As the strongest economy on the continent, South Africa is in a position to help with stopping conflicts.
But the army, air force and navy spread too thinly over Africa and need more resources South Africa is to become militarily involved in Liberia. But can we afford this?
The president's office announced on August 13 that SA "will send troops" to Liberia to help stabilise the situation there.
This will be in addition to the troops already deployed in Burundi (1 359 and due to expand) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1 393).
There are also elements supporting the EU Interim Emergency Force in the Ituri region of the DRC and some military observers with the United Nations and African Union missions in Eritrea and Ethiopia.
The president has also been reported as saying that SA will make additional troops available for operations
in the DRC if that is requested. It is clear that SA's regional security role is expanding quickly.
Anyone who is not wildly optimistic will understand that this is not a temporary thing. Africa has several current and looming conflicts to work through, and none of them will be quick or easy.
This raises three issues:
l Should SA be taking such an active part in regional security?
l Can SA's armed forces take on the additional responsibilities?
l How can SA best contribute to regional security operations?
The rationale
There is no doubt that SA must play a regional security role and that it must bear a share of the burden that is commensurate with its economic strength.
That is a responsibility that comes with having the largest economy - by far - on the continent, and it is in SA's self interest to do so.
It is in our interest because we need large-scale foreign capital investment if we are to expand our economy sufficiently to counter unemployment.
SA also needs regional neighbours with growing economies to whom it can export. Hence our country needs a stable region and continent if it is to meet its own economic goals, and must therefore do its best to help deal with the continent's conflicts and instability.
President Thabo Mbeki made his view quite clear at Davos in January 2001, when he set as the first precondition for what was then still the Millennium Africa Project, "creating peace, security and stability, and democratic governance, without which it would be impossible to engage in meaningful economic activity".
There is also the issue of credibility.
SA has taken a leading role with regard to Nepad and as a vocal representative of Africa on the international stage. But SA will not be taken as seriously as it should, as General Siphiwe Nyanda has put it, "if we are not willing to be serious about security in our region".
If one wants to be a player, one must pay the dues.
The real question, then, is whether the SANDF can take on its expanding regional role effectively. The answer at the moment must be no.
This is not a snide attack on transformation. It is an assessment based on current strength, equipment and organisation.
There is no question that the SANDF can handle its immediate commitments - to the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and to the UN Mission in the DRC (MONUC) for a time. But there is equally no question that the SANDF will not be able to sustain those deployments for any length of time or take on any other extended large-scale mission.
The key weaknesses in the SANDF are readily visible:
The army does not have enough troops to take on more missions, and does not have an adequate airborne force for an effective rapid deployment, let alone one requiring what other's term "forcible entry".
The air force does not have enough airlift capacity for the rapid deployment of a credible force, to sustain it, and, should it become necessary, to briskly extract it.
Pending the delivery of new Gripen fighter jets, it also lacks fighters suited to a distant deployment to support ground forces in a peace-enforcement mission or to interdict aerial smuggling of weapons.
The navy does not have enough sealift capacity to deploy the equipment of a credible force and, pending the delivery of new patrol corvettes, does not have enough combat vessels to interdict seaborne weapons deliveries and to support operations in coastal areas.
The SANDF as such also lacks proper deployable headquarters, although that is being addressed.
The key issue in respect of the army is the rotation of troops. One cannot deploy troops and just leave them.
They have to come back for training and they have to have time to spend time with their families. That is why armed forces generally try to limit deployments to six months in every 30 or, at worst, in every 36 months.
An army lives and dies - literally - by its training.
Soldiers, units and formations must train frequently, regularly and thoroughly if an army is to be effective.
Any slippage in the training programme will sooner or later result in body bags. Peacekeeping and even peace-enforcement operations bring valuable experience, but cannot replace that training.
The SANDF's present rotation of six months in 24 or even 18 months is not sustainable - it will destroy the training programme and it will cause soldiers to leave the army in order to have a family life. Other armies have been down this road, there is no need for the SANDF to experience it for itself.
Taking a different perspective, the current average deployment among countries that are active in peace support operations is 4% of the total strength of their forces at any one time. At the SANDF's present uniformed strength of about 55 000, that would be 2 200 troops.
The present deployment of 2 752 personnel for the two main missions is already 25% over that international average, and the force in Burundi is still to be expanded, and the Liberian deployment is yet to come.
At present South Africa is letting its enthusiasm outrun its capacity.
What then of South Africa's future regional security role?
SA will have to put troops on the ground and at risk in regional security operations if it is to be taken seriously in its leadership role.
One cannot preach regional defence and security co-operation and leave the others to deploy all of the troops needed. Future army deployments in Africa are, therefore, a given.
Taking a pragmatic view, SA should be able to sustain the deployment of at least a small brigade (about 4 000 troops) or two battalion groups (about 3 000 troops) for an extended period, and still have the ability to respond effectively to a sudden but short-term crisis.
Assuming a conservative one-in-six troop rotation programme, that translates into about 26 000 combat troops and, at the SANDF's ratios, another 26 000 or so in supporting functions and in the individual training programmes (basic training, promotion courses, etc).
That means an army of about 50 000, not the present 34 000 and shrinking.
Looking beyond that requirement, SA should seek to play to its strengths and focus its efforts on those things it can do better than its African partners.
With Africa's biggest and only real industrialised economy, SA's strength will lie in providing capabilities that the poorer and less industrialised countries cannot afford or cannot support: Airborne forces, inter-theatre airlift and sealift, combat helicopters, fighters capable of independent operation, patrol aircraft, and warships able to patrol for extended periods.
SA is the only country south of the Sahara that can sustain an effective capability in those categories.
What does that mean in more specific terms?
The SANDF must accelerate the formation of deployable headquarters.
The army needs more infantry.
The army needs to recreate its airborne brigade and acquire some vehicles and other heavy equipment that are air-transportable in South African aircraft.
The air force needs to acquire additional medium-heavy transport aircraft.
The air force needs to cancel plans to dispose of some of its Oryx helicopters.
The air force needs to accelerate the process of bringing the Rooivalk into service, and should acquire additional aircraft.
The air force needs to acquire maritime patrol aircraft and, ideally, some surveillance aircraft for overland surveillance missions.
The navy needs to accelerate the acquisition of its multi-purpose hulls, the ships that will replace the strike craft and the mine-sweepers, to ensure that it has vessels suited to inshore operations to complement the patrol corvettes.
The navy needs to acquire at least two ships on which helicopters can land, to be able to deploy, support and sustain a force during a crisis response operation.
Is this at all feasible?
It is, but not with a defence budget of only 1.5% of GDP.
There is a general international view that a developing country at peace can reasonably spend some 2% of GDP on defence.
SA is a developing country and is at peace. But Africa is not at peace and South Africa cannot afford to stand by and watch it deteriorate.
Two percent - which is less than many people pay for their car and household insurance - of GDP would be a small price to pay for investing in long-term stability and the economic growth that only stability can make possible.
The average for Sub-Saharan Africa in 2001 was 3.4%.
Dropping all of the countries that were at war at the time, the average is 2.08%. North of the Sahara, the average was 3.56%, not counting Algeria which is at war.
Once SA demonstrates the willingness to develop the muscle to go with the words, it is likely that there will also be a willingness by the major powers to assist it in acquiring the necessary equipment in an affordable way. Alternatively, of course, SA can look away and pretend that it is not part of Africa and that all of this unseemly brawling is really not its concern.
But that would be the end of South Africa's ability to influence events and its ability to influence the international view of Africa. - Independent Foreign Service
Helmoed Romer Heitman is a military analyst and correspondent of Jane's Defence Weekly in Cape Town.
