a year, says De Wit. Existing training facilities cannot at this stage cope with a 10000 intake.
Under the MSDS, every recruit must have a grade 12 (matric) qualification and be aged between 18 and 22. After the first year of training, a leadership component will be selected for training as officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The rest will complete their second year as ordinary troops. Thereafter, the intake will be split: some will remain as professional soldiers while the rest will pass out of the regular force and into the reserves. In this way the two components of the SANDF - the regular and reserve forces - will receive a constant intake of young, fit and trained soldiers.
The reserves have been depleted by inadequate funding and generally deteriorating morale over the past 10 years. There are now just over 16200 conventional reserves and 50500 commandos. The latter are being phased out and the personnel mostly absorbed into the conventional reserve.
Meanwhile, a 16-month-old project to revamp the conventional reserve - Project Phoenix - stepped up a gear this month. It has received funding to begin direct recruitment of 750 volunteers a year. They will receive basic training through a programme started last year to run combined reserve and regular force exercises.
Legislation is being prepared to ensure that reserves serve at least 30 days a year for at least five years. Companies may be unwilling to let their staff take time off for camps, especially since they are no longer compelled to give military leave. But De Wit says the SANDF may try to persuade government to set up an incentive framework to encourage private-sector participation.
MSDS recruits who prefer to remain in the regular force after their two years' training will be enlisted into the second tier, known as the "core service". Enlisted troops will not be allowed to stay in core service past the age of 28. They may go to the reserves and undergo vocational training before leaving the regular force. De Wit expects about 2500 of a 7000 intake to enter the reserves after basic training. Those who become officers or NCOs will stay in the core service up to the age of 45. Senior officers and those older than 45 who are eligible to remain in the regular force will enter the third tier, the "senior career system". This includes the ranks major up to general and in noncommissioned ranks, staff sergeant up to warrant officer. They will have to retire at 60, but may take early retirement from 51.
De Wit hopes the system will grow to full function by 2010. The aim is for the MSDS and core service elements each to comprise 40% of the regular defence force and the senior career system 20%.
Once that stage is reached, De Wit says, the SANDF could be saving up to R800m on its human resource budget, which is now R7,6bn. That is because it is cheaper to recruit youths and school-leavers under the MSDS than it is to retain older, higher-paid soldiers.
What could give the MSDS crucial political support beyond the military is a plan to use the system as a skills booster. De Wit hopes to register the MSDS as a form of learnership under the national qualification framework. It could also encourage school-leavers to sign up for military training.
"We are going to tell the private sector about our MSDS discharges," he says. "We'll tell them: if you're looking for staff, don't hire school-leavers; hire these people because they are more mature and have built up some life skills already." The MSDS, however, will not solve the skills crisis within the defence force. That is where a special foundation training course, conducted by state arms manufacturer Denel, comes in. Military recruiters scour mostly black schools for good students who fancy a career in the military. They enrol them in the foundation course where they undergo intensive bridging tuition in maths, science and other technical fields to enable them to go on to tertiary qualifications.
To give further impetus to this, the SANDF is forming a reserve officers training corps, on the American model, to improve the education level of its officers. Out of these initiatives, the military hopes, will come the black pilots, navigators, engineers and military leaders of the future defence force.
Dozens of trainee pilots are currently moving through military flying schools in Mpumalanga and the Western Cape. It will be a tight thing to have them ready in time for the new aircraft: it takes eight to 10 years to train a frontline fighter pilot. At 2 Squadron, near Louis Trichardt, in August last year, there were just 10 fighter pilots (only one of them black) for 36 Cheetah jets, though these mostly were hangar-bound because of fuel shortages.
The shortage of operational funding hurts personnel morale. Pilots want to fly, not kick their heels on the ground. The challenge for the SANDF is to keep its specialist staff. SA Airways, itself under staff pressure from dollar-and pound-paying international airlines, has hired away many military pilots, air traffic controllers and technicians over the years. De Wit hopes to establish a formal antipoaching agreement between the defence force and the airline.
The force is also putting together an incentive scheme for specialists such as pilots, navy combat officers and special force infantry. The first phase, an extra allowance, was introduced early this year. It is still too early to say how well it is working, he says.
The financial obstacles are daunting. "We have only two options," De Wit says. "We either get extra money or the SANDF must make capacity within its own ranks by speeding up the exit mechanism." The latter will be helped by the new pension equalisation scheme. There is also a plan to transfer about 3700 soldiers in the 35-40 age group to the police over the next 18 months. That will enable the defence force to take in nearly 5000 MSDS recruits, says De Wit.
Even then, the financial crunch is bound to intensify as the annual payments for the strategic weapons rise from R6,5bn to a peak of more than R7bn in the next three years. Thereafter the payments will diminish, which should free more cash for operations, recruitment and training. Of course, further large capital acquisitions - such as new-generation armoured cars and transport aircraft - loom in the future.
Defence chiefs are already lobbying the treasury and cabinet not to cut the defence budget as strategic weapons payments decline.